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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation compares three of the leading theories on wage and promotion dynamics, 
tournament theory, job assignment theory, and signaling theory, via their predictions on the 
impact of promotion on employees’ turnover behavior. In the first chapter entitled “Theory on 
Promotion and Turnover”, I incorporate turnover into all three theories through an employer-
employee specific match factor and generate three predictions from each theory. The first two 
are similar among the theories and the third distinguishes among them. Specifically, all the 
theories predict that promotions are positively correlated with wage levels and that performance 
ratings are positively related to the probability of promotion. Regarding promotion and turnover 
dynamics, the tournament model predicts that promotion is negatively related to turnover, while 
the job assignment model predicts that neither promotion nor the wage is related to turnover. 
Further, under certain conditions, the signaling model predicts that promotion is positively 
related to turnover and that the wage is negatively related to turnover controlling for promotions. 
In the second chapter entitled “Theoretical Extensions on Promotion and Turnover,” I further 
extend both tournament and job assignment theories by adding firm specific human capital. 
These extensions enrich the predictions of both theories regarding promotion and turnover 
dynamics. Specifically, the further extended tournament theory predicts that promotion is 
negatively correlated with turnover while the wage is negatively correlated with turnover 
controlling for promotions. On the other hand, the further extended job assignment theory 
predicts that promotion is positively correlated with turnover while the wage is negatively 
correlated with turnover given promotions. In the third chapter of my dissertation entitled 
 “Evidence on Promotion and Turnover,” I test these predictions using a dataset on employees 
from a single firm in the financial services industry in the U.S. I first show that tournament 
theory better captures the promotion-turnover dynamics in the full sample. I then conduct further 
tests by breaking up the sample into a high level subsample and a low level subsample. I find 
that tournament theory better explains the promotion-turnover dynamics in higher level jobs, 
while both signaling theory and job assignment theory with firm specific human capital better 
explain the dynamics in lower level jobs. I interpret this finding as evidence consistent with both 
an incentive argument related to Rosen (1982) and Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) and the 
hybrid approach discussed in Waldman (2013). 
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CHAPTER 1 
THEORY ON PROMOTION AND TURNOVER 
1. Introduction 
Theory on promotion inside firms identifies three distinct roles of promotions, which are to 
reward previous performance, to assign workers to tasks, and to signal a worker’s ability to 
outside firms. Three leading theories of wage and promotion dynamics, tournament theory, job 
assignment theory, and signaling theory, each models promotion with a focus on one of the three 
roles. Specifically, tournament theory sees promotion as an incentive device, job assignment 
theory treats promotion as a labor allocation device, whereas signaling theory sees promotion as 
a signal of ability. This paper aims to investigate how these three roles of promotions affect 
workers’ turnover decisions differently by comparing the predictions of these three theories for 
promotion and turnover dynamics. 
Because none of the theories originally incorporated turnover, I start my analysis with the 
introduction of turnover into all the theories by assuming there is an employer-employee specific 
match factor that enters workers’ utility functions as a disutility of effort. Moreover, there is 
asymmetric learning about match qualities so that the realization of each match is only 
observable to the worker. Because the asymmetric learning assumption suggests that firms are 
unable to identify the quality of matches, workers with sufficiently poor matches do not get fully 
compensated and eventually change employers. 
With turnover integrated in this way, each theory generates three predictions. The first two 
predictions are similar between the three theories. The third distinguishes among them. 
Specifically, all three theories predict that promotions are positively related to wages, and that 
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output is positively related to the probability of promotion. As for the third prediction, 
tournament theory predicts that promotion is negatively related to turnover, job assignment 
theory predicts that promotion is not related to turnover, while signaling theory predicts that 
promotion is positively related to turnover under certain conditions. 
To understand these predictions note that wage increases upon promotion in the job 
assignment model and signaling model are driven by wage offers from outside firms, while those 
in the tournament model are designed to induce efficient effort and turnover. As a result, there is 
rent extraction in both the job assignment and the signaling models regarding a worker’s 
potential good matches but not in the tournament model. These differences explain the different 
predictions between the models. 
Because the market wage is independent of a worker’s job assignment in the tournament 
model while there is a large wage increase at promotion, there is a negative relationship between 
promotion and turnover according to tournament theory. In addition, because there is symmetric 
learning of abilities in the job assignment model while asymmetric learning of abilities in the 
signaling model, the amount of rent extracted is independent of job assignment in the former 
model while it increases with the distance between a worker’s realized ability and expected 
ability in the latter model. Because turnover is determined by the amount of rent extracted in 
both the job assignment and the signaling models, the job assignment model predicts that 
promotion has no relationship with turnover. In addition, when the average difference between 
the realized and expected abilities of the promoted workers is lower than that of the non-
promoted workers, the signaling model predicts that promotion is positively related to turnover. 
The contribution of this chapter is that I extend the tournament, the job assignment, and the 
signaling theories by incorporating turnover and derive novel and testable predictions from each 
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theory. In addition, because each theory makes a different prediction regarding promotion and 
turnover dynamics, I am able to test which theory best matches the data. In a later chapter, 
“Evidence on Promotion and Turnover”, I test these predictions using data from a U.S. financial 
services firm. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 offers a brief literature review. Section 3 
develops the theories and testable implications. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, I review tournament, job assignment, and signaling theories as well as related 
empirical literature, with a special emphasis on promotion and turnover. Given the vast number 
of studies in related fields, I restrict my attention to the most important papers. 
2.1. Literature on Tournament Theory 
Tournament theory, developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981), proposed a payment scheme 
based on the rank order of workers’ outputs. In their basic setting, a firm hires two identical 
workers where each worker’s output depends on both effort and a stochastic term. At the 
beginning of the game, the firm sets a high wage for the worker who ends up with the higher 
output and a low wage for the worker who ends up with the lower output. The workers then 
choose their effort levels accordingly to maximize expected utilities. One of the key insights 
from Lazear and Rosen’s study is that, by appropriately choosing the wage spread, firms can 
induce efficient effort levels even when effort itself cannot be observed. 
A number of studies extend Lazear and Rosen’s model to take into account more complex and 
realistic issues. These studies include but are not limited to Rosen’s (1986) model of multi-round 
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tournaments, Lazear’s (1989) model of sabotage and wage compression, and Meyer’s (1992) 
model of multi-stage tournaments with the possibility of biased tournament contests.1 The 
aforementioned studies each generates testable predictions. For example, Lazear and Rosen’s 
(1981) analysis predicts that promotions are associated with large wage increases. Also, it 
predicts that the size of wage increases associated with a promotion is positively related to the 
size of the pool from which the promoted worker is drawn. Moreover, Rosen (1986) predicts the 
existence of a convex wage structure in multi-round tournaments, where the wage increases 
associated with promotions are greater at higher job levels.2 
Each of the predictions above is well supported by empirical studies. For example, Murphy 
(1985), Lazear (1992), Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b), and McCue (1996) find 
that promotions are associated with large wage increases. Moreover, O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal 
(1988) find that the size of wage increases associated with promotions is positively related to the 
size of the pool from which the promoted worker is drawn. Further, Lambert, Larcker, and 
Weigelt (1993), Eriksson (1999), and Bognanno (2001) find evidence consistent with the convex 
wage structure. However, there is currently no existing tournament literature, theoretical or 
empirical, that focuses on turnover.3 
                                                 
1
 Other papers building on Lazear and Rosen (1981) include but are not limited to Malcomson (1984), 
O’Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984), Garvey and Swan (1992), and Drago and Garvey (1998). 
2
 See Rosen (1986), Prendergast (1999), and Waldman (2013) for more details on the convex wage 
structure prediction. 
3
 See Lazear and Oyer (2012) and Waldman (2013) for more discussion of the empirical evidence on 
tournament theory. 
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2.2. Literature on Promotion and Job Assignment 
The job assignment theory of Gibbons and Waldman (1999) integrates three principle 
elements of the literature on wage and promotion dynamics, namely, job assignment, on the job 
human capital acquisition, and symmetric learning. In their basic setup, workers have either high 
or low innate ability. Each worker lives for multiple periods and the proportion of high ability 
workers is public information. In each period, there are three types of jobs, the productivities of 
which depend on both abilities and a stochastic term. Additionally, the return to ability increases 
with job level. There is incomplete information regarding ability in the sense that neither firms 
nor the worker in question directly observe it throughout the game. Lastly, Gibbons and 
Waldman (1999) assume symmetric learning of ability in the sense that all participants of the 
game are equally informed about it at any point in time through observations of output. As a 
result, in each period, firms allocate workers to the jobs that maximize expected profits, while 
each worker chooses a wage offer to accept to maximize expected utility. In equilibrium, each 
worker is paid according to her expected productivity and is promoted to a higher level job if her 
perceived ability is above a certain cutoff point. In a closely related study, Gibbons and 
Waldman (2006) further enrich this job assignment theory by incorporating schooling and the 
acquisition of task specific human capital.4 
Similar to tournament theory, job assignment theory also generates rich empirical predictions, 
including a positive relationship between promotions and wage increases, serial correlation 
                                                 
4
 Related literature on job assignment includes Sattinger (1975), Rosen (1982), and Waldman (1984a); 
that on human capital acquisition includes Becker (1962), Kahn and Huberman (1988), and Prendergast 
(1993); and that on symmetric learning includes Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and Farber and Gibbons 
(1996). Papers that build on the study of Gibbons and Waldman (1999) include Lluis (2005) and Ghosh 
(2007). 
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between wage increases, and that workers who receive large wage increases earlier at one job 
level are promoted faster to the next. Further, each prediction listed above is supported by a 
number of empirical studies. For example, empirical studies mentioned in the tournament section 
find evidence consistent with the positive relationship between promotions and wage increases. 
Moreover, corresponding to the second prediction, Baker, Gibbs, Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b), 
Lillard and Weiss (1979), and Hause (1980) find that wage increases are serially correlated. 
Finally, in support of the third prediction, Rosenbaum (1984), Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 
(1994a, 1994b), and Podolny and Baron (1997) find that workers who receive wage increases 
earlier at one level of the job ladder are promoted faster to the next.5 As is the case with the 
tournament literature, there is currently no existing job assignment literature, theoretical or 
empirical, that focuses on turnover, except for Ghosh (2007) which I discuss in more detail in the 
following subsection. 
2.3. Literature on Asymmetric Learning and Signaling 
The idea of asymmetric learning and promotion as a signal of ability was first proposed by 
Waldman (1984). The asymmetric learning idea, which first appeared in Waldman (1984) and 
Greenwald (1986), is the idea that each worker’s current employer accrues more accurate 
information regarding the worker’s ability than outside firms. Because of the existence of 
asymmetric learning, Waldman (1984) argues that outside firms may use promotion as a signal 
of each worker’s ability. Two of the key conclusions of the signaling theory are, there are large 
wage increases upon promotion and the probability of promotion is below the efficient level. 
                                                 
5
 See Waldman (2012) for a more complete discussion of the predictions and relevant empirical studies. 
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Following the signaling idea of Waldman (1984), Bernhardt (1995) studies how the 
composition of a worker's skills and the non observability of a worker's ability affect wage and 
promotion paths. Similar to the findings of Waldman (1984), Bernhardt (1995) finds that there is 
inefficient promotion due to employers’ exploitation of their private knowledge of an able 
worker’s ability. In addition, Bernhardt provides explanations for fast track promotion plans and 
other empirical regularities. 6 
There are several empirical studies that have found consistent evidence with the signaling role 
of promotion. For example, Belzil and Bognanno (2010) find that past speed of promotion is 
negatively related to current promotion probabilities, which is consistent with the signaling 
perspective of past promotions. As another example, DeVaro and Waldman (2012) study how 
the signaling role of promotion interacts with education using the Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 
(1994a, 1994b) dataset which is also the dataset I employ. This paper finds consistent evidence 
of the signaling role of promotion. Specifically, signaling is important for understanding the 
differences between promotion practices concerning bachelor’s and master’s degree holders.7 
2.4. Match Literature on Turnover 
To incorporate turnover into tournament, job assignment, and signaling theories, I follow the 
insights of the match literature on turnover. Match theory concerning labor market turnover can 
be mainly divided into two categories. Papers in the first category model a match as a “pure 
search good” (e.g., Burdett, 1978; Mortensen, 1978). That is, a match dissolves because of the 
arrival of new information on alternative potential matches. Papers in the second category, in 
                                                 
6
 See also Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) and Ghosh and Waldman (2010) for related analyses. 
7
 See also Okamuar (2011) and Bognanno and Melero (2012) for other recent papers that have found 
empirical evidence consistent with the signaling role of promotions. 
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contrast, treat a match as an “experience good”. That is, the only way to determine the quality of 
a match is to form and “experience” it. Despite the differences in the details of the matching 
procedure, each type of model captures several well documented empirical findings, such as the 
negative relationship between turnover and seniority.8 
A classic model that falls into the second category is Jovanovic (1979). In this study, 
Jovanovic assumes that matches follow a non-degenerate distribution and enters into workers’ 
productivity functions. There is imperfect information and symmetric learning on match qualities 
on both sides of the market in the sense that workers’ outputs are instantaneously observed by 
both workers and firms. In equilibrium, wages are determined by the expected marginal 
productivities conditional on all the information available at that time and a worker switches 
employers if her revealed productivity at the current firm is relatively low. The two stylized facts 
Jovanovic (1979) captures are the positive relationship between wage and tenure and the 
negative relationship between separation probability and tenure. 
Novos (1995), Ghosh (2007), and Peterson (2011) adopt an alternative approach of modeling 
match as an “experience good”. Different from Jovanovic (1979), Novos and the others enter 
match into a worker’s utility function as a disutility of effort. For example, Novos builds a model 
with match introduced as disutility of effort to study the interactions between labor market 
imperfections and the scope of the firm. He finds that firms offer wider ranges of jobs than the 
first best outcome when facing adverse selection and uncertain preferences from the labor 
market. Meanwhile, Peterson (2011) uses this match structure to study employee bonding and 
turnover efficiency. 
                                                 
8
 A partial list of the empirical studies that support both types of models include Parsons (1977), Mincer 
and Jovanovic (1982), and Topel and Ward (1992). 
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Of these papers the one closest to mine is Ghosh (2007), which develops a theory 
incorporating turnover into a job assignment framework. Ghosh’s theory explains several well 
documented empirical findings, such as the negative relationship between tenure and turnover 
and the serial correlation in wage increases. It is worth noting that, even though both Ghosh’s 
(2007) model and my job assignment model incorporate match as disutility of effort, the 
empirical phenomena we attempt to explain are quite different. For example, when it comes to 
turnover, Ghosh’s model aims to capture the negative relationship between turnover and 
seniority, while mine seeks to investigate the impact of promotion on turnover.9 
3. Models and Testable Implications 
This section enriches the tournament model, the job assignment model, and the signaling 
model with labor turnover and derives three testable implications from each of them. 
3.1. Extension of the Tournament Model 
My tournament model extends the classic one-period model of Lazear and Rosen (1981). For 
the purpose of studying how promotion affects a worker’s subsequent turnover behavior, in my 
extension I consider a two-period model along the lines of Waldman (2003). Additionally, for 
tractability reasons, I introduce turnover into the model following Novos’ approach instead of 
                                                 
9
 It is worth noting that Ghosh’s (2007) model could be used to derive the prediction that promotion has 
no impact on turnover. However, this prediction was not explicitly derived or discussed in his paper.  
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Jovanovic’s. That is, the model generates turnover through an employer-employee specific match 
factor that enters workers’ utility functions as disutility of effort.10 
3.1.1. The Model 
There is a pool of ex-ante homogeneous workers, where each worker lives for two periods 
and the number of workers is denoted by . There are multiple firms in the market, where the 
number of firms is denoted by . Moreover, the numbers of workers and firms satisfy the 
relationship  > 2. Assume each firm runs one tournament in the first period, where each 
tournament consists of two workers.11 In addition, each firm can choose to hire more workers in 
the second period. Further, assume there is a single job in each period, the production of which 
depends both on workers’ effort levels and a stochastic term. Specifically, worker  in period  
produces 	
 =  + 	
 + 	
, where 	
 ∈ [0,+∞) denotes worker ’s effort choice in period  and 
	
 denotes a stochastic term that is distributed independently	across time and individuals with 
                                                 
10
 I adopt Novos’ approach instead of Jovanovic’s because it is more tractable in terms of the extension of 
the job assignment model. To understand why, recall that Jovanovic enters matches into workers’ 
production functions and allows symmetric learning of the matches among all participants of the game via 
observing workers’ outputs. However, in the job assignment model, there is also symmetric learning of 
abilities through observing output. Because both of these learning procedures take place through 
observing employee output, Jovanovic’s way of modeling turnover complicates the job assignment model 
by making it hard to disentangle these two learning procedures. To keep the extensions of the tournament 
and the job assignment models as similar and tractable as possible, I adopt Novos’ approach for all of the 
models’ extensions. Moreover, my conjecture is that the choice between these two approaches should 
have no impact on each model’s predictions. 
11
 For simplicity, assume that a firm has to hire either two workers or no worker at all in the first period. 
Thus, the employment dynamics in period 1 is the following. Each firm makes a wage offer. Workers 
then apply. If no worker or only one worker applies, the firm retracts the offer and makes a new offer. If 
more than two workers apply, because of the homogeneity assumption, the firm randomly chooses two 
workers from the applicants. This matching procedure continues until all workers are employed. Because 
of the assumption that  > 2, there is no unemployment in equilibrium. On the other hand, there are 
 − 2 number of firms with zero employment in equilibrium. As a final note, one can generalize this 
assumption to allow each firm to run multiple tournaments. However, such a generalization would have 
little impact on the predictions of the model. 
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mean zero and variance .12 Moreover, let , ) and , ) denote the cumulative 
distribution function and density function of 	
, and assume that  satisfies the monotone 
likelihood ratio property (MLRP) and the convexity of distribution function condition (CDFC).13 
Assume further that effort 	
 is associated with disutility of effort 	
), where  ′ ≥ 0,	" > 0, 
!0) = 0, and 0) = 0. 
For each worker , there is a match factor "	 following a uniform distribution on the interval 
[−#, #], where # > 0. Moreover, let %") ≡ '( denote the density function of the uniform 
distribution. Assume that # is large enough so that there is strictly positive turnover in 
equilibrium. Further, assume the match factor is both firm and worker specific in the sense that a 
worker who switches employers is assigned a new match factor that is independent of the 
previous draw. Also, each match factor enters the worker’s utility function as disutility of effort, 
i.e., worker ’s total disutility of effort is given by )	
) = "	 + 	
). Moreover, assume there 
is asymmetric learning of match qualities in the sense that the realization of a match is only 
observable to the worker. As a result of this asymmetric learning assumption, firms are unable to 
distinguish good matches from bad matches. Therefore, workers with sufficiently bad matches 
do not get fully compensated for the matches and leave eventually. Finally, I assume both 
workers and firms are risk neutral, the price of output is normalized to 1, and there is a zero 
discount rate. 
                                                 
12
 The term  is a strictly positive constant. This assumption ensures that wages in equilibrium are strictly 
positive. 
13
 Note that the MLRP and CDFC properties guarantee the validity of the first order approach in solving 
the maximization problem. To ensure MLRP holds, I assume **+ 
,+,-)
+,-)) ≥ 0, where -, ) =
*
*- , ). Likewise, to ensure CDFC holds, I assume , . + 1 − .)!) ≤ ., ) + 1 −.), !), where . ∈ [0,1]. See Rogerson (1985) for a more detailed discussion of the first order 
approach. 
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Now consider the timing of the game. There are two periods in the game where each period 
contains five stages. In period 1.1, each firm announces the first period wage 12 and the second 
period wages 13 and 143, where 13 and 143 are promised to the winner and the loser of the 
tournament, respectively. In period 1.2, each worker chooses a firm to apply to, while each firm 
hires either two or none of the applicants.14 In period 1.3, each worker chooses a first period 
effort to maximize her expected lifetime utility. In period 1.4, nature assigns a match factor "	 to 
each worker  which is the worker’s match quality with the current firm. Finally, at the end of 
period 1, each worker privately learns her match quality, while each firm observes workers’ 
outputs, makes the promotion decision, and pays the first period wage 12. 
                                                 
14
 See footnote 11 for details. 
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 In period 2.1, current firms offer second period wages, while outside firms simultaneously 
make market wage offers. In period 2.2, firms make wage offers. Each worker, on the other 
hand, chooses a wage to accept and makes her turnover decision based on the match she 
observes and the wages she is offered. In period 2.3, each worker chooses a second period effort 
level to maximize her expected utility in period 2. In period 2.4, nature assigns a new match 
factor to each worker who switched employers, which is independent of the previous draw. 
Lastly, at the end of period 2, workers who switched employers receive the market wage 15, 
• Each firm 
announces a first 
period wage 12 and 
second period wages 
13 and 143 .  
 
• Workers apply.  
• Each firm hires either two 
workers or no worker. 
• The matching procedure 
continues until all workers 
are hired. 
 
• Each worker 
chooses 	' to 
maximize 67	. 
 
• Nature assigns 
a match factor "	 
to worker . 
• Each worker  learns "	. 
• Firms observe 	'. 
• First period employers 
make promotion 
decisions and pay 12.  
 
1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5 t=1 
Figure 1.Timing of the Tournament Model, Period 1 
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those who stayed and ended up with the higher output earn the high wage 13, and those who 
stayed and ended up with the lower output earn the low wage 143.15  
3.1.2. Analysis 
In this subsection I focus on the symmetric perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game. 
Note that a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, where each 
player’s strategy specifies optimal actions given the player’s beliefs and the other players’ 
actions, and beliefs are consistent with Bayes Rule. By symmetric here I mean I restrict the focus 
to equilibria in which each worker in a tournament chooses the same effort level. 
Let us first consider the second period problem. Because period 2 is the last period of 
production, each worker is free of future career concerns and thus chooses the lowest effort level 
                                                 
15
 For tractability reasons, I assume no worker gets the high wage if the high output worker leaves. This 
assumption seems reasonable since the role of the high wage is to induce first period effort for the firm’s 
first period employees. See Waldman (2003) for a related discussion. 
Figure 2. Timing of the Tournament Model, Period 2 
• Current firms offer 
13 and 143. 
• Outside firms offer 
15.  
 
• Each worker  
chooses a wage to 
accept and makes her 
turnover decision. 
• Each worker  
chooses 	 to 
maximize 67	. 
• Nature assigns 
new match factors 
to each worker 
who left. 
• Workers who left receive 
15. 
• Workers who stayed and 
produced the higher output 
receive 13. 
• Workers who stayed and 
produced the lower output 
receive 143.  
 
2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.5 t=2 
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possible, which, in this model, equals zero. Due to the fact that outside firms are only willing to 
pay a worker her expected second period productivity, the equilibrium market wage in period 2 
must equal . 
We now consider the first period problem. In period 1, each worker chooses an effort level to 
maximize her expected utility given the wage offers and her rival’s choice of effort. That is, 
given the other worker’s effort level, a worker’s effort choice follows the best response which is 
a function of wages. Because of competition at the initial stage of hiring, on the other hand, firms 
choose wages to maximize workers’ expected utilities subject to a zero profit constraint, and the 
constraint from each worker’s best response function.16 We can first write down each worker ’s 
expected utility function. Let 67	 and 	' denote worker ’s expected lifetime utility and first 
period effort choice. 67	 is given by the following expression. 
67	 = 12 + 89	' > :';<8"	 < 13 −15)13 + [1 − 8"	 < 13 −15)]15> + ?1 −
89	' > :';@<8"	 < 143 −15)143 + [1 − 8"	 < 143 −15)]15> − 6["	 + 	')] −
<89	' > :'; A B%B)CB + ?1 − 89	' > :';@ A B%B)CB>DEFGDHG(
DFGDH
G(   
This expression says that worker ’s expected lifetime utility equals the summation of the 
expected wages from the two periods net of the associated  expected costs of effort. Note that the 
expected second period wages depend both on workers’ promotion probabilities and their 
probabilities of staying conditional on the wage they earn, where the probability of staying is 
determined by a comparison of the wages of staying and leaving with the associated disutilities 
                                                 
16
 Papers that use a similar approach include but are not limited to Stiglitz (1975), Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976), and Ghosh and Waldman (2010). 
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of staying and leaving. As a result, promoted workers are less likely to change employers if the 
wage they earn is higher than that of non-promoted workers. 
I now analyze the cost part of the utility function. Recall that the total cost of effort in each 
period equals the summation of a worker’s match quality and the disutility of effort. Therefore, 
in period 1, because the expected match quality of young workers equals zero, the expected total 
cost equals the disutility of first period effort. In period 2, because workers exert zero effort in 
equilibrium, the total cost equals the expectation of match qualities. Therefore, the expected total 
cost for the workers who switched employers equals zero, while that for the workers who stayed 
is calculated by taking the expectation of match qualities over the range of values where workers 
stay conditional on the wages. 
After the analysis of workers’ expected utilities, we now switch to a firm’s profit function. 
Define I	 ≡ 8"	 < 1I −15) as each worker ’s probability of staying conditional on the 
wages 13 and 143. A firm’s expected profit from a tournament can be expressed as the 
following. 
6J = 6	'	) + K89yM' > yN';3	 + ?1 − 89yM' > yN';@43: O6		) + 69:'; + K89yN' > yM';3: +
?1 − 89yN' > yM';@43: O69:; − <89yM' > yN';3	 + 89yN' > yM';3:>13 − K?1 − 89yM' >
yN';@43	 + ?1 − 89yN' > yM';@43: O143 −12 −12  
The expression above captures that each firm’s expected profit equals the summation of the 
two workers’ expected productivities over the two periods minus the expected wages. It is worth 
noting that a firm’s second period profit depends on both the probability of promotion and the 
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probability of workers staying, because it only receives the output and incurs the wage if a 
worker stays.17 
Based on the utility function and the profit function, we can set up the maximization problem 
that describes the equilibrium tournament. 
max67	  
<12,13 ,143 , 	'>  
s. t.			6J = 0  
	' ∈ argmax	67	, given 12, 13, 143, and :' 
<	' ≥ 0>  
One can also view the firms’ problem from an efficiency standpoint. To see how, let us first 
characterize the efficient effort level and turnover rates for the promoted and non-promoted 
workers, denoted by 'X, 83X and 843X , respectively. We know that an effort level is efficient if it 
equates the marginal cost of effort to its marginal revenue. Because of the assumption that the 
output price is normalized to 1, 'X must satisfy !'X) = 1 for efficiency. As for the efficient 
turnover rate, recall that turnover is efficient if a worker leaves whenever her current match is 
worse than the expected match with another potential employer. Given that the expectation of the 
new value for the match factor " when a worker leaves is zero, for efficiency, 83X and 843X  must 
satisfy the conditions 83X = 843X = 8X = 8" > 0) = '.18 
                                                 
17
 Note that the profit function does not explicitly show the potential profits from external hiring in period 
2. The reason is that, when hiring from the outside, firms pay each worker the exact amount of her 
expected output and hence make zero expected profits from such hires. 
18
 One can introduce an employer switching cost to adjust the equilibrium turnover rate to be closer to that 
in reality. 
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Now I describe the firms’ problem in terms of efficiency. First note that the first period wage 
12 serves to meet firms’ zero profit conditions, whereas the second period wages 13 and 143 
simultaneously serve two roles. First, they determine the equilibrium turnover rates for promoted 
and non-promoted workers, respectively. Second, as is also true in Lazear and Rosen (1981), the 
wage spread between the two acts as an incentive to elicit positive first period effort. 
Consequently, the double duty of the second period wages creates a tension between the turnover 
rates and the effort level in equilibrium. That is, the larger the wage spread, the higher the level 
of effort it induces, yet the more likely the firm retains ill matched workers from the promoted 
pool and loses well matched workers from the non-promoted pool. Therefore, from an efficiency 
standpoint, in equilibrium, firms choose wages that minimize the summation of these three types 
of inefficiencies, namely, the insufficient first period effort, the inefficiently low turnover of 
promoted workers, and the inefficiently high turnover of non-promoted workers. 
Below let '∗ and ∗ denote the equilibrium first period and second period efforts, while 83∗ 
and 843∗  denote the equilibrium turnover rates for promoted and non-promoted workers. 
Moreover, let 13∗ and 143∗  denote the equilibrium wage offers to the workers who are and are 
not promoted, 15∗  denote the equilibrium market wage, and W[∗ denote the equilibrium first 
period wage offered to the young workers. The previous analysis is summarized in Proposition 
1.1. 
Proposition 1.1: 
i) In period 1, the equilibrium effort level '∗ is below the efficient level, i.e., '∗ < 'X, and the 
equilibrium first period wage is below the expected productivity of the young workers, i.e., 
12∗ <  + '∗. 
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ii) In period 2, the equilibrium effort level ∗ satisfies ∗ = 0 and the market wage 15∗  satisfies 
15∗ = . The equilibrium wages offered to promoted and non-promoted workers satisfy 
13∗ >  > 143∗ . Moreover, |13∗ − | = |143∗ − |. 
iii) The equilibrium turnover rates of promoted and non-promoted workers satisfy 83∗ < 8X <
843∗ . 
Proposition 1.1 explicitly lays out the result of the firm’s problem of inefficiency 
minimization. Specifically, the double duty of the second period wages results in insufficient 
first period effort, inadequate turnover of promoted workers, and excessive turnover of non-
promoted workers in equilibrium. In addition, Proposition 1.1 says that each worker’s first period 
wage is below her expected productivity in that period. The intuition here is that firms offer 
higher promotion wages to the promoted workers, and the promoted workers are more likely to 
stay. As a result, each firm makes strictly negative expected second period profit from each 
worker. Therefore, to satisfy the zero profit condition, firms offer the young workers a wage that 
is strictly below their expected productivity in the first period.19 
3.1.3. Testable Implications 
I develop three testable implications from Proposition 1.1. 
Corollary 1.1:  13∗ > 143∗ . Promotions are positively related to wage levels (Test 1). 
Corollary 1.1 follows directly from Proposition 1.1, part ii). It is worth noting that this 
positive relationship holds even after controlling for output levels. That is to say, among the 
workers with the same output, those that are promoted earn higher wages. To understand why, 
                                                 
19
 See Appendix 1 for a complete proof of Proposition 1.1. 
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consider the case in which there are two tournaments, where the promoted worker in the first 
tournament and the non-promoted worker in the second tournament produce the same level of 
output. From part ii) of Proposition 1.1, we know that the first worker earns the high wage 13∗, 
while the second worker earns the low wage 143∗  despite the fact that they produce the same 
output. As a result, given output fixed, tournament theory predicts that wages are higher with 
promotions than without. 
Along the lines of the previous argument, conditional on whether a worker is promoted, 
output is not correlated with wages. The reason is that, in the model, workers with the same job 
assignment always earn the same wage regardless of output. Using performance ratings as a 
proxy for output levels in the dataset I use for the empirical analysis in the third chapter of my 
dissertation, the argument above translates into the following testable implication. Promotions 
are positively related to wages with or without controlling for performance ratings, while 
performance ratings are not related to wages controlling for promotions. 
Corollary 1.2: Across the economy, workers with higher output levels are more likely to be 
promoted (Test 2). 
Although I describe it as a prediction, Corollary 1.2 is in a sense more like an inherent 
assumption of the tournament model. Because promotions in tournaments are purely based on 
the rank order of workers’ outputs, all else equal, the higher the output, the more likely a worker 
gets promoted. With performance ratings as a proxy for output levels, Corollary 1.2 translates 
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into the testable implication that performance ratings are positively related to the probability of 
promotion.20 
Corollary 1.3: 83∗ < 843∗ . Promoted workers have strictly lower turnover rates than non-promoted 
workers (Test 3). 
Following Proposition 1.1, part iii), Corollary 1.3 says that promotion is negatively related to 
turnover. The intuition behind this result is that the benefit from staying for promoted workers is 
higher than that for non-promoted workers because the former earn higher wages by staying and 
the market wage is independent of whether the worker is promoted or not. On the other hand, 
both types of workers have the same expected cost of staying. This is because their match 
qualities are drawn from the same distribution. Consequently, non-promoted workers are more 
likely to leave due to the fact that their costs of staying are more likely to outweigh the 
associated benefits.21 
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 Performance ratings might be related to various factors such as schooling or experience, and in that 
sense may not be an unbiased measure of output. However, DeVaro and Waldman (2012) argue that 
performance ratings in the dataset I use in the empirical study largely reflect absolute performance. 
21
 Besides Corollaries 1.1-1.3, one can also derive from the tournament model that a worker with a worse 
match quality is weakly more likely to quit. The reason is that in the tournament model, turnover rates are 
characterized by a step function. Specifically, when match qualities fall in the interval [−#,143∗ −15∗], 
workers never quit regardless of the job assignment. On the other hand, when match qualities fall in the 
interval (143∗ −15∗ ,13∗ −15∗], workers quit if they lose in a tournament, which happens with a 
probability of '. Finally, when match qualities fall in the interval (13∗ −15∗ , #], workers always quit. As 
a result, a worker’s quitting behavior follows a step function. That is, as match qualities get worse, 
probabilities of switching employers only weakly increase. However, we cannot test this implication 
because of the fact that match qualities are unobservable in the dataset. 
 22 
 
3.2. Extension of the Job Assignment Model 
This subsection extends the symmetric learning model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999) by 
incorporating turnover. Similar to my approach with tournament theory, I introduce turnover into 
the job assignment model following Novos’ approach. To ensure different roles of promotions 
are the main driving force of any differences in the predictions of the three theories, I keep my 
assumptions on the match factor exactly the same as those in the tournament model. 
3.2.1. The Model 
There are two types of workers and each worker lives for two periods, where each firm hires 
,  > 0, workers. A worker’s innate ability, denoted by ]	, is either high or low, ]	 ∈ <]^ , ]_>, 
and the proportion of high ability workers, denoted by ` ∈ 0,1), is common knowledge. On the 
firm’s side, there are two types of jobs in each period, denoted jobs 1 and 2. The productivity of 
worker  at job a in period  is given by 	:
 = C: + b:9]	 + 	:
;, where 	:
 denotes a stochastic 
term that follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance c, i.e.,  	:
~e0, c). 
Assume that C' > C > 0 and  b > b' > 0, i.e., job 2 is more sensitive to ability. 
Moreover, assume there is incomplete information concerning ability on both sides of the 
market, in the sense that neither firms nor the worker in question directly observes ability 
through the entire game. Further, I assume symmetric learning of abilities. That is, at any point in 
time, all participants in the game are equally informed about each worker’s ability through 
observing outputs. Furthermore, assumptions on the match factor remain exactly the same as in 
the tournament model. Specifically, for each worker, there is a match factor "	, which follows a 
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uniform distribution on the interval [−#, #], where # > 0.22 The match factor is both firm and 
worker specific, in the sense that a worker who switches employers is assigned a new match that 
is independent of the previous draw. Further, I assume asymmetric learning of the match factor, 
in the sense that the realization of a match is only observable to the worker. As discussed in the 
tournament section, because firms are unable to tell good matches from bad ones, a worker with 
a sufficiently bad match is not fully compensated for it and leaves.  
In addition, I assume there is an employer switching cost, denoted by f, which is constant 
across firms and workers. In order for there to be strictly positive equilibrium turnover, I restrict 
f to be in the interval 0, #). As a result, it is efficient for a worker to leave when the disutility 
from her match with the current firm is higher than the employer switching cost.23 Finally, I 
assume both workers and firms are ex-ante homogeneous and risk neutral, and there is free entry 
into the market as well as a zero discount rate. 
The timing of the game is the following. At the beginning of each period, firms 
simultaneously make wage offers based on workers’ expected productivities. Each worker then 
chooses the wage offer that maximized her expected utility and makes her turnover decision 
based on the match quality. At the beginning of period 2 when there are multiple firms tied at the 
highest expected utility, I assume the worker randomly picks a wage offer to accept unless one of 
these came from the worker’s previous employer, in which case the worker chooses to stay with 
that firm. 
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 Note that I keep the uniform distribution assumption on the match factor for calculation convenience. 
One can easily generalize it to any continuous distribution with zero mean, as long as the distribution is 
the same across the individuals and is independent of workers’ abilities. Such a generalization would have 
no effect on the predictions of the model. 
23
 The role of the employer switching cost is to adjust the equilibrium turnover rate to better match the 
turnover rate in the real world. 
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Specifically, at the beginning of period 1, each firm makes a wage offer 12 to the young 
workers, while each worker picks the highest wage offer to accept. During period 1, nature 
assigns a match factor to each worker, which is drawn from the uniform distribution defined 
previously. At the end of period 1, all firms (and the worker in question) simultaneously observe 
each worker’s first period output and update their beliefs concerning the worker’s ability. 
Meanwhile, workers observe the realizations of the matches and get paid the first period wage. 
At the beginning of the second period, each worker ’s current employer offers her a job and a 
second period wage, denoted by 1	, while outside firms offer her a market wage, denoted by 
1	5, based on their updated beliefs on the worker’s expected ability, denoted by ]	-.24 Each 
worker then makes her turnover decision based on the comparison of the cost and benefit from 
                                                 
24
 Note that each outside firm can also offer a job at the time they make the market wage offer. However, 
job offers made by outside firms are not important to the dynamics of the model. 
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staying. If a worker leaves, nature assigns a new match factor to her, which comes from the same 
distribution and is independent of the previous draw. Finally, at the end of period 2, firms pay 
second period wages. 
3.2.2. Analysis 
This subsection analyzes the model with a focus on the perfect Bayes Nash equilibrium of this 
game. I begin the analysis by explaining how a firm updates its beliefs on abilities. At the 
beginning of the game, all firms form a common belief about a worker’s expected ability, 
denoted by ]̅. Based on the distribution of ]	, we know ]̅ = `]_ + 1 − `)]^. At the end of 
period 1 when the first period outputs are observed, firms update their beliefs according to Bayes 
rule. Following the notation of Gibbons and Waldman (1999), let h	' denote the signal the 
market extracts concerning worker ’s ability in period 1 from observing her output in that 
Figure 3. Timing of the Job Assignment Model 
• Firms offer 12 
and a job to each 
worker.  
• Each worker 
chooses which 
wage offer to 
accept.  
• Nature assigns 
a match factor 
"	 to each 
worker .  
 
• Firms observe 	:' of 
all workers and update 
their beliefs on ]	-. 
• Each worker  
observes "	 and gets 
paid 12.  
 
• The current firm offers 
1	 and a job to worker , 
while outside firms offer 
1	5. 
• Each worker  makes 
her turnover decision.  
 
• Nature assigns 
new match factors 
to the workers who 
left. 
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t 
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period, i.e., h	' ≡ +ijkG*jlj = ]	 + 	:' . Because h	' is independent of job assignment, the learning 
of a worker’s ability does not vary across jobs.25 Accordingly, the posterior probability of worker 
 being a high ability worker can be expressed as 
8]	 = ]_|h	') = 3mik|nionp)q3mik|nionp)qr3mik|nions)'Gq), where the conditional distributions of the signal 
8h	'|]	 = ]I), t ∈ <u, v>, are driven by the Normal distribution of the stochastic term 	:'. 
Finally, as defined, ]	- ≡ 6]	|h	'). 
As a preliminary step of the analysis, let ]w denote the critical ability level such that it is 
efficient to promote a worker to job 2 if her ability is above ]w. That is, ]w satisfies the condition 
C' + b']w = C + b]w. To focus on more interesting cases, assume ]^ < ]w < ]_. Also, recall that 
in each period, firms choose wages to maximize the expected profit from each worker based on 
the signal h	'. 
Now I analyze the profit maximization problem. Consider first the second period problem 
outside firms face. Because of market competition, outside firms offer a wage equal to the 
worker’s expected second period output. Therefore, we know in equilibrium 1	5 satisfies 
1	5 = 6	:|h	'). 
We now look at the second period problem the current firm faces. Let us start by considering 
the benchmark case, where there is complete information regarding match qualities. That is, both 
firms and workers simultaneously observe the realizations of match qualities at the end of period 
1. In this case, for any given market wage 1	5, each worker ’s current employer pays her a 
                                                 
25
 This point is less important in my two-period model than in Gibbons and Waldman (1999) due to the 
fact that in my model all workers are assigned to the low level job in period 1 and there are only two 
periods. 
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wage lower than the market wage by the exact amount of the disutility of the match. That is, 
there is full rent extraction by firms. As a result of the rent extraction, workers switch employers 
when their matches with the current firms are worse than a potential match with an outside firm. 
I now analyze the problem each firm faces when there is asymmetric learning regarding the 
match qualities.26 Note first that the employer of each worker  makes a positive expected profit 
from her by offering her a wage that is strictly below her expected output. One can think of this 
positive profit as the rent the firm extracts from its employees’ potential good matches. In other 
words, because a worker with a sufficiently good match has a strictly positive probability of 
staying even if she receives a wage that is below the market level, the current firm is strictly 
better off by offering the worker a wage that is below her expected output in the second period. 
As a result, firms earn positive expected second period profits from their employees through this 
rent extraction behavior. 
We now solve for the second period wage 1	 explicitly. Let us first write down the current 
firm’s expected profit function regarding each worker , denoted by 6Π	 . Because each worker 
makes her turnover decision based on a comparison of the wage difference between leaving and 
staying to the associated change in expected match qualities plus the employer switching cost, 
we have 6Π	 = 8"	 ≤ 1	 −1	5 + f)[6	:|h	') −1	]. Based on our previous analysis, each 
firm’s problem is to choose a wage 1	 to maximize the expected profit 6Π	 given the market 
wage 1	5. Define the gap between the turnover and non-turnover wages for each worker  as 
∆	≡ 1	
5 −1	. Because of rent extraction, it must be the case that ∆	> 0 in equilibrium. 
Moreover, due to the assumption that "	 follows a uniform distribution on the interval [−#, #], 
                                                 
26
 Recall that asymmetric learning of the match quality refers to the assumption that only the worker in 
question observes the realized match quality but not the firms. 
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and the fact that 1	5 = 	69	:zh	';, the expected profit can be further expressed in terms of the 
wage gap ∆	, i.e., 6Π	 = G∆ir(r{( ∆	. From this expression we can see that expected profits do not 
vary with workers’ expected abilities, which in turn means that the equilibrium wage gap is 
independent of job assignment. Indeed, the first order condition with respect to ∆	 	is ∆∗= (r{ .27 
This finding further indicates that the rent extraction should not distort firms’ promotion 
decisions. 
Because of the previous analysis and the fact that production functions are linear in expected 
ability, it is optimal for a firm to promote a worker if her expected ability in the second period is 
above the efficient level ]w. As a result, we can explicitly express second period wages in terms of 
expected ability. Consider first market wages. According to the fact that market wages equal 
workers’ expected productivities, workers whose expected abilities are greater than ]w are offered 
1	5 = C + b]	-, while those whose abilities are below ]w are offered 1	5 = C' + b']	-. Based 
on the market wages and the equilibrium wage gap, the equilibrium wage offered to each worker 
 at the current firm satisfies 1	 = 1	5 − (r{ . Also, the current firm offers to keep the worker in 
job 1 when expected ability is below ]w and promote the worker to job 2 when expected ability 
exceeds ]w. As a concluding remark concerning the second period analysis, the equilibrium 
turnover rate for each worker  satisfies 8 |"	 ≥ − (r{ + f} =
~(G{
( . 
We now consider the first period problem. Because of market competition, each firm’s 
expected profit is subject to a zero profit constraint. Due to the fact that firms make strictly 
positive profits in the second period, the zero profit constraint yields that firms must make 
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 See Peterson (2011) for a related analysis. 
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negative first period profits by paying young workers a wage that is higher than their expected 
productivity. Moreover, the wedge between the first period wage and productivity equals exactly 
the amount of expected second period profit. Because all the young workers are assigned to job 1 
in the first period, this analysis yields that the equilibrium first period wage satisfies 12∗ = C' +
b']̅ + (r{)

( . 
The analysis above is summarized in Proposition 1.2. 
Proposition 1.2: 
i) In period 1, all young workers are assigned to job 1 and paid a first period wage 12∗ = C' +
b']̅ + (r{)

( . 
ii) In period 2, a worker with an expected ability  ]	- > ]w  is promoted to job 2, receives a wage 
of  1	 = C + b]	- − (r{  if she stays, and a market wage of 1	5 = C + b]	- if she 
switches employers; whereas one with an expected ability ]	- ≤ ]w remains at job 1, receives 
a wage of  1	 = C' + b']	- − (r{  if she stays, and a market wage of 1	5 = C' + b']	- if she 
switches employers.28 
iii) The equilibrium turnover rate of each worker  equals 8 |"	 ≥ − (r{ + f} =
~(G{
( . 
Proposition 1.2 demonstrates three things. First, part ii) says that promoted workers earn 
higher wages than non-promoted workers. This is because outside firms offer higher second 
period wages to promoted workers. There are two factors that determine the level of outside 
                                                 
28
 To keep the exposition clear, I assume a firm does not promote a worker when the firm is indifferent 
between promoting and not promoting the worker. 
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wage offers in period 2. One determinant is workers’ expected abilities in period 2. Because 
promoted workers have higher expected abilities in the second period, wages associated with 
abilities are also higher for these workers. Another determinant is job assignment. Because 
workers who are promoted have higher expected abilities than the cutoff point ]w, these workers 
are more productive in the high level job than in the low level job. Because both factors indicate 
higher wages for the promoted workers than for the non-promoted workers, promotions are 
associated with higher wages. 
The other point Proposition 1.2 makes is that equilibrium turnover is constant across workers. 
What is more important with respect to the empirical analysis is that turnover is independent of 
both job assignment and output. As we shall see in the following subsection, this finding is key 
to the derivation of the testable implication on the promotion turnover relationship in the job 
assignment model. Finally, because the equilibrium market wage is strictly higher than the inside 
wage for each worker, the equilibrium turnover rate is strictly higher than the efficient turnover 
rate, denoted by 8X, where 8X = 8"	 > f) = (G{( . On the other hand, because ]w defines the 
efficient level of promotion, promotion is efficient in the job assignment model. 
3.2.3. Testable Implications 
Below let 1I and 8I∗ denote the average wage level and equilibrium turnover rate of a worker 
with job assignment t, where t ∈ <8, e8>. Next, define  ≡ C' + b']w = C + b]w as the output 
level such that a worker with an expected output above  is promoted to the high level job in the 
second period. Proposition 1.2 yields the following three testable implications. 
Corollary 2.1:   13 >	143. Promotions are positively related to wage levels (Test 1). 
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Corollary 2.1 comes from Proposition 1.2, part ii). As I have demonstrated above, promoted 
workers earn strictly higher wages than non-promoted workers, because the former group not 
only has higher levels of expected abilities, but also produces higher output due to a more 
efficient labor allocation. As a result, the average wage level of promoted workers is greater than 
that of non-promoted workers. 
Note that the job assignment model makes no prediction regarding the relationship between 
promotions and wages if we control for output. This is because, for any given output level, all 
workers are either promoted or not.  However, the conclusion above changes when the 
performance measure is coarse. When performance ratings do not reflect output levels precisely, 
both promotion and performance ratings can be positively related to wages. To see the logic 
behind this, consider a case where there are two workers, 1 and 2, who have the same 
performance rating but different output levels. Specifically, suppose worker 1 produces a higher 
output than worker 2, and that her output is higher than  so that she is promoted to the high 
level job in period 2, while worker 2 stays with the low level job. From the analysis of 
Proposition 1.2, we know worker 1 earns a higher wage than worker 2. However, because the 
two workers have the same performance rating, it appears in the data that it is the promotion that 
drives the wage but not the performance rating. Therefore, when the performance measure is 
coarse, the job assignment model predicts that both promotion and performance ratings are 
positively related to wages. 
Finally, controlling for promotions, performance ratings are positively related to wages. 
Because in the job assignment model, wages are determined by expected output, given job 
assignments, the better the performance ratings, the higher the corresponding levels of expected 
output, and hence the higher the wages. 
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Corollary 2.2: The probability of promotion weakly increases with output (Test 2). 
Corollary 2.2 follows directly from the role of promotion in the job assignment model. That 
is, a worker is promoted if her perceived expected ability is strictly greater than the efficient 
level ]w. Because both production functions are linear in ability, this is equivalent to promoting a 
worker when her first period output is above , and not otherwise. In other words, promotion 
follows a step function in the job assignment model. That is, the probability of promotion weakly 
increases with output. 
Corollary 2.3: 83∗ = 843∗ . Equilibrium turnover is independent of job assignment with or without 
wage controls (Test 3). 
Corollary 2.3 says that promotion is not related to turnover. From the analysis of Proposition 
1.2, part iii), we know that turnover rates are the same across workers, and thus are independent 
of job assignment. Similarly, neither wages nor wage increases affect turnover in the job 
assignment model. The reason is that firms extract the same amount of rent from each worker 
regardless of their outputs, and hence workers have the same incentive to leave despite the wages 
they earn. As a result, there is no relationship between wage and turnover. 
3.3. Extension of  the Signaling Model 
This subsection extends the signaling model of Waldman (1984) by incorporating turnover. 
Similar to my approach with tournament theory and job assignment theory, I introduce turnover 
into the signaling model following Novos’ approach. To ensure different roles of promotions are 
the main driving force of any differences in the predictions of all three theories, I keep my 
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assumptions on the match factor exactly the same as those in the tournament and job assignment 
models. 
3.3.1. The Model 
In this economy there are two time periods and a single product, the price of which is 
normalized to 1. Each worker lives for two periods and the labor supply is fixed at 1 unit per 
period. In addition, I refer to the workers in the first period as the young workers and those in the 
second period as the old workers. 
There are  homogeneous firms and  homogeneous workers in the market, where 
 >  > 0. Each firm hires 1 worker in each period. Assume each worker ’s ability ]	 
follows a uniform distribution on the interval []^ , ]_] and the distribution is public information. 
Assume there is incomplete information regarding ability in the sense that none of the 
participants of the game observes ability at the beginning of the game. In addition, there is 
asymmetric learning of ability across firms so that ability is observable to a worker’s current 
employer at the end of the first period but remains unknown to outside firms throughout the 
game. 
There are two jobs in each period, namely, a low level job and a high level job, where the 
productivity of job a for each worker  is given by 	: = C: + b:]	. Without loss of generality, 
assume C' > C and b' < b. That is, the return to ability is higher at the high level job. Let ]̅ 
denote the expected ability of a young worker. Given ability follows a uniform distribution, we 
have ]̅ ≡ nsrnp . To limit the number of cases to be considered here, assume C' + b']̅ > C +
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b]̅, i.e., it is efficient to allocate young workers to the low level job.29 Moreover, assume 
workers accumulate firm specific human capital , where  > 0. As a result, productivity for an 
old worker  at job a equals 	: = 1 + )C: + b:]	). 
I now discuss the assumptions on the match factor. For each worker  there is a match factor 
"	 which satisfies the following four assumptions. First, "	~7[−#, #] and is independently 
distributed across workers.30 Second, match is firm and worker specific in the sense that a 
worker who switches employers is assigned a new match factor which is independent of the 
previous draw. Third, match enters a worker’s utility function. Fourth, there is asymmetric 
learning of the match quality between the worker and the firms in the sense that only the worker 
observes the match quality but not the firms. Finally, assume both firms and workers are risk-
neutral, firms can only sign spot contracts, and there is free entry into the market and a zero 
discount rate. 
The timing of the model is the following. In period 1.1, each firm makes a first period wage 
offer 12 to the workers. In period 1.2, each worker chooses a wage offer to accept where her 
choice maximizes her expected lifetime utility. In period 1.3, nature assigns a match factor "	 
and an ability level ] to each worker . In period 1.4, each worker  and the current employer of 
this worker learn about the worker’s realized ability ]	. In addition, each worker  learns about 
her match quality at the current firm "	.  
                                                 
29
 Refer to footnote 93 in Appendix 2 for a related parameter restriction. 
30
 Here I assume # is large enough so that the probability of turnover for each worker is in the interval 
0,1). A sufficient condition to ensure this is # > npGns~lk . 
 35 
 
In period 2.1, each firm makes job assignment decisions. Outside firms then observe these 
decisions and make a market wage offer 15:  to each worker  based on the worker’s job 
assignment a. In period 2.2, the current employer of each worker  makes a counteroffer 1	. In 
• Each firm 
announces a first 
period wage 12 
and makes a job 
offer.
.
  
 
• Each worker  
chooses a wage offer 
that maximizes her 
expected lifetime 
utility 67	. 
• Nature assigns a 
match factor "	 and 
an ability level ]	to 
each worker . 
• Each worker  and the 
current employer of this 
worker learn ]	. 
• Each worker  learns 
"	. 
 
1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 t=1 
Figure 4. Timing of the Signaling Model, Period 1 
Figure 5. Timing of the Signaling Model, Period 2 
• First period employers 
make job assignment 
decisions. 
• Outside firms observe job 
assignments. 
• Outside firms offer 15:  to  
the workers who are 
assigned to job a.  
• Each worker ’s 
current firm makes a 
counteroffer 1	 and a 
job offer. 
• Each worker  
chooses a wage 
offer to accept. 
• Nature assigns a 
new match factor 
to each worker 
who left. 
 
• Each worker earns 
a second period 
wage based on her 
job assignment and 
turnover decision. 
 
2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.5 t=2 
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period 2.3, each worker  chooses a wage offer to accept and makes her turnover decision at the 
same time. In period 2.4, nature assigns a new match factor " to each worker  who switched 
firms. In period 2.5, each worker earns the second period wage based on the job assignment and 
her turnover decision.31 
3.3.2. Analysis 
Below let 12∗ denote the equilibrium wage in the first period while ]-: denotes the expected 
ability level of the group of workers who are assigned to job a and switch employers in the 
second period. Moreover, let ]′ denote the ability level so that a worker with ability ]′ is as 
productive at the low level job as she is at the high level job. That is, ]′ satisfies the condition 
C' + b']′ = C + b]′. The analysis of the signaling model can be summarized as Proposition 
1.3. 
Proposition 1.3: 
i) In period 1, all the young workers are assigned to job 1 and earn a wage 12∗ that is higher 
than the expected first period productivity, i.e., 12∗ > C' + b']̅. 
ii) In period 2, there exists an ability level ]r > ]′ such that each worker  whose ability ]	 
satisfies ]	 > ]r is promoted to job 2 and earns a wage of 1	 = ' [1 + )C + b]	) +
C + b]-) − #] if she stays and a market wage of 15 = C + b]- if she switches employers. 
On the other hand, each worker  whose ability ]	 satisfies ]	 ≤ ]r remains at job 1 (see 
                                                 
31
 Note that the model is different from the original model of Waldman (1984) in two ways. First, 
counteroffers are allowed in the wage determination process. Second, the productivity of the low level job 
varies with ability. Also, this model is different from Golan (2005) because of the second assumption just 
mentioned. Note that these two changes are important for the derivation of the promotion and turnover 
results of my signaling model. See Waldman and Zax (2013) for a related discussion and analysis. 
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footnote 28), earns a wage of 1	' = ' [1 + )C' + b']	) + C' + b']-') − #] if she stays and a 
market wage of 15' = C' + b']-' if she switches employers. 
iii) For each worker , the second period wage 1	: increases in the ability distance B	: , where 
B	: ≡ ]	 − ]-:, a ∈ <1,2>. 
iv) For each worker , the turnover rate 8	:is a decreasing function of the return to ability b: 
and the ability distance B	:  defined in part iii), where a ∈ <1,2>. 
Proposition 1.3 says a few things. First, the first period wage is above the expected 
productivity of the young workers. Because each firm makes strictly positive expected second 
period profit from its employees, in order to satisfy the zero profit condition, the first period 
wage is higher than a young worker’s expected productivity, i.e., 12∗ > C' + b']̅. Second, the 
second period wage increases in both the realized ability of a worker and the expected ability of 
the group of workers with the same job assignment. Third, the difference between the turnover 
and the non-turnover wages in the second period is an increasing function of the ability distance 
B	: , a ∈ <1,2>, i.e., the distance between each worker’s realized ability and expected ability. 
Suppose the returns to ability at the two jobs approach each other in the limit.32 Because turnover 
is a decreasing function of both the ability distance B	: 	and the return to ability b:, two workers 
who are assigned to different jobs will have the same turnover rate as long as their ability 
distances are the same.33,34 
                                                 
32
 See footnote 37 for a discussion. 
33
 See Appendix 2 for a complete proof of Proposition 1.3. 
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3.3.3. Testable Implications 
Below let 1 : and 8a denote the average wage rate and turnover rate of the workers who are 
assigned to job a in period 2, respectively, where a ∈ <1,2>. Also, let r denote the output level 
of a young worker whose ability equals ]r, i.e., r = C' + b']r. 
Corollary 3.1: 1  > 1 '. Workers who are promoted on average earn a higher wage than 
workers who are not promoted (Test 1). 35 
Corollary 3.1 follows directly from Proposition 1.3, part ii). Because the second period wage 
is an increasing function of realized ability and expected ability while both are higher for the 
promoted workers, workers who are promoted earn higher second period wages. So the average 
wage rate of promoted workers is higher than that of non-promoted workers. 
In addition, the signaling model predicts that wage increases with performance ratings 
controlling for promotions. The intuition here is that the wage in the signaling model increases 
with both ability and the expected ability of the group of workers with the same job assignment. 
As a result, controlling for the job assignment, wage increases with realized ability. Since output 
also increases with realized ability, the signaling model says that wage increases with 
performance ratings given promotions.36 
                                                                                                                                                             
34
 Note that the current model yields that, for workers who switch employers, it is optimal for their new 
employers to allocate these workers consistently with their period-one employers. See Appendix 2 for the 
proof of this statement. 
35
 Note that instead of wage levels, Test 1 can also be expressed in terms of wage increases. That is, all 
three theories predict that there are large wage increases upon promotion. The reason is that the first 
period wages in all the theories do not vary across workers. 
36
 Note that the current theory predicts that controlling for performance ratings, there is no relationship 
between promotion and wages. However, when performance ratings are coarse, promotion is positively 
related to wages. See Corollary 2.1 for a related discussion. 
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Corollary 3.2: The probability of promotion weakly increases with output (Test 2). 
Corollary 3.2 also follows from Proposition 1.3, part ii). Because a worker is promoted if her 
realized ability is greater than the cutoff ability level ]r and because both production functions 
are linear in ability, the promotion rule is equivalent to promoting a worker if her first period 
output is above r, and not otherwise. In other words, promotion follows a step function of 
output in the signaling model. As a result, the probability of promotion weakly increases with 
output. 
Corollary 3.3: For a sufficiently small value of firm specific human capital, , and sufficiently 
similar returns to ability, b' and b, the following condition holds: 8 > 8'. 37 Workers who 
are promoted are more likely to switch employers than those who are not promoted (Test 3). 
Corollary 3.3 follows directly from Proposition 1.3, part iv). To begin, note first that a 
worker’s turnover rate is determined by the distance between her realized ability and the market 
expected ability as well as the return to ability at that job. Therefore, the average turnover rate of 
any group of workers is determined by the return to ability of their job assignment as well as the 
average ability distance of these workers. In addition, the average ability distance is higher for 
non-promoted workers if firm specific human capital is sufficiently small. To understand this 
point, recall that the cutoff ability level for promotion ]r decreases with the firm specific human 
capital . In particular, when  is close to 0, the cutoff ability level for promotion is closer to ]_. 
In other words, there are more workers who are not promoted than those who are promoted. 
                                                 
37
 Specifically, holding C', b', and all the other parameters fixed and only varying C and b = b' so that ]! remains the same, there exists an interval 1, ) so that ∀ ∈ 1, ), the condition 8 > 8' holds. 
See Appendix 2 for a complete proof of this statement. 
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Because ability follows a uniform distribution, the previous condition tells us that the average 
ability distance of the non-promoted workers is higher than that of the promoted workers. Since 
the average turnover rate decreases in both the average ability distance and the return to ability 
and given the assumption that the returns to ability are similar between the two jobs, workers 
who are promoted have a higher average turnover rate than those who are not promoted.38 
In addition to the previous point, the signaling model also predicts that, controlling for 
promotion, wage is negatively related to the probability of turnover. The reason is that, given the 
job assignment, the equilibrium wage 1	: increases in the ability distance B	:  while the turnover 
rate 8	: decreases in this ability distance. Therefore, given promotions, wage is negatively related 
to the probability of turnover. 
Comparing all three tests from each theory, we can see that the three theories mainly differ in 
their predictions regarding the relationship between promotion and turnover. Therefore, much of 
the focus in the empirical analysis will be on promotion and turnover dynamics. 
4. Conclusions 
Current theory assigns three different roles to promotions, namely, rewarding previous 
performance, allocating workers to tasks, and acting as a signal of ability to outside firms. In this 
chapter, I compare these three roles of promotions via their implications for promotion and 
turnover dynamics. I use the tournament theory of Lazear and Rosen (1981) to model promotion 
as an incentive device, the job assignment theory of Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 2006) to 
                                                 
38
 Note that the current theory makes no prediction regarding the relationship between promotion and 
turnover controlling for wages. The reason is that given the wage, a worker is either promoted or not. 
That is, there exists no variation in the promotion outcomes among workers with the same wage. 
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model promotion as a labor allocation device, and the signaling theory of Waldman (1984) to 
model promotion as a signaling device. These models are all workhorse models in the personnel 
economics literature and each can match many empirical regularities. 
By theoretically extending these three theories with turnover using a firm worker specific 
match factor, I show that tournament theory predicts that promotion is negatively related to 
turnover, job assignment theory predicts that promotion is not related to turnover, while 
signaling theory predicts that promotion can be positively related to turnover when certain 
conditions are met. The intuition behind these predictions is threefold. First, wages in both the 
job assignment model and the signaling model are driven by market wage offers, while those in 
the tournament model are designed to elicit efficient effort and turnover. As a result, in the 
tournament model, the difference between the turnover and non-turnover wages is higher for the 
promoted workers and hence the turnover rate is lower for such workers. Therefore, promotion is 
negatively related to turnover according to tournament theory. Second, in the job assignment 
model, because the difference between current firm and outside firms’ wage offers is 
independent of the job assignment, promotion is not related to turnover according to job 
assignment theory. Third, due to the fact that fewer workers are promoted when firm specific 
human capital is small in the signaling model, the average ability distance, i.e., the distance 
between the realized ability and the expected ability of workers, is smaller for the promoted 
workers than the non-promoted workers when firm specific human capital is small. In turn, since 
turnover in the signaling model is negatively related to both a worker’s ability distance and 
return to ability at the worker’s job level, promotion is positively related to turnover according to 
signaling theory when firm specific human capital is small and returns to ability are similar 
across jobs. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS ON PROMOTION AND TURNOVER 
1. Introduction 
This chapter further extends both the tournament model and the job assignment model from 
the previous chapter by incorporating firm specific human capital. The purpose of these 
extensions is to allow each model to generate within job wage dispersion, which sheds light on 
the wage-turnover relationship given promotions.39 
The basic assumptions regarding human capital are several. First, only a proportion of the 
workers accumulate human capital. Second, workers with human capital have higher 
productivities than those without it. Third, human capital is firm specific in the sense that it only 
contributes to the productivity of a worker if she stays with her current employer. Because the 
human capital is firm specific, outside firms are not willing to offer a worker a higher wage if 
she accumulated human capital, yet the current firm of each worker has the incentive of offering 
different wages based on the worker’s human capital outcome in order to alter her probability of 
leaving the firm. As a result, human capital generates wage dispersion within each job and 
workers with the same job assignment may have different turnover rates conditional on their 
human capital outcomes. 
Based on the extensions with firm specific human capital, both the tournament and the job 
assignment models make a new prediction that wage is negatively associated with turnover 
controlling for promotions. The idea here is that each worker makes her turnover decision based 
                                                 
39
 Note that the signaling model needs no such extension due to the fact that it already incorporates firm 
specific human capital and predicts a negative relationship between wage and turnover controlling for 
promotions. See Chapter 1 for details. 
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on the comparison of the wage difference between the current firm’s wage offer and the outside 
wage offer and the current match quality. Therefore, given that workers with different human 
capital outcomes earn different wages at their current employer but the same market wage, the 
workers with the higher wages thus have lower probabilities of turnover. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the extension of the tournament 
model and then discusses testable implications. Section 3 presents the extension of the job 
assignment model and then discusses testable implications. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Extension of the Tournament Model with Firm Specific Human Capital 
This section further extends the tournament model in the first chapter of my dissertation by 
incorporating firm specific human capital. In the next section, I incorporate firm specific human 
capital into the job assignment model following the same approach as in the tournament model. 
2.1. The Model 
The assumptions remain the same as in the original model except for the introduction of a 
productivity enhancing firm specific human capital term. As a brief review, there is a pool of ex-
ante homogeneous workers where each worker lives for two periods. Also, there is a pool of 
homogeneous firms in the market. Each firm runs one tournament in the first period and each 
tournament consists of two workers. In addition, the firm can make wage offers during the 
second period. There is a single job in each period, the productivity of which depends on the 
worker’s effort level, her human capital outcome, and a stochastic term. 
I now describe the assumptions regarding human capital. During the first period of production 
in each firm, there is a probability c of both workers in the firm’s tournament accumulating firm 
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specific human capital of an amount , where 1 > c > 0 and that # >  > 0.40, 41 Further, the 
human capital enters the production functions of period 2 additively. That is, the second period 
productivity of a worker who attains the human capital is given by 	 =  +  + 	 + 	.42 
Also, there is complete information regarding the human capital accumulation across firms in the 
sense that each worker's human capital outcome is public information. 
Assumptions on the match factor remain the same as in the original model. Specifically, for 
each worker , there is a match factor "	 that follows a uniform distribution on the interval 
[−#, #], where # > 0. Further, the match factor is both firm and worker specific and each match 
factor enters the worker’s utility function as disutility of effort. Moreover, there is asymmetric 
learning of match qualities so that the realization of a match is only observable to the worker. In 
addition, the realization of the match factor is independent of the human capital accumulation 
outcome. Finally, both workers and firms are risk-neutral, the price of output is normalized to 1, 
and there is a zero discount rate. 43 
I modify the timing of the game in the following way to incorporate the human capital 
accumulation. Below let 1I denote the second period wage offer to a worker with the promotion 
outcome t and human capital outcome , where t ∈ <8, e8> and  ∈ <, 0>, and let 15 denote 
the market wage offer.  
                                                 
40
 The upper bound on  ensures that matching is sufficiently important that there is strictly positive 
equilibrium turnover even when the human capital is accumulated. The purpose of this assumption is to 
reduce the number of cases to be considered here. Note that, however, this assumption is not required for 
any of the predictions derived from the model. 
41
 For tractability reasons, I assume the two workers in a tournament either both accumulate the human 
capital or not. This assumption reduces the number of cases to be considered and brings no qualitative 
change to the predictions of the model. 
42
 Alternatively, the human capital  can also contribute to the production in period 1. However, such a 
setup would not bring any qualitative change to the predictions of the model. 
43
 Refer to Chapter 1 of the dissertation for details of these assumptions. 
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At the beginning of period 1, each firm announces a first period wage 12 and second period 
wages (13 ,143 ) and (13,143 ) to the workers. In period 1.2, each worker chooses a firm to 
apply to, while each firm either hires two workers or no worker. In period 1.3, each worker 
chooses a first period effort to maximize the workers’ expected life time utility. In period 1.4, 
nature assigns a match factor "	 to each worker . Also, nature randomly assigns a realization of 
the human capital of the amount either  or 0 to the two workers in the tournament, where the 
probability the workers in a tournament both receive the human capital is c. Finally, in period 
1.5, each worker privately observes her match quality with the current firm while each firm 
observes workers' outputs and human capital outcomes. Each firm then makes the promotion 
decision and pays the first period wage 12.  
The timing of period 2 stays roughly the same as the original setting. The major change here 
is the second period wage offers now depend on a worker's human capital outcome. Specifically, 
• Each firm 
announces a first 
period wage 12 and 
second period wages 
13, 143 )and 
(13,143 ). 
 
• Workers apply.  
• Each firm hires either 
two workers or no 
worker. 
• The matching 
procedure continues until 
all workers are hired. 
 
• Each worker  
chooses 	' to 
maximize 67	. 
• Nature assigns a 
match factor "	 
and a realization 
of the human 
capital outcome 
to each worker . 
• Each worker  learns her 
value of "	. 
• Firms observe 	' and the 
human capital outcome. 
• First period employers 
make promotion decisions 
and pay 12.  
 
1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5 t=1 
Figure 6. Timing of the Extended Tournament Model, Period 1 
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in period 2.1, each firm makes the second period wage offer 1I, where t ∈ <8, e8> and 
 ∈ <, 0>, while outside firms make the market wage offer 15. In period 2.2, each worker 
chooses a wage to accept and makes her turnover decision based on the match quality and the 
wages. In period 2.3, nature assigns a new match factor to each worker who switched employers, 
which is independent of the previous draw. In period 2.4, each worker chooses a second period 
effort to maximize her expected utility in period 2. Lastly, in period 2.5, workers who switched 
employers receive the market wage 15, those who stayed and ended up with the higher outputs 
earn the high wage 13, while those who stayed and ended up with the lower outputs earn the 
low wage 143 , where  ∈ <, 0>.44 
                                                 
44
 As in the original setting, I assume no worker gets the high wage if the high output worker leaves. See 
footnote 15 for a related discussion. 
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2.2. Analysis 
Below let e'∗∗ and 12∗∗ denote the first period effort level and wage in equilibrium, and ∗∗ 
and 15∗∗ denote the second period levels. Also, define ` ≡ 1 − (.45 The analysis of the extended 
tournament model is summarized in Proposition 2.1. 
Proposition 2.1: 
i) In period 1, the equilibrium effort level e'∗∗ is below the efficient level, i.e., e'∗∗ < 'X, and the 
wage offer to the young workers 12∗∗ satisfies the firm’s zero profit condition. 
ii) In period 2, each worker exerts zero effort, i.e., ∗∗ = 0, and receives a market wage of 
15∗∗ =  in equilibrium if they switch employers. 
                                                 
45
 Note that due to the assumption that 0 <  < #, 0 < ` < 1. 
Figure 7. Timing of the Extended Tournament Model, Period 2 
• Current firms offer 
13 and 143 ,  ∈ <, 0> based on 
each worker’s human 
capital outcome.
 
• Outside firms offer 
15.  
 
• Each worker chooses 
a wage to accept and 
makes her turnover 
decision. 
 
• Each worker  
chooses 	 to 
maximize 67	. 
• Nature assigns 
new match factors 
to workers who 
left. 
 
• Workers who left receive 
15. 
• Workers who stayed and 
produced the higher outputs 
receive 13,  ∈ <, 0>. 
• Workers who stayed and 
produced the lower outputs 
receive 143 ,  ∈ <, 0>. 
  
2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.5 t=2 
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iii) In period 2, the wage offers to the old workers satisfy the following relationships: 13 >
13 >  > 143 > 143 . Also, 13 −143 = `13 −143 ),	where 0 < ` < 1. 
iv) If  is sufficiently small, the equilibrium turnover rates of the promoted and the non-
promoted workers satisfy 83 > 83 and 843 < 843 . 
Proposition 2.1 says several things. First, the equilibrium effort level is below the efficient 
level of effort. Following the same intuition as in the tournament model analyzed in the first 
chapter of my dissertation, the intuition behind the first point is that the second period wages 
serve both the roles of eliciting first period effort and determining the turnover rates of the 
promoted and non-promoted workers. As a result, effort is lower than the efficient level because 
the wage spread is constrained by the need to minimize inefficiencies from turnover. 
Second, given the human capital outcome, the promoted workers earn higher wages than the 
non-promoted workers. The reason is that the wage difference between the promotion and the 
non-promotion wages serves as an incentive for each worker to exert effort. In addition, the wage 
spread is smaller for the human capital workers. The reason is that the workers with the human 
capital contribute more to the productivities at the firm, and thus each firm has a stronger 
incentive to minimize the inefficiencies from turnover for the human capital workers. As a result, 
the wage spread is lower under the human capital case. This analysis leads to my last point. That 
is, compared to the non-human capital workers, the human capital workers have a higher 
turnover rate if they are promoted and a lower turnover rate if not. 
2.3. Testable Implications 
I now discuss testable implications from Proposition 2.1. 
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Corollary 1.1': Across the economy, there are large wage increases upon promotion (Test 1). 
Corollary 1.1 follows immediately from Proposition 2.1, part iii) since promoted workers earn 
higher wages than non-promoted workers regardless of the human capital outcomes. Note that 
this positive relationship also holds after controlling for performance ratings because given 
output fixed, it is still true that promoted workers earn higher wages than non-promoted 
workers.46 
Corollary 1.2': Across the economy, workers with higher outputs are more likely to be promoted 
(Test 2). 
Identical to Corollary 1.2, Corollary 1.2' is more of an inherent assumption of the tournament 
model than a result. See Corollary 1.2 for a related discussion. 
Corollary 1.3': When  is sufficiently small, the turnover rates of the promoted and non-
promoted workers satisfy the following relationships, i.e., 83 < 8X < 843 ,  ∈ <, 0>; the wage 
is negatively related to turnover controlling for promotions (Test 3). 
Corollary 1.3' follows from Proposition 2.1, part iii). Given the human capital outcome, the 
promoted workers have strictly lower turnover rates than the non-promoted workers. That is, 
promotion is negatively correlated with turnover. Note that the firm specific human capital needs 
to be sufficiently small for the above conclusion to hold. The reason is that when the human 
capital is large, each firm will have an incentive to keep all the workers with the human capital 
                                                 
46
 Note than when firm specific human capital is added, the tournament model’s prediction concerning the 
relationship between performance ratings and wages controlling for promotions becomes ambiguous. The 
reason is that the relationship between the human capital and non-human capital wages differs by the 
promotion outcomes. Specifically, the human capital wage is higher for the promoted workers yet it is 
lower for the non-promoted workers. Given that the human capital workers have higher outputs, the 
ambiguous wage relationships lead to an ambiguous relationship between performance ratings and wages. 
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from leaving independent of whether or not the worker is promoted. As a result, there will be no 
turnover in equilibrium. 
In addition, the wage is negatively correlated with turnover controlling for promotions. The 
intuition here is that a worker compares the net benefit of staying to the net cost of staying when 
she makes her turnover decision. The net benefit of staying equals the difference between the 
current firm’s wage offer and the market wage, while the net cost of staying is a function of the 
realized match quality. Therefore, the higher the wage difference, the less likely the worker will 
leave. Given that workers with different human capital outcomes earn different wages from the 
current firm but the same market wage, there exists wage dispersion after controlling for the job 
assignment.  As a result, controlling for the job assignment, wage is negatively related to 
turnover in this extended tournament model.47 
3. Extension of the Job Assignment Model with Firm Specific Human Capital 
In this subsection I enrich the job assignment model in the same fashion as I did the 
tournament model to generate within job wage dispersion. This extension generates a negative 
relationship between wage and turnover controlling for promotions. 
                                                 
47
 Note that the current model does not shed light on the relationship between promotion and turnover 
controlling for wages. The reason is that, given the current setting of the model, it is theoretically possible 
that a human capital worker who is not promoted earns the same wage as a non-human capital worker 
who is promoted. However, given the assumption that the human capital is a fixed amount, this is 
unlikely to occur in equilibrium. One way to generate such a prediction is to allow the human capital 
when there is a positive outcome to vary instead of being a fixed amount. 
 51 
 
3.1. The Model 
Same as the original setting of the model, there are two types of workers and each worker 
lives for two periods. Also, each firm hires ,  > 0, workers. Each worker ’s innate ability ]	 
is either high or low, ]	 ∈ <]^, ]_>, and the proportion of high ability workers, denoted by 
` ∈ 0,1), is common knowledge. There are two types of jobs in each period, where the 
productivity of each worker  at job a in period , 	:
, depends on both ability and a stochastic 
term, i.e., 	:
 = C: + b:9]	 + 	:
;, where a ∈ <1,2> and  ∈ <1,2>. Also, job 2 is more sensitive 
to abilities in the sense that the return to ability is higher at job 2. Moreover, there is complete 
information concerning outputs, incomplete information concerning ability on both sides of the 
market, and symmetric learning of ability so that at any point in time, all participants of the game 
are equally informed of it through observing the outputs. 
What is new to this extension is the introduction of firm specific human capital. Specifically, 
assume each worker has a probability  c of accumulating firm specific human capital  in period 
1. Moreover, if the worker accumulates the human capital, her productivity at the current firm 
becomes 	:
 =  + C: + b:]	 + 	:
), where a ∈ <1,2> and  ∈ <1,2>.48 Further, assume there is 
symmetric learning of the human capital among firms in the sense that all firms observe whether 
a worker accumulates the human capital or not. 
Assumptions on the match factor remain exactly the same as in the tournament model. 
Specifically, for each worker , there is a match factor "	, which follows a uniform distribution 
on the interval [−#, #], where # > 0. The match factor is both firm and worker specific and there 
                                                 
48
 Alternatively, one can introduce the human capital multiplicatively into the production functions. Such 
a change would have no qualitative effects on the predictions of the job assignment model. 
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is asymmetric learning of the match factor so that the realization of a match is only observable to 
the worker. As discussed in the tournament section, because firms are unable to tell good 
matches from bad ones, the worker with a sufficiently bad match is not fully compensated for it 
and leaves. In addition, the same as in the original model, I assume there is an employer-
switching cost, denoted by f, which is strictly positive and constant across firms and workers. In 
order for there to be strictly positive equilibrium turnover, I restrict f to be in the interval 0, #). 
As a result, it is efficient for a worker without firm specific human capital to leave when the 
disutility from her match with the current firm is higher than the employer switching cost. In 
addition, assume the realization of the match factor and the human capital accumulation are 
independent. Finally, I assume both workers and firms are ex-ante homogeneous and risk neutral, 
and there is free entry into the market as well as a zero discount rate. 
The timing of the game is the following. At the beginning of each period, firms 
simultaneously make wage offers based on each worker’s expected productivity. Each worker 
then chooses the highest wage offer to accept and makes her turnover decision to maximize her 
expected utility. At the beginning of the second period when there are multiple firms tied at the 
highest expected utility, I assume each worker randomly picks a wage offer to accept unless one 
of these came from the worker’s previous employer, in which case the worker chooses to stay 
with that firm. 
Specifically, at the beginning of period 1, each firm makes a wage offer 12 to young workers, 
while each worker picks the highest wage offer to accept. During period 1, nature assigns a 
match factor to each worker, which is drawn from the uniform distribution defined previously, as 
well as the realization for firm specific human capital. At the end of period 1, all firms (and the 
worker in question) simultaneously observe each worker’s first period output and update their 
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beliefs concerning the worker’s ability. In addition, each firm observes the human capital 
outcomes of all workers. In the meantime, each worker observes the realization of her match and 
gets paid the first period wage. At the beginning of the second period, each worker ’s current 
employer offers her a second period wage denoted by 1	where  ∈ <, 0>, while outside firms 
offer her a market wage denoted by 1	5. These wage offers are made based on their updated 
beliefs regarding the worker’s expected ability, denoted by ]	-. Each worker then makes her 
turnover decision based on a comparison of the cost and the benefit from staying. If a worker 
leaves, nature assigns a new match factor to her which is drawn from the same distribution and is 
independent of the previous draw. Finally, at the end of period 2, each firm pays second period 
wages. 
 
Figure 8. Timing of the Extended Job Assignment Model 
• Each firm offers 
12 and a job to 
each worker.  
• Each worker 
chooses the 
highest wage to 
accept.  
• Nature assigns a 
match factor "	 
and a realization 
of the human 
capital outcome to 
each worker .  
• Each firm observes 
	:' ,  ∈ <, 0> and the 
human capital outcomes of 
all workers and update their 
beliefs on ]	-. 
• Each worker  observes "	 
and gets paid 12.  
• Each worker ’s current 
firm offers 1	,  ∈ <, 0>, 
to each worker , while 
outside firms offer 1	5. 
• Each worker makes her 
turnover decision.  
• Nature assigns 
new match factors 
to the workers 
who left. 
1.1 1.2 1.3 2.2 2.1 2.3 
• Each firm pays 
the period-two 
wages. 
 
t 
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3.2. Analysis 
This subsection analyzes the model following a logic similar to the one in the original 
analysis. To begin, let 1 > 0) be an indicator function for the realization of the firm specific 
human capital whose value equals 1 if a worker attains the human capital in period 0, and 0 
otherwise. Also, let h'
 denote the labor market signal the firms extract regarding the worker’s 
expected ability at the end of period 1. Because each firm observes the human capital perfectly at 
the end of the first period, the signal each firm extracts is independent of the human capital 
outcomes, i.e., h'
 	= +kj
 G*jG')
lj = ]	 + ':
 ,  ∈ <, 0>. As a result, the ability signal does 
not vary with the job assignment or human capital outcomes. Let ]	- denote each worker 's 
expected ability at the end of period 1, i.e., ]	- = 6]	|h'
	). Lastly, since the human capital 
contributes to the productivities of both jobs equally, it has no impact on firms’ promotion 
decisions. 
I now define the average ability level of the young workers and the efficient ability level for 
promotion. Following the notation in Chapter 1’s job assignment model, let ]̅ and ]w denote the 
average ability level of the young workers and the critical ability level for promotion, 
respectively. The same as in the original model, the average ability level of the young workers ]̅ 
satisfies the following condition, i.e., ]̅ = `]_ + 1 − `)]^. Additionally, because the human 
capital contributes equally to the productivities at the two jobs, each firm's promotion decisions 
are independent of the human capital outcomes. Therefore, the critical ability level for promotion 
is also independent of the human capital accumulation. That is, ]w satisfies the condition 
C' + b']w = C + b]w. 
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We now solve the utility maximization problem with respect to each worker . Consider the 
second period problem first. Because the outside firms do not benefit from the firm specific 
human capital, their decisions do not depend on the human capital outcome. Let 1	5 denote the 
market wage offer. The previous analysis tells us that 1	5 equals worker 's expected second 
period productivity at an outside firm, i.e., 1	5 = 6	:| = 0). On the other hand, the current 
firm’s wage offer to each worker  varies with her human capital outcome. Specifically, because 
a worker would produce a higher output if she accumulated the human capital, the current 
employer of this worker has an incentive to offer her a higher wage if she attained the human 
capital in order to decrease her probability of switching employers. Let 1	 and 1	denote the 
wages each worker 's current employer offers if she attains and does not attain the human 
capital, respectively. The analysis above tells us 1	 > 1	, ∀. 
We now solve for the second period wages explicitly. Similar to the analysis in the original 
model, each firm extracts rents from the good matches of their current employees. Specifically, 
each firm chooses a wage difference to maximize its expected second period profit from each 
worker. Because the human capital contributes the same amount of output to the two jobs, job 
assignment should have no impact on the rent each firm extracts from a worker. Let ∆	 denote 
the difference between the turnover and non-turnover wages each worker  receives given her 
human capital outcome , i.e., ∆	= 1	5 −1	 , where	 ∈ <, 0>. If worker  does not 
accumulate the human capital, the problem stays exactly the same as in the original model. That 
is, ∆	 satisfies ∆	=
(r{

 in equilibrium. On the other hand, if worker  accumulates the human 
capital, the firm's second period profit function is given by 6Π	 = 	89αM ≤ s − ∆	;[69	: ; −
1	
], where 69	: ; = 1	5 + . Therefore, we can rewrite the expected profit function as 
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6Π	 = 89αM ≤ s − ∆	;∆	 + ). Given that "	~7[−#, #], 6Π	 can be expressed as 6Π	 =
{r(G∆i
( ∆	 + ). Taking the first order condition of the profit function with respect to ∆	 we 
have ∆	= {r(G .49 From the solution to the wage difference ∆	 we can see that given the human 
capital outcome, the wage difference is independent of the job assignment. Therefore, the human 
capital outcomes exert no distortion on the promotion decisions, i.e., a worker is promoted to the 
high level job in period 2 if her expected ability is above the critical value ]w and remains at the 
low level job otherwise. 
Based on the solution to the wage difference ∆	 we now can express the equilibrium wages 
explicitly. Consider first the market wages. If ]	- > ]w, worker  is promoted to the high level job 
and earns a market wage of 1	5 = C + b]	-. On the other hand, if  ]	- ≤ ]w, worker  stays at 
the low level job and gets a market wage of 1	5 = C' + b']	-. Given the market wages above, 
the current firm’s wage offer to each worker  satisfies 1	 = 1	5 − (r{G') , where 
 ∈ <, >. 
Based on the second period wages, we can now characterize the equilibrium turnover rates. 
Let 8 denote the equilibrium turnover rate of the workers with the human capital outcome , 
where  ∈ <, >. Since each worker makes her turnover decision based on a comparison of her 
match quality with the summation of the wage difference and the employer switching cost, we 
know 8 = ~(G{(  and 8 =
~(G{G
( . Consistent with my previous conjecture, workers with the 
human capital have lower turnover rates than workers without the human capital in equilibrium. 
Last but not least, the equilibrium first period wage satisfies the zero profit constraint, 
                                                 
49
 Note that ∆	> 0 in equilibrium due to the assumptions that 0 <  < # and f > 0. 
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12∗∗ = C' + b']̅ + c (r{r)

( + 1 − c)
(r{)
( . As a result, each firm pays a young worker a 
higher wage than her expected output in the first period because of the rent extraction in the 
second period. 
The previous analysis is summarized in Proposition 2.2. 
Proposition 2.2: 
i) In period 1, all young workers are assigned to job 1 and paid the first period wage, 
12∗∗ = C' + b']̅ + c (r{r)

( + 1 − c)
(r{)
( . 
ii) In period 2, a worker with the expected ability ]	- > ]w  is promoted to job 2, receives a 
second period wage of 1	 = C + b]	- − (r{G  if she accumulates the firm specific human 
capital and 1	 	= C + b]	- − (r{  otherwise; whereas a worker with the expected ability 
]	- ≤ ]w remains at job 1 (see footnote 28), receives a second period wage of 1	 = C' +
b']	- − (r{G  if she accumulates the firm specific human capital and 1	 = C' + b']	- −
(r{
  otherwise. 
iii) The equilibrium turnover rate of the workers with the firm specific human capital equals 
8 = ~(G{G(  while that of the workers without the human capital equals 8 =
~(G{
( . 
Proposition 2.2 tells us several things. First, for each worker , 1	 > 1	. That is, workers 
with the human capital earn strictly higher wages than those without it. Moreover, as is shown in 
Proposition 2.2, part i), the first period wage is strictly above young workers' expected 
productivity. The reason is that each firm extracts strictly positive rents from its employees in the 
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second period. Because the first period wage satisfies the zero profit condition, it is higher than a 
young worker’s expected productivity in the first period. 
Additionally, let ∗ denote the rent extracted in equilibrium from the workers with the human 
capital outcome ,  ∈ <, 0>. We know that ∗ = 69	: ; −1	 ,  ∈ <, 0>. That is, ∗ = ∆∗ +
 and ∗ = ∆∗ . Based on the solutions to ∆∗ , we know ∗ > ∗ and 6Π	 > 6Π	. That is, each 
firm extracts more rent from the workers with the human capital and hence makes higher 
expected profit. 
Furthermore, as is stated in Proposition 2.2, part iii), the human capital workers have lower 
equilibrium turnover rates. The reason is that the difference between the turnover wage and the 
non-turnover wage for a human capital worker is higher due to the higher wage she receives at 
her current employer. 
In addition, given the human capital outcome, turnover is independent of the job assignment. 
The intuition behind this point is that the wage difference between the turnover and the non-
turnover wages is the same among the workers with the same human capital outcome. 
As a final point, Proposition 2.2, part ii) says that there exists a strictly positive probability  
that a promoted worker without the human capital earns the same wage as a non-promoted 
worker with the human capital.50 
                                                 
50
 Specifically, there exists an ability interval such that for each non-human capital worker who is 
promoted with an expected ability in this interval, there exists a human capital worker who is not 
promoted with an ability that is  lower than the first worker yet earns the same second period wage as the 
promoted worker. Moreover, the interval can be expressed as ]w,max ]w +  , ]_) and  = 8]w <
]	 < max ]w +  , ]_), where the probability is defined based on the distribution of 	:
. 
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3.3. Testable Implications 
We now derive testable implications from Proposition 2.2. 
Corollary 2.1': Promotions are positively related to wage increases without controlling for 
performance ratings while they have no impact on wage increases controlling for performance 
ratings; performance ratings are positively related to wage increases controlling for promotions 
(Test 1). 
Similar to the discussion following Corollary 2.1, because workers who are promoted are on 
average of higher expected productivities, they also earn higher wages than the non-promoted 
workers. Moreover, since wages are determined by expected productivities in the job assignment 
model, controlling for performance ratings, promotion has no significant impact on wage 
increases. However, when performance ratings are coarse, workers with the same performance 
rating might be of different expected productivities and hence job assignments. As a result, 
promotions will be positively correlated with wage increases controlling for performance ratings 
if the ratings are coarse.51 Lastly, performance ratings are positively related to wage increases 
controlling for promotions. This is because, given the job assignment, workers with higher 
expected productivities earn strictly higher wages. 
Corollary 2.2': The probability of promotion weakly increases with performance ratings (Test 2). 
Similar to the argument in Corollary 2.2, because a worker whose expected ability is higher 
than the cutoff ability level ]w is promoted while one whose expected ability is lower than the 
cutoff level remains at the low level job in period two, a worker is only promoted if her expected 
                                                 
51
 See Corollary 2.1 for a related discussion. 
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output reaches a certain cutoff level. As a result, the probability of promotion follows a step 
function of performance ratings. 52 
Corollary 2.3': On average, across workers with different human capital outcomes, promotion is 
not related to turnover, while promotion is positively related to turnover controlling for the wage; 
wage is negatively related to turnover controlling for promotions (Test 3). 
Proposition 2.2, part iii) tells us that turnover only varies with the human capital outcome and 
hence is independent of job assignment. Because the realization of the human capital outcome is 
independent of ability, without controlling for the wages, promotion is not related to turnover. 
On the other hand, due to the possibility that a promoted worker without the human capital earns 
the same wage as a worker who is not promoted but has the human capital and the fact that the 
human capital workers have a lower turnover rate, the model further predicts that controlling for 
the wages there is a positive relationship between promotion and turnover. Finally, the further 
extended job assignment model predicts that controlling for promotions, wage is negatively 
related to turnover. The logic behind this prediction is that workers with the human capital both 
earn higher wages and have a lower turnover rate.53 
                                                 
52
 As in the original case, promotion follows a step function of expected outputs in this further extended 
model. What changes is that now there are two critical output levels, one for the workers with the human 
capital and the other for the workers without it. In more detail, if a worker's output is above the first 
critical point, she is promoted with probability 1. If her output is between the two critical levels, she is 
promoted if she does not accumulate the human capital. Lastly, if her output is below the second critical 
level, she is not promoted with probability 1. 
53
 In fact, the negative relationship between wage and turnover also holds without controlling for 
promotions. Because turnover is independent of the job assignment, whether or not promotion is 
controlled for does not alter the wage and turnover dynamics. 
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4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I further extend both tournament theory and job assignment theory with 
productivity enhancing firm specific human capital. The purpose of each extension is to generate 
within-job wage dispersion to allow each theory to make predictions regarding the wage and 
turnover dynamics controlling for promotions. Extending the two models in this way yields that 
each model predicts that wage is negatively correlated with turnover controlling for promotions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EVIDENCE ON PROMOTION AND TURNOVER 
1. Introduction 
Following the previous chapters of my dissertation, this one tests the empirical predictions 
derived from the tournament model, the job assignment model, and the signaling model as well 
as the extensions of the first two models with firm specific human capital. Recall from the first 
chapter that each theory makes three predictions regarding wage, promotion, and turnover 
dynamics. The first two predictions are the same across the three theories, and the third 
prediction distinguishes among them. Specifically, all three theories predict that promotions are 
positively related to wages, and that output is positively related to the probability of promotion. 
As for the promotion and turnover dynamics, tournament theory predicts that promotion is 
negatively related to turnover, job assignment theory predicts that promotion is not related to 
turnover, while signaling theory predicts that promotion is positively related to turnover given 
certain conditions. In the second chapter, I further extended both the tournament model and the 
job assignment model with firm specific human capital. As a result of the extension, the 
tournament model predicts that promotion is negatively correlated with turnover, controlling for 
wages. On the other hand, the job assignment model predicts that promotion is positively related 
to turnover controlling for wages. That is, with the introduction of human capital, the direction of 
the promotion-turnover relationship changes from being insignificant to positive for the job 
assignment model. In addition, both models predict that wage is negatively related to turnover 
controlling for promotions. 
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I test these predictions using a dataset from a single firm in the financial services industry in 
the U.S. The data were first collected and analyzed in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a, 
1994b) (hereafter, the BGH dataset). In my analysis of the full sample, I find that both promotion 
and performance ratings are positively related to wage levels, and that performance ratings are 
positively related to the probability of promotion. Moreover, promotion has no significant impact 
on turnover. Lastly, turnover is decreasing in wages controlling for promotions. Comparing these 
results to the theoretical predictions, it seems that job assignment theory without firm specific 
human capital best captures the empirical findings concerning the full sample. 
To explore the theoretical predictions further, I divide the data into subsamples where the 
samples differ in terms of which job level the worker was on in the period of the observation. 
The logic behind this approach is twofold. To begin, the classic paper of Baker, Jensen, and 
Murphy (1988) on firm hierarchies suggests that tournament theory is likely to be more 
applicable in jobs in which incentives are relatively important. In the empirical analysis, I use job 
level as a proxy for the importance of incentives. Building on Rosen (1982), the idea is that 
incentives to induce higher effort should become more critical as the job level increases, as the 
return to effort likely increases with job level. This argument suggests that tournament theory 
should be more applicable in higher level jobs. Building on an argument of Rosen (1986), the 
hybrid approach of tournament theory and signaling theory discussed in Waldman (2013) 
provides another explanation for why the promotion-turnover dynamics might vary with job 
level. Specifically, by incorporating high market wage offers due to promotion signaling as 
constraints in a classic tournament setting, Waldman (2013) argues that tournament theory is 
more likely to hold in higher level jobs while signaling theory is more likely to hold in lower 
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level jobs. The reason is that the constraints on promotion wages in tournaments due to market 
wages and signaling are more likely to be binding at lower level jobs. 
Consistent with the full sample results, the subsample results provide further evidence in 
support of the positive relationship between promotions and wages and that between 
performance ratings and the probability of promotion. Moreover, I find that promotion is 
negatively related to turnover in the high level subsample, while it is positively related to 
turnover in the low level subsample. Consistent with the conjecture of both the incentive 
argument building on Rosen (1982) and Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) and the hybrid 
approach of Waldman (2013), these results suggest that tournament theory with firm specific 
human capital better describes the role of promotion among higher level jobs, while signaling 
theory better captures the role of promotion among lower level jobs.54, 55 
The subsample findings discussed above also provide more insight into the interpretation of 
the full sample results. Recall that tournament theory predicts a negative relationship between 
promotion and turnover, while signaling theory predicts a positive relationship between 
promotion and turnover when certain conditions are met. Therefore, instead of interpreting the 
full sample results as evidence consistent with the job assignment model without human capital, 
it seems more plausible to interpret these results as suggesting that the incentive role and the 
signaling role of promotions seem to coexist in the BGH data. That is, the full sample findings 
provide further evidence consistent with the incentive argument based on Rosen (1982) and 
Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) as well as the hybrid approach of Waldman (2013).  
                                                 
54
 Note that the incentive argument is silent on the role of promotion in lower level jobs. 
55
 According to Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a), firm specific human capital seems to be not 
prevalent at the firm in their study. Therefore, it seems more likely that the signaling model captures the 
underlying dynamics of promotion and turnover in the dataset I study. 
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The contributions of this chapter are twofold. First, I show clear evidence of the relationship 
between promotion and turnover using data from a representative firm in the financial services 
industry in the U.S. Second, I describe the conditions under which each theory better matches the 
empirical evidence. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 offers a brief literature review. Section 3 
reviews the testable implications of each theory. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents 
the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related Empirical Literature 
This section reviews the related empirical literature. To begin, a number of empirical studies 
have found evidence consistent with the existence of large wage increases upon promotion. 
These studies include but are not limited to Murphy (1985), Lazear (1992), Baker, Gibbs, and 
Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b), and McCue (1996). In addition, there is rich empirical evidence that 
high performance ratings today predict good outcomes in the future. Specifically, both Medoff 
and Abraham (1980, 1981) and DeVaro and Waldman (2012) find that performance ratings are 
positively related to future promotions and wage increases.56 
However, the empirical evidence on the relationship between promotion and turnover is 
decidedly mixed. Within the field of economics, one of the most relevant studies is Dias da Silva 
and van der Klaauw (2011), who study returns to job transitions using Portuguese matched 
employer-employee data. One of their major findings is that promotions have no significant 
impact on turnover. Outside the field of economics, several human resource studies also shed 
                                                 
56
 See Waldman (2012) for a detailed discussion of the aforementioned papers.  
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light on the manner in which promotion and turnover interact. For example, Trevor, Gerhart, and 
Boudreau (1997) explore the relationship between performance ratings and voluntary turnover 
using a single-firm dataset and conclude that promotion significantly increases voluntary 
turnover. They further find that this positive effect is more pronounced for poor performers. 
Another example is Saporta and Farjoun (2003), who investigate how promotion affects turnover 
and how this effect varies with occupations using a longitudinal dataset from a single firm. They 
find that promotion decreases turnover regardless of occupation. 
My paper is different from these studies mainly in five ways. First, the focus of the papers 
differs. I focus on how promotion affects turnover and how such interactions vary with job level. 
On the other hand, Trevor, Gerhart, and Boudreau focus on how performance ratings interact 
with turnover, while Saporta and Farjoun stress how the promotion-turnover dynamics vary with 
occupation. Second, my study differs from the aforementioned studies in terms of the 
approaches. For example, neither of the human resource studies control for both job level and 
education, which turn out to be key to the understanding of the promotion-turnover relationship. 
Third, in contrast to Trevor, Gerhart, and Boudreau (1997) and Dias da Silva and van der 
Klaauw (2011), I control for wage increases upon promotion in my study of the promotion and 
turnover dynamics.57 Fourth, my paper differs from those studies in terms of the empirical 
findings. Instead of the positive relationship Trevor, Gerhart, and Boudreau find, I find that 
promotion is unrelated to turnover when I focus on the full sample. Moreover, I find that how 
promotion affects turnover varies with job level, which is novel to my study. Specifically, 
                                                 
57
 Because promotions are often accompanied by significant wage increases, taking wage increases into 
account is important for getting a true estimate of the impact of promotion on turnover as opposed to the 
combined effect of promotion and the wage increases associated with promotions. 
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promotion is negatively correlated with turnover in higher level jobs while it is positively 
correlated with turnover in lower level jobs. Fifth, in contrast to both of the human resource 
studies, I focus more on economic theories rather than psychological explanations concerning 
promotion-turnover interactions.58 
3. Review of Testable Implications 
This section offers a brief review of the three sets of testable implications derived from 
tournament, job assignment, and signaling theories.59 To begin, all three theories predict that 
wages are positively related to promotions. In terms of tournament theory, this prediction is in a 
sense an inherent assumption of the promotion scheme. Job assignment theory makes such a 
prediction because workers who are promoted are of higher expected abilities and are assigned to 
the job in which they are more productive. Signaling theory predicts a positive correlation 
between wage and promotion because promotion sends out a positive signal to outside firms 
regarding the worker’s high ability and hence market wage offers bid up the wage the worker 
receives after the promotion. 
Besides the positive relationship between wage and promotion, all three theories predict that 
performance ratings are positively related to the probability of promotion. Tournament theory 
makes such a prediction due to the assumption that workers are promoted according to the rank 
order of their outputs. On the other hand, job assignment theory and signaling theory predict 
such a positive relationship between performance ratings and the probability of promotion 
                                                 
58
 Note than none of the psychological explanations fully capture the empirical evidence I find. 
Specifically, none of them explains the finding that the promotion and turnover dynamics vary with job 
level. 
59
 See “Theory on Promotion and Turnover” and “Theoretical Extensions on Promotion and Turnover” 
for details. See also Table 1 for the summary of the predicted correlations of all the theories. 
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because in both theories, workers revealed to be of high ability are promoted and firms learn 
from observing performance ratings.60 
Even though the first two predictions are the same among the theories, the one regarding 
promotion and turnover dynamics distinguishes among them. Specifically, tournament theory 
predicts that promotion is negatively correlated with turnover. The intuition behind this 
prediction is that there is a wage premium associated with promotion which is only available at 
the current employer of each worker. In order to earn the wage premium, a promoted worker has 
to stay with her current employer. As a result, there is a negative relationship between promotion 
and turnover according to the tournament model. However, due to the lack of within job wage 
dispersion, the tournament model makes no prediction regarding the relationship between wage 
and turnover controlling for promotions. 
On the other hand, the job assignment model predicts that promotion is not related to 
turnover. The logic behind this prediction is that the difference between the turnover and non-
turnover wages is the same among workers and hence is independent of the job assignment. As a 
result, promotion is not related to turnover with or without controlling for wages. In addition, 
because turnover is the same among workers and hence is independent of ability, the wage is 
unrelated to turnover controlling for promotions. 
The signaling model makes the prediction that when the return to effort is similar at different 
jobs and when firm specific human capital is small, promotion is positively related to turnover. 
The intuition behind this prediction is threefold. First, because the difference between the 
turnover and non-turnover wages increases with the distance between a worker’s realized ability 
                                                 
60
 Note that I use performance rating as a proxy of output in the interpretation of all the testable 
implications. 
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and expected ability-what I call the ability distance-the turnover rate decreases with this distance. 
Second, when return to effort is similar among the jobs, turnover decreases with the ability 
distance in a similar fashion at all jobs. Third, when firm specific human capital is small, the 
proportion of promoted workers is small. As a result, the average distance between the realized 
and expected abilities is smaller for the promoted workers. Therefore, the turnover rate of the 
promoted workers is higher than that of the non-promoted workers. That is, promotion is 
positively related to turnover.  
In addition, the signaling model predicts that the wage is negatively correlated with turnover 
given promotion. The idea here is that the difference between the turnover and non-turnover 
wages increases in the ability distance given the job assignment. Because turnover decreases in 
the ability distance, given promotion, we should expect to see that wage is negatively associated 
with turnover. 
When firm specific human capital is introduced, both the tournament and the job assignment 
models make new predictions regarding the relationships between wage, promotion, and 
turnover. To begin, as previously, the tournament model with firm specific human capital 
predicts that promotion is negatively correlated with turnover controlling for wages. Similar to 
the intuition in the original extension of the model, workers who are promoted only earn the high 
wages if they stay with their current employers. As a result, there is a negative correlation 
between promotion and the probability of leaving. 
On the other hand, the job assignment model with human capital predicts that promotion is 
positively related to turnover controlling for wages, which is different from the job assignment 
model with no human capital. The idea behind this prediction is that, because workers with the 
human capital have higher expected productivities at their initial employers, each firm pays 
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higher wages to these employees to increase their probabilities of staying. As a result, the 
workers with the human capital have a lower turnover rate than the workers without it. Because 
it is theoretically possible for a human capital worker with low ability who is not promoted to 
earn the same wage as a non-human capital worker with high ability who is promoted, job 
assignment theory predicts that, controlling for wages, there is a positive relationship between 
promotion and turnover. 
Another new result is that both the tournament and the job assignment models with human 
capital predict that wage is negatively associated with turnover controlling for promotions. The 
reason is that workers with different human capital outcomes earn different wages upon 
promotion. However, all workers receive the same market wage offer due to the fact that the 
human capital is firm specific. Because each worker makes her turnover decision based on a 
comparison of the wage gain from staying to the match quality, workers with higher wages have 
a higher probability of staying. Therefore, both the enriched tournament and job assignment 
models predict that there is a negative relationship between wage and turnover controlling for 
promotions. 
Table 1 summarizes the predicted correlations from all three theories and the associated 
theoretical extensions. As has been reviewed in this section, the three theories make similar 
predictions regarding the relationship between promotions and wages and that between 
performance ratings and the probability of promotion.61 Therefore, the theories mainly differ in 
their predictions on the promotion and turnover dynamics. Specifically, tournament theory 
                                                 
61
 Note than when firm specific human capital is added, the tournament model’s prediction concerning the 
relationship between performance ratings and wages controlling for promotions becomes ambiguous. See 
footnote 46 for a related discussion. 
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predicts that promotion is negatively related to turnover, job assignment theory predicts that 
promotion is not related to turnover, while signaling theory predicts that promotion increases 
turnover given certain conditions hold. In addition, tournament theory and job assignment theory 
enriched with firm specific human capital predict a negative relationship between wage and 
turnover controlling for promotions.62 
4. Data 
My data consist of personnel records of all managerial employees of a medium-sized firm in 
the financial services industry in the U.S. over the years 1969-1988. They were first collected 
and analyzed in the seminal studies of Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b) and 
originally contained information on 16,133 unique employees over twenty years. All told, the 
dataset contains 74,071 employee-year observations and individual information on gender, race, 
age, education, salary, tenure, performance ratings, and turnover. 
One unique feature of the BGH dataset is its simple and well-constructed hierarchical levels. 
Specifically, the data can be grouped into eight job levels, the construction of which is purely 
based on the pattern of transitions between job titles.63 The rigid hierarchical structure is 
convenient in defining promotions. Based on the eight job levels above, I construct a 0/1 
indicator variable for promotion, whose value is 1 if the job level in the contemporaneous year is 
higher than that in the previous year. Similar to DeVaro and Waldman (2012), I do not 
distinguish between single-level promotions and multiple-level promotions. This is unlikely to 
                                                 
62
 Note that when enriched with human capital, job assignment theory predicts a positive relationship 
between promotion and turnover instead of the zero relationship it predicted given no firm specific human 
capital. 
63
 See Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a) for a more complete discussion of the construction of job 
levels. 
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cause any problem because 97.44% of the promotions in the BGH dataset are single-level 
promotions.64 
Another advantage of the BGH dataset is that it contains complete records of individuals’ 
career histories, including salary and turnover. I define turnover based on the variable “year-to-
quit.” “Year-to-quit” measures the number of years until a worker leaves the firm since the end 
of the previous year. For example, if “year-to-quit” equals 3 in 1980, it means that the individual 
left the firm in 1982. Therefore, for individuals who leave by the end of the contemporaneous 
year, “year-to-quit” equals 1. Further, for individuals who never leave during the twenty-year 
span, “year-to-quit” is recorded as missing for each year during the period of observation. Based 
on the variable “year-to-quit,” I construct a 0/1 indicator variable for turnover, whose value 
equals 1 if “year-to-quit” is 1, and 0 otherwise (where 0 includes missing values of “year-to-
quit”).65 
Another key variable in my study is compensation. To measure compensation, I use real 
annual salary measured in 1988 dollars. Further, performance ratings are measured on a 5-point 
scale in a descending order, i.e., a performance rating of 1 denotes the best performance, while 
that of 5 denotes the worst. Finally, for those variables whose values change on a yearly basis, 
such as performance rating, promotion, and job level, I use their values from the previous year 
instead to ensure they each have at least a full-year of impact on each observation.66 
                                                 
64
 I also ran all the tests on the sample without multiple-level promotions. I found no qualitative 
differences in the coefficients. 
65
 Due to lack of information, I do not distinguish between quits and layoffs. Also, I have experimented 
with defining turnover to be 1 when an individual exits the dataset. The adoption of this alternative 
definition has no impact on the results. 
66
 DeVaro and Waldman (2012) use a similar approach in their empirical analysis. 
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I now discuss the restrictions I employ in constructing my samples. First, because tenure is an 
important control variable in most of my regressions, I drop the 1969 cohort from the sample 
because their complete career paths prior to year 1969 are not available. To exclude retirements 
from the turnover sample, I drop the observations in which workers’ ages are higher than 60.67 I 
also restrict attention to male workers because previous studies find that the promotion dynamics 
between male and female workers might be different (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1990). 
Additionally, I exclude those workers who work overseas because the compensation data are 
recorded in local currencies. Also, I restrict my attention to white workers. Finally, to keep the 
sample sizes across tests fairly constant, I drop all observations that contain missing values of 
salary, promotion, age, education, tenure, and job level. As a result, my full sample consists of 
4,216 employees and 22,060 employee-year observations. Table 2 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the full sample, while Table 3 breaks down salary, change-in-salary, promotion, 
turnover, and performance rating by job level. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
This section discusses the empirical findings on the testable implications derived from the 
theory chapters. As a first step, I run the tests on the full sample. Here, I find that each theory is 
able to capture some of the empirical findings, though none of them describes the data perfectly. 
To further examine the validity of the various theories, I then divide the full sample into 
subsamples according to job level. The logic behind this approach is twofold. To begin, 
tournament theory is likely more applicable to jobs in which incentives are relatively important, 
                                                 
67
 I have also experimented with other cutoff retirement ages such as 50 and 55. The results are robust to 
these other cutoff levels. 
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an insight built on the study of Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988). In seeking an explanation for 
why promotion serves as both an incentive device and a labor allocation device, Baker et al. 
consider promotion based incentive schemes and point out that there are costs associated with 
using promotions as incentives under certain conditions. Building on this insight, it seems 
plausible to assume that firms should only adopt tournament based incentive schemes in jobs in 
which incentives are particularly important. 
When it comes to the empirical analysis, I use job level as a proxy for the importance of 
incentives because incentives are likely to be more important at higher job levels.68 Rosen (1982) 
argues that return to ability increases with job level. According to this argument, if we were to 
take a standard approach according to which productivity is determined by the sum of ability and 
effort, it seems plausible to assume that return to effort should also increase with job level. 
Therefore, incentives to induce higher effort should become more critical as job level increases. 
My conjecture that firms are more likely to run tournaments in jobs in which incentives are more 
important suggests that tournament theory should fit the data better in jobs at higher levels. 
A second motivation for my approach of splitting the full sample into subsamples by job level 
builds on a discussion in Waldman (2013). In comparing classic promotion tournaments and 
market-based tournaments, Waldman proposes a hybrid approach of the incentive role and the 
signaling role of promotion by incorporating market wage offers as a constraint into a classic 
tournament setting. Waldman (2013) then conjectures that the signaling model should be better 
at capturing the empirical evidence in lower level jobs while the tournament model should be 
better at capturing the evidence in higher level jobs. The intuition behind this conjecture is that 
                                                 
68
 Papers that have a similar setup include but are not limited to Garicano (2000) and Lemieux, Macleod, 
and Parent (2009). 
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the market wage is more likely to be binding at lower job levels because of the convex reward 
scheme argument of Rosen (1986). 69 
To separate the sample by job level, I group the jobs of levels 1 and 2 into a low level 
subsample and the jobs of levels 3 through 7 into a high level subsample, where the logic for this 
approach is further discussed at the beginning of the subsection that discusses the subsample 
results.70 Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the level subsamples. Finally, I cluster 
standard errors by individual in all regressions because individual characteristics will frequently 
be serially correlated over time.71 
5.1. Results from the Full Sample 
This subsection presents the results of the tests using the full sample. As discussed earlier, 
previous studies have already found evidence consistent with the first two tests. For example, 
both Baker et al. (1994b) and McCue (1996) find that promotions are associated with wage 
premiums. Also, both Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) and DeVaro and Waldman (2012) find 
that performance ratings are positively related to the probability of promotion. Therefore, it is the 
test on promotion and turnover dynamics that clearly distinguishes this chapter from the previous 
studies. However, for completeness, I also report the results on the first two tests. 
Below I present the results in the order of the derivation of the tests in the theoretical chapters. 
Let t1	
 denote worker ’s annual compensation at the last day of year , and 8e	
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 See Waldman (2013) for more detail. 
70
 Note that in all the regressions the job levels are pre-promotion job levels.  
71
 Standard errors barely change when they are not clustered by individual. 
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denote a 0/1 indicator variable whose value is 1 if worker  is promoted during year . Further, 
let #	
 denote worker ’s performance rating in year . 
5.1.1. The relationship between promotions and wage levels (Test 1) 
To study wage and promotion dynamics, I consider the following regression specification. 
t1	
 = " + "' ¡  	
 + "t1	,
G' + "~#	,
G' + ¢	
" + £	,
G'"¤ + 	
           (1) 
where ¢	
 denotes a vector of individual characteristics in the contemporaneous year 
including age, education, tenure at the job level, and their square terms, as well as job level 
indicators. £	,
G' denotes a vector of individual characteristics in the previous year including 
tenure at the company and its square term, and 	
 denotes a stochastic term. Note that the key 
focus of regression (1) is on the coefficients of  ¡  	
 and #	
. From Table 1 we 
know that the tournament model predicts "' > 0 and "~ = 0, while both the job assignment 
model and the signaling model predict "' > 0 and "~ > 0.72, 73 
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 Instead of treating performance rating as a continuous variable, I also run all the tests employing 
indicator variables of performance ratings. Overall, results on the coefficients of these indicator variables 
in each test are consistent with the coefficients on the continuous variable. 
73
 Note that the current signaling theory predicts that there is no relationship between wage and promotion 
controlling for outputs because wage is fully determined by a worker’s expected output. However, 
because performance rating is a coarse measure of output, promotion captures part of the positive 
relationship between output and wage in the data. Therefore, the signaling model predicts that promotion 
is positively correlated with wage given performance ratings when the ratings are coarse. To theoretically 
generate such a positive relationship between wage and promotion controlling for outputs without coarse 
performance ratings, one can introduce a slot constraint concerning promotions in the signaling model, 
which occurs with a strictly positive probability. The idea here is that when the slot constraint is binding, 
a worker might not get promoted even with a sufficiently high expected output. That is, two workers with 
the same expected output can have different job assignments and the one that is assigned to the high level 
job earns a higher wage. Therefore, with a slot constraint, the signaling model would predict that, 
controlling for even non-coarse performance ratings, promoted workers earn higher wages than non-
promoted workers.  
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Table 5 displays the OLS estimates and the estimates controlling for individual fixed effects 
for the relationship between promotion and wage levels in the full sample. To begin with, 
columns (1) and (4) report the estimates for the regressions without controlling for performance 
ratings. In order to test the relationship between promotions and wages given performance 
ratings, I construct a more stringent sample where the observations contain no missing 
information on performance ratings. I report in columns (3) and (6) the estimates for the 
regressions where performance ratings are also controlled for using this more stringent sample. 
To exclude the possibility that changes in the coefficients of the regressions controlling and not 
controlling for performance ratings are caused by the changes in the underlying sample, I also 
run the regression of promotion and wages without controlling for performance ratings in the 
more stringent sample and report these results in columns (2) and (5) of Table 5. Overall, I find 
that promotions are positively related to wages. Moreover, performance ratings are positively 
related to wages controlling for promotions. 
To examine those results more closely, consider first the OLS estimates in columns (1) to (3). 
Column (1) suggests that, all else equal, compensation among the promoted workers is on 
average 0.047 log points higher than that among the non-promoted workers. Further, column (3) 
shows that, when performance ratings are added as an explanatory variable, both promotion and 
performance ratings are positively related to wages. Specifically, all else equal, the average pay 
of the promoted workers is higher than that of the non-promoted workers by approximately 
0.044 log points. Also, given promotions, a one unit improvement in performance rating 
increases compensation by approximately 0.8%. Lastly, all the coefficients mentioned above are 
significant at the 1% level. 
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I now discuss the rest of the findings from the wage-promotion regressions. To begin, age, 
education, tenure at the company, and tenure at the job level decreases wage growth at a 
decreasing rate, ceteris paribus.74 Also, compensation increases in the starting level of 
compensation. Overall, the previous results are more consistent with the job assignment model 
and the signaling model because both of these models capture the positive relationship between 
performance ratings and wages given promotions. 
Now consider the linear fixed-effect estimates shown in columns (4) to (6) of Table 5. On the 
whole, the results are consistent with the non-FE estimates. Specifically, column (4) tells us that, 
controlling for individual fixed effects, promotion increases the average level of compensation 
by approximately 0.037 log points, which supports both theories. Moreover, column (6) says 
that, controlling for performance ratings, workers earn an average promotion premium of 0.035 
log points, while given promotions, a one unit improvement in performance ratings increases 
compensation by approximately 0.5%. As a final note, all the coefficients discussed above are 
significant at the 1% level. 
5.1.2. The relationship between performance ratings and the probability of promotion (Test 2) 
I use the following regression specification to study the relationship between performance 
ratings and the probability of promotion. 
8 ¡  	
 = 1) = Λβ + §'#	,
G' + ¢	
§ + £	,
G'§~)		                                         (2) 
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 Note that because of the quadratic terms of age, education, and tenure included, the average levels of 
age, education, tenure at the company, and tenure at the job level at which they have zero impact on wage 
levels, are 54.57, 16.42, 4.42, and 9.28 for the OLS estimates, respectively. As a result, about 95.65%, 
73.00%, 100%, and 100% of the observations in the stringent sample are located to the left of the critical 
points of the age, education, and tenure distributions, respectively. Therefore, the impact of age, 
education, and tenure on wage levels is mostly negative. 
 79 
 
In the above regression, ¢	
 and £	,
G' are vectors of individual characteristics and Λ denotes 
the logit cumulative distribution function. According to Table 1, we know all three theories 
predict that §' < 0. 
I report the logit marginal effects estimates for the relationship between promotion and 
performance ratings in Table 6. Consistent with the predictions of all three theories, I find 
performance ratings are significantly positively related to the probability of promotion.75 To be 
specific, a one unit improvement in performance ratings increases the promotion probability by 
approximately 6.5 percentage points, which is significant at the 1% level. In addition, I find that 
the probability of promotion is negatively related to age and tenure at the company while 
positively related to tenure at the job level.76 Moreover, education has no significant impact on 
promotion.77 In summary, the positive relationship between performance ratings and the 
probability of promotion provides evidence consistent with all three theories.78 
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 To be more precise, the tournament theory model I developed predicts a positive correlation between 
promotions and performance ratings across firms but not within each firm. However, if we allow each 
firm to run multiple tournaments, the above prediction also holds within a single firm. In addition, job-
assignment theory predicts that promotion follows a step function of performance ratings. There is a 
similar issue and similar resolution concerning the signaling model. 
76
 Because the regression controls for quadratic terms of age, education, and tenure, the levels of age, 
tenure at the company, and tenure at the job level at which they have zero impact on the probability of 
promotion, are 66.03, 13.95, and 7.53 years. Therefore, all of the observations in the sample are located to 
the left of the critical points of the age and tenure distribution. Therefore, age and tenure at the company 
decrease the probability of promotion, while tenure at the job level increases this probability. 
77
 Note that my findings on tenure at the company are somewhat different from those of DeVaro and 
Waldman (2012) which is likely due to the different regression specifications we use. Specifically, aside 
from tenure at the company, DeVaro and Waldman also control for job title indicators as well as tenure at 
job titles. 
78
 I also run linear FE estimates for the impact of performance ratings on promotion probabilities. Overall, 
the rating coefficients are quite similar to those under the non-FE specifications.  
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5.1.3. The relationship between promotion and turnover (Test 3) 
Let % ¨	
 denote an indicator variable whose value is 1 if worker  switches employers 
by the end of year , and let ©#	
 ≡ t1	
 , t1	
 − t1	,
G') denote a vector of wage 
measures. I consider the following regression specification for the investigation of the 
relationship between promotion and turnover. 
8% ¨	
 = 1) = Λγ + γ' ¡  	,
G' +©#	
γ + γ~#	,
G' + ¢	
γ +
£	,
G'γ¤)                                                                                                                                        (3) 
In equation (3), Λ denotes the logit cumulative distribution function, ¢	
 is a vector of 
individual characteristics in year  including age, education and their square terms and £	,
G' is a 
vector of individual characteristics in year  − 1 including tenure at the company, tenure at the 
job level and the associated square terms, as well as job level indicators. Recall from Table 1 that 
the tournament model predicts γ' < 0, the job assignment model predicts γ' = 0 and  γ = 0«¬, 
while the signaling model predicts γ' > 0 and  γ < 0«¬. In addition, the extension of the 
tournament model with firm specific human capital predicts that γ' < 0 and  γ < 0«¬ while that 
of the enriched job assignment model predicts that γ' > 0 and  γ < 0«¬. 
Table 7 presents the OLS estimates and the average logit marginal effects estimates for the 
impact of promotion on turnover in the full sample. To test the robustness of the results to 
different wage measures, I adopt both log compensation and change in log compensation as two 
separate wage measures. Overall, I find evidence of an insignificant relationship between 
promotion and turnover, which is consistent with the job assignment model without human 
capital. Also, this relationship is robust to all regression specifications. 
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Because of the similarities between the OLS and the logit marginal effects estimates, I focus 
on the latter for a more detailed discussion. First, columns (5)-(8) show that promotion has no 
significant impact on turnover. On average, the size of the promotion coefficient is close to zero 
and insignificant, which is robust to all the regression specifications. 
Aside from the promotion and turnover dynamics, I find that both log compensation and 
change in log compensation are significantly negatively related to separation probabilities, which 
is more consistent with the signaling model and the job assignment model with firm specific 
human capital. Specifically, column (6) shows that, controlling for promotions, a one percent 
increase in the level of compensation decreases turnover rates by approximately 4.9 percentage 
points, which is significant at the 1% level. Meanwhile, column (7) says that a one percent 
increase in compensation growth rate decreases the separation probability by about 25.7 
percentage points, which is also significant at the 1% level. Lastly, column (8) suggests that, 
when both the level and the growth rate of compensation are controlled for, the latter has a more 
statistically significant impact on turnover. Specifically, a one percent increase in the 
compensation growth rate decreases turnover by approximately 23.1 percentage points, which is 
significant at the 1% level, while a one percent increase in the level of compensation decreases 
turnover by about 3.0 percentage points, which is significant at the 5% level.79 
Overall, results from the full sample regressions suggest that each theory captures a subset of 
the empirical findings. Specifically, all three theories are able to explain the positive relationship 
between wages and promotions as well as that between performance ratings and the probability 
of promotion. However, tournament theory does not explain the positive relationship between 
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 I show the estimates of logit coefficients in Table 13 of Appendix 4. Overall, the logit coefficients are 
consistent with the logit marginal effect estimates in terms of both signs and significance levels. 
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performance ratings and wages after controlling for promotions. And it is not consistent with the 
insignificant relationship between promotion and turnover. The job assignment model, on the 
other hand, does a better job at explaining the empirical findings regarding the relationship 
between wage and performance rating controlling for promotions as well as the promotion and 
turnover dynamics. However, it is not consistent with the negative wage-turnover dynamics 
controlling for promotions. In addition, the signaling model is able to capture the positive 
relationships between promotions, performance ratings, and wages. However, it does not explain 
the insignificant promotion and turnover dynamics.80 Lastly, the extensions of the tournament 
and the job assignment models with the human capital are able to capture the negative wage and 
turnover dynamics controlling for promotions. However, the negative promotion and turnover 
dynamics the tournament model predicts as well as the positive dynamics the job assignment 
model predicts contradict the empirical evidence of an insignificant relationship between 
promotion and turnover. 
5.2. Results from the Level Subsamples 
I now divide the full sample into subsamples by job level. My goal here is to test the 
conjecture that the tournament model is more applicable to higher level jobs while the signaling 
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 According to Proposition 1.3, when firm specific human capital is small and return to effort does not 
vary much across jobs, signaling theory predicts a positive relationship between promotion and turnover. 
According to Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a), firm specific human capital is not prevalent in the 
BGH dataset. Also, because there are eight job levels in the BGH dataset, return to ability should not vary 
much across adjacent job levels. As a result, I interpret signaling theory as predicting a positive 
relationship between promotion and turnover in the BGH data. In other words, signaling theory does not 
explain the insignificant promotion-turnover pattern actually found in the full sample. 
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model is more applicable to lower level jobs due to both the incentive argument of Rosen (1982) 
and Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) and the hybrid approach of Waldman (2013).81 
My approach with breaking up the sample by job level is the following. I group the jobs of 
levels 1 and 2 into a low level subsample and I group the jobs of levels 3 to 7 into a high level 
subsample. Due to the sample size concern, this particular way of grouping the job levels allows 
me to split the full sample relatively evenly by the job level a worker is promoted from.82 My 
conjecture is that, tournament theory should capture the promotion-turnover dynamics better in 
higher level jobs and signaling theory should capture these dynamics better in lower level jobs. 
Below I present the empirical findings from the subsamples. As a final note, I compile all of the 
subsample results for each test into one table for ease of comparison. 
5.2.1. The relationship between promotions and wage levels (Test 1) 
Table 8 displays the OLS estimates for the relationship between promotions and wage levels, 
where columns (1) and (2) report the results without controlling for performance ratings while 
columns (5) and (6) report the results controlling for performance ratings. Similar to the full 
sample results, as a robustness check, in columns (3) and (4) I also report the results without 
controlling for performance ratings using the more stringent sample, which contains no missing 
information on performance ratings. Overall, similar to the findings from the full sample, the 
subsample findings are more consistent with the predictions of job assignment theory and 
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 Note that the incentive argument is silent on which role of promotion prevails at lower level jobs while 
the hybrid approach argues that the signaling role of promotion should prevail. 
82
 I also experimented with other ways of splitting the job levels. The promotion coefficients in the 
promotion-turnover regressions are more negative in terms of magnitudes as the high-level sample 
becomes more exclusive of higher level jobs. This finding not only serves as a robustness check of my 
approach, but also provides further evidence along the lines of my results reported below consistent with 
the conjecture that tournament theory is more applicable to jobs at higher hierarchical levels. 
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signaling theory. Specifically, in both of the level subsamples, I find that promotions are 
significantly positively related to wage levels with and without the control of performance 
ratings, while performance ratings are positively related to wages controlling for promotions. 
Because of the similarities between the two sets of results, I focus on the ones that control for 
performance ratings in the following discussion. Column (5) of Table 8 shows that, in the high 
level subsample, given performance ratings, compensation among the promoted workers is 0.051 
log points higher than that among the non-promoted workers. Moreover, holding fixed the 
promotion outcomes, a one unit increase in performance rating increases the level of 
compensation by approximately 1.2%, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, findings from the low 
level subsample displayed in column (4) of Table 8 suggest that the wage premium associated 
with promotions is 17.7% lower, while the rating premium is 75% lower in the low level 
subsample than in the high level subsample. Further, all coefficients discussed above are 
significant at the 1% level.83 Finally, the promotion premiums are not statistically significantly 
different between the level subsamples, while the rating premiums are. 
Table 9 shows the associated linear fixed-effect estimates of the promotion and wage 
dynamics of the subsamples. Overall, all of the results including the individual fixed effects are 
quite consistent with the non-FE estimates. Specifically, as shown in columns (5) and (6), when 
controlling for performance ratings, promotion increases the wage premium in the high level 
subsample by about 3.7 percentage points, and that in the low level subsample by about 3.1 
percentage points. Moreover, given promotions, a one unit improvement in performance rating 
increases the wage premium in the high level subsample by about 0.9 percentage points. Lastly, 
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 One exception is the rating coefficient in the low level subsample is significant at the 5% level. 
 85 
 
all of the coefficients mentioned above are significant at the 1% level. Finally, similar to the 
findings of the non-FE estimates, the promotion coefficients are not statistically significantly 
different between the level subsamples in all regressions. 
In summary, similar to my conclusions in the full sample section, the subsample findings 
regarding wage and promotion dynamics are consistent with the predictions of all three 
theories.84 Moreover, the job assignment model and the signaling model explain the results from 
both subsamples better in the sense that they capture the positive relationship between 
performance ratings and wages. 
5.2.2. The relationship between performance ratings and the probability of promotion (Test 2) 
Table 10 shows the average logit marginal effects estimates for the effects of performance 
ratings on the probability of promotion in the level subsamples. Consistent with the full sample 
results, I find that in both subsamples performance ratings are significantly positively related to 
the probability of promotion, which supports all three theories. Specifically, column (1) of Table 
10 says that, in the high level sample, a one unit improvement in performance ratings increases 
the probability of promotion by approximately 5.2 percentage points. Similarly, column (2) 
shows that, in the low level subsample, workers with a one unit improvement in performance 
ratings are 8.3 percentage points more likely to be promoted. In addition, both of these 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
Also, I find that the size of the rating effects in the lower level jobs is approximately 1.6 times 
of that in the higher level jobs, and this difference is statistically significant between the level 
                                                 
84
 However, tournament theory does not describe the data in the high level subsample perfectly because it 
does not explain the positive relationship between performance ratings and wages controlling for 
promotions. 
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subsamples. One potential explanation for this pattern is that promotion gets progressively less 
likely as job level increases. In other words, because chances of promotion decrease with job 
level, a one unit increase of performance ratings in higher level jobs might appear to have a 
much smaller effect on the promotion probability in terms of absolute values, even though the 
size of the impact might stay relatively the same in terms of percentage changes. Another 
possible explanation for this pattern is that performance ratings tend to vary less in higher 
hierarchical levels and thus might not be able to capture as much variation of the promotion 
probabilities. In fact, one can find evidence consistent with both of the aforementioned 
conjectures in Table 3. That is, both the mean promotion rate and the standard error of 
performance ratings decrease with job level.85 
In summary, consistent with the findings from the full sample, I find that performance ratings 
are significantly positively related to the probability of promotion in both of the level 
subsamples, which supports the predictions of all three theories.86 
5.2.3. The relationship between promotion and turnover (Test 3) 
In this subsection, I present the key findings in the subsample section, i.e., the relationship 
between promotion and turnover. Similar to my approach with the full sample, I run both linear 
and logit regressions and control for two different wage measures as a robustness check of my 
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 Note that the standard error of performance ratings at job level 6 is slightly higher than that at job level 
5. 
86
 In both of the level subsamples, tenure is mostly positively related to the probability of promotion, 
which is consistent with the full sample results. However, age is positively related to the probability of 
promotion in the high level subsample, while negatively related to this probability in the low level 
subsample. The reason why age has a different impact on the probability of promotion at different job 
levels remains unclear. 
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results. For completeness, I report the associated full sample results with promotion-level and 
wage-level interactions in Table 14 of Appendix 4. 
Tables 11 and 12 contain the OLS and logit marginal effects estimates for the promotion and 
turnover dynamics of the level subsamples, where columns (1) through (4) in both tables are for 
the regression specifications with different wage measures. On the whole, there is strong 
evidence that promotion is significantly negatively related to turnover in the high level 
subsample, while it is positively related to turnover in the low level subsample.87 In addition, 
wage is negatively related to turnover controlling for promotions. These findings suggest that 
tournament theory with human capital better explains the promotion and turnover dynamics at 
higher job levels, while both the signaling theory and the job assignment theory with firm 
specific human capital better capture the dynamics at lower job levels. 
Because of the similarities between the OLS and the logit marginal effects estimates, I focus 
on the latter for more detail. Table 12 demonstrates that, given workers are from the higher level 
jobs, those who are promoted are approximately 3.0 percentage points less likely to leave than 
those who are not, which is significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, in the low level 
subsample, promotion on average increases turnover by about 1.2 percentage points, which is 
significant at the 10% level when controlling for the level of compensation. Moreover, the 
differences in the promotion coefficients between level subsamples are statistically significant 
across all regression specifications, which suggests the promotion schemes at different 
hierarchical levels are substantially different. 
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 Note that the positive relationship between promotion and turnover in the low level subsample is only 
significant when the level of compensation is controlled for. 
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As for the coefficients of the level and growth rate of compensation, I find that only the 
growth rate has a significant impact on turnover in the high level subsample, while both of them 
significantly decrease turnover in the low level subsample. Specifically, all else equal, a one 
percent increase in the compensation growth rate significantly decreases the separation 
probability in the higher level jobs by approximately 31.3 percentage points. On the other hand, 
among lower level jobs, a one log point increase in the level of compensation reduces the 
turnover probability by approximately 6.5 percentage points, while a one percent increase in the 
compensation growth rate reduces the turnover probabilities by approximately 19.1 percentage 
points. Furthermore, all of the compensation coefficients mentioned above are significant at the 
5% level. Note, however, comparing the coefficients of the compensation measures, we can see 
that the differences in the coefficients of both level and change of compensation between the 
level subsamples are insignificant.88 Overall, it seems that the tournament model with human 
capital better explains the promotion-turnover dynamics at higher job levels, while the signaling 
model and the job assignment model with human capital better explain the dynamics at lower job 
levels. However, according to Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a), firm specific human 
capital is not significant at the firm in this study. Therefore, it seems more plausible to interpret 
the finding of the positive promotion and turnover dynamics at lower job levels of the hierarchy 
as evidence consistent with the signaling theory. Overall, the subsample results on the promotion 
and turnover relationship shows evidence consistent with the conjectures of both the incentive 
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 For completeness, I report the estimates for logit coefficients in Table 15 in Appendix 4. Overall, the 
coefficients are consistent with the marginal effects in terms of both sign and significance level.  
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argument of Rosen (1982) and Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) and the hybrid approach 
proposed by Waldman (2013).89, 90 
Before we move on, it is worth pointing out an alternative interpretation of the insignificant 
relationship between promotion and turnover in the full sample. Recall from the theories that the 
tournament model predicts that promotion is negatively related to turnover, while the signaling 
model predicts that promotion is positively related to turnover. Therefore, if the reality were a 
mixture of the two theories, as the subsample results suggest, one might predict that promotion 
would have no significant impact on turnover in the full sample. That is to say, instead of 
arguing that the overall evidence favors job assignment theory without human capital, it seems 
more appropriate to view the full sample findings as further evidence consistent with the 
subsample findings, i.e., the incentive role and the signaling role of promotions coexist in the 
BGH data. 
I now briefly summarize the main empirical findings from the level subsamples. First, 
promotion is significantly negatively related to turnover in the higher level jobs, while it is 
significantly positively related to turnover in the lower level jobs. Moreover, controlling for 
promotions, changes in compensation are significantly negatively associated with the separation 
probability in both subsamples, while compensation is only significantly negatively related to 
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 Note that my initial extension of tournament theory does not explain the negative wage and turnover 
relationship given promotions. See Chapter 2 for an extension of the tournament model which captures 
such negative wage and turnover dynamics. 
90
 To see whether the differences in the promotion coefficients across the level subsamples are caused by 
the differences in the distribution of individual characteristics across those subsamples, I re-estimated the 
promotion coefficients of both subsamples by evaluating the rest of the explanatory variables at the 
quantiles of their full sample distributions. I report the findings in Table 16 of Appendix 4. Overall, the 
results are consistent with the subsample findings, which is further evidence consistent with my 
conclusion that tournament theory is more applicable to the promotion-turnover dynamics in higher level 
jobs while signaling theory is more applicable to the dynamics in lower level jobs. 
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turnover in the low level subsample. Overall, results on the promotion and turnover dynamics 
provide evidence consistent with the conjecture that tournament theory is more applicable to 
higher job levels while signaling theory is more applicable to lower job levels.91 Two of the 
potential explanations for these empirical findings include an incentive argument based on Rosen 
(1982) and Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) and the hybrid approach of Waldman (2013). 
6. Conclusion 
Current theory assigns three different roles to promotions, namely, rewarding previous 
performance, allocating workers to tasks, and signaling ability to outside firms. In the first 
chapter of my dissertation titled “Theory on Promotion and Turnover”, I extend tournament 
theory, job assignment theory, and signaling theory with turnover and compare the three roles of 
promotion via the theories’ implications for promotion and turnover dynamics. In the second 
chapter of my dissertation titled “Theoretical Extensions on Promotion and Turnover”, I further 
extend both tournament and job assignment theories with firm specific human capital and 
generate predictions regarding wage and turnover dynamics controlling for promotions. In this 
chapter, I first empirically test these predictions using a large dataset from a single firm in the 
financial services industry in the U.S. and show that each theory is able to capture some of the 
empirical findings. 
To investigate whether tournament theory is more applicable to jobs in which incentives are 
more likely to be important and market wages are less likely to be binding, I divide the sample 
further by hierarchical level. One of the main findings of this chapter is that the tournament 
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 As a robustness check, I also ran all three tests on the observations where bonus data are not missing 
using total compensation as the wage measure, where total compensation is defined as the summation of 
salary and bonus. Results are mostly consistent with those using salary as the wage measure. 
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model with firm specific human capital better explains the promotion and turnover dynamics in 
higher level jobs, while the signaling model better explains the dynamics in lower level jobs. 
Overall, the empirical findings suggest that the role of rewarding past performance of promotion 
prevails at higher job levels while the signaling role of promotion prevails at lower job levels. 
These findings are consistent with both an incentive argument based on Rosen (1982) and Baker, 
Jensen, and Murphy (1988) and the hybrid approach of Waldman (2013). 
I now propose two potential ways to extend the current study. Following the idea of Waldman 
(2013), the first way to is to build a formal hybrid model that combines the classic tournament 
approach of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and the market based tournament approach represented by 
Zabonjik and Bernhardt (2001) and Ghosh and Waldman (2010). Specifically, instead of a single 
promotion, the hybrid model would generate a sequence of promotions, where the predictions of 
the model would be as if promotions at earlier rounds act more like a signaling device, while 
those at later rounds act more like an incentive device. My conjecture is that such a hybrid model 
would be able to formally capture the subsample results that the tournament role and the 
signaling role of promotions seem to coexist in reality. 
The second way to extend the current study is to explore promotion and turnover dynamics 
using other datasets, such as matched employer-employee datasets that contain multiple firms, 
industries, and occupations. Besides providing a robustness check of the empirical findings in 
this paper, such an empirical extension might be able to shed light on how promotion and 
turnover dynamics differ across industries and occupations, which would provide an even 
broader understanding of how internal labor markets operate. 
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Table 1. Summary of Predicted Correlations 
Theory Tournament Job Assignment Signaling 
Firm Specific Human Capital N Y N Y --- 
Promotion and Wage 
Controlling for Ratings + + +① +① +① 
Without Controlling for Ratings + + + + + 
Ratings and Wage Controlling for Promotions 0 NP + + + 
Ratings and Probability of Promotion + + + + + 
Promotion and Turnover 
Controlling for Wages NP NP 0 + NP 
Without Controlling for Wages − −② 0 0 +③ 
Wage and Turnover Controlling for Promotions NP − 0 − − 
Note: ① Holds when performance ratings are coarse; ② Holds when firm specific human capital is sufficiently small; ③ Holds when return to ability are 
sufficiently close at different job levels and firm specific human capital is sufficiently small; “+” stands for positive relationship, “−” stands for negative 
relationship, “0” stands for no relationship, and “NP” stands for no prediction. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, Full Sample 
Variable Mean 
 
[Standard Deviations] 
Annual salary (measured in 1988 dollars) 55310.13 
[22651.86] 
Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1) 0.05 
[0.07] 
Worker’s age (in years) 38.71 
[7.87] 
Education (in years) 15.59 
[2.48] 
Tenure at current firm (in years) 6.04 
[3.73] 
Job level 2.65 
[1.09] 
Tenure at current job level (in years) 3.33 
[2.43] 
Tenure at pre-promotion job level (in years) 3.83 
[2.27] 
Promotion to higher hierarchical level 0.20 
[0.4] 
Turnover rate 0.09 
[0.29] 
Performance rating (1=best; 5=worst) 1.89 
[0.71] 
Rating=1 30.56% 
Rating=2 50.69% 
Rating=3 17.92% 
Rating=4 0.78% 
Rating=5 0.04% 
Number of workers 4216 
Number of observations 22060 
Sample size of performance rating 15949 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Key Variables by Job Level, Full Sample 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
Job level Salary ∆ Log-salary Proportion of workers promoted Turnover Rate Performance Rating Sample size Sample size (%) 
1 38920.44 0.02 0.36 0.08 2.16 3667 16.62% 
[8108.58] [0.06] [0.48] [0.28] [0.74] 
2 43877.24 0.04 0.25 0.10 2.02 6428 29.14% 
[8357.87] [0.06] [0.43] [0.29] [0.7] 
3 53086.39 0.05 0.15 0.10 1.83 6390 28.97% 
 
[9870.61] [0.06] [0.36] [0.29] [0.67] 
  4 77489.84 0.06 0.02 0.10 1.60 5118 23.20% 
[20415.15] [0.07] [0.14] [0.3] [0.64] 
5 119835.81 0.06 0.06 0.09 1.53 341 1.55% 
 
[34679.11] [0.09] [0.23] [0.28] [0.56] 
  6 158207.46 0.05 0.00 0.06 1.64 114 0.52% 
[52446.59] [0.1] [0.00] [0.24] [0.89] 
7 331257.88 0.01 0.00 0.00 --- 2 0.01% 
[10300.82] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] --- 
∆ log-salary is defined as the change in log-salary between the contemporaneous year and the previous year; both salary and ∆ log-salary are measured in 
1988 dollars; sample sizes of  performance rating by level are 2822, 4725, 4644, 3561, 153, 44, and 0, while those for proportion of workers promoted are 
3159, 5412, 5225, 4022, 277, 77, and 2 for job levels 1 through 7, respectively. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics, Level Subsamples 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
Variable Low level High level 
Annual salary (measured in 1988 dollars) 44781.42 71128.13 
 
[9844.14] [25993.99] 
Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1) 0.04 0.05 
 
[0.06] [0.07] 
Worker’s age (in years) 38.21 41.43 
 
[7.73] [7.16] 
Education (in years) 15.01 16.20 
 
[2.31] [2.52] 
Tenure at current firm (in years) 5.47 8.62 
 
[2.67] [3.72] 
Job level 2.08 3.68 
 
[0.71] [0.62] 
Tenure at current job level (in years) 3.10 4.38 
[2.36] [2.57] 
Tenure at pre-promotion job level (in years) 3.81 4.75 
[2.17] [2.38] 
Promotion to higher hierarchical level 0.26 0.10 
 
[0.44] [0.3] 
Turnover rate 0.08 0.09 
 
[0.27] [0.29] 
Performance rating (1=best; 5=worst) 2.02 1.77 
 
[0.72] [0.69] 
Rating=1 23.31% 37.55% 
Rating=2 52.48% 48.97% 
Rating=3 23.09% 12.86% 
Rating=4 1.07% 0.63% 
Rating=5 0.05% 0.00% 
Number of workers 2679 1861 
Number of observations 9775 8280 
Sample size of performance rating 7302 5894 
The low level subsample contains observations at levels 1 and 2 while the high level subsample 
contains observations at levels 3 through 7. 
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Table 5. OLS and Linear Fixed Effects Estimates for the Impact of Promotion on Log-salary, Full Sample 
Dependent variable Log-salary(t) 
 
OLS Linear Fixed Effects 
Full Sample Stringent Sample Full Sample Stringent Sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promotion(t) 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating(t-1) --- --- -0.008*** --- --- -0.005*** 
--- --- (0.001) --- --- (0.001) 
Log-salary(t-1) 0.973*** 0.967*** 0.962*** 0.866*** 0.890*** 0.885*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age(t)*100 -0.963*** -0.921*** -0.885*** --- --- --- 
(0.069) (0.083) (0.082) --- --- --- 
Age(t)2 *10000 0.890*** 0.837*** 0.810*** -0.750*** -0.386 -0.396* 
(0.083) (0.099) (0.098) (0.205) (0.235) (0.234) 
Education(t)*100 -0.661*** -0.526** -0.499** -2.026** -2.492* -2.453* 
(0.195) (0.235) (0.235) (0.857) (1.308) (1.320) 
Education(t)2*10000 2.010*** 1.585** 1.538** 5.892** 8.000** 7.864* 
(0.605) (0.735) (0.737) (2.579) (4.031) (4.063) 
Tenure at company(t-1)*100 0.048 -0.380*** -0.359*** 0.279 -0.398 -0.360 
(0.063) (0.077) (0.076) (0.210) (0.244) (0.242) 
Tenure at company(t-1)2*10000 1.419*** 3.600*** 3.438*** 3.900*** 5.823*** 5.708*** 
(0.346) (0.402) (0.392) (0.459) (0.545) (0.540) 
Tenure at level(t)*100 -0.809*** -0.511*** -0.375*** -0.006 0.032 0.098 
(0.091) (0.104) (0.103) (0.117) (0.141) (0.141) 
Tenure at level(t)2*10000 4.395*** 2.678*** 2.064*** 0.422 -0.042 -0.336 
(0.663) (0.726) (0.702) (0.831) (0.958) (0.944) 
Average log-salary 10.857 10.858 10.858 10.857 10.858 10.858 
 
(0.340) (0.323) (0.323) (0.340) (0.323) (0.323) 
Level(t) indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 22060 14759 14759 22060 14759 14759 
Adj. R-sq. 0.970 0.968 0.968 0.977 0.976 0.976 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; individual fixed effects are calculated; * significant at 
10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; job levels indicate pre-promotion job levels; 
observations in the stringent sample are those that contain no missing information on performance ratings. 
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Table 6. Logit Marginal Effects for Performance Ratings and the Probability of Promotion,  
Full Sample 
Dependent variable Promotion(t) 
Rating(t-1) -0.065*** 
(0.005) 
Age(t)*100 -2.620*** 
(0.394) 
Age(t)2*10000 1.984*** 
(0.498) 
Education(t)*100 0.265 
(1.166) 
Education(t)2*10000 4.379 
(3.599) 
Tenure at company(t-1)*100 -1.794*** 
(0.499) 
Tenure at company(t-1)2*10000 6.430** 
(3.137) 
Tenure at level(t)*100 12.446*** 
(0.956) 
Tenure at level(t)2*10000 -82.594*** 
(8.881) 
Average promotion rate 0.195 
 
(0.396) 
Level(t) indicators Yes 
N 14915 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.189 
Log likelihood -5973.684 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level; average marginal effects are calculated; job levels indicate pre-
promotion job levels. 
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Table 7. OLS and Logit Marginal Effects Estimates for the Impact of Promotion on Labor Turnover, Full Sample 
Dependent variable Turnover(t) 
 
OLS Logit Marginal Effects 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Promotion(t-1) 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.008 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Log-salary(t) --- -0.053*** --- -0.033** --- -0.049*** --- -0.030** 
--- (0.014) --- (0.015) --- (0.013) --- (0.014) 
Log-salary(t)˗Log-salary(t-1) --- --- -0.258*** -0.230*** --- --- -0.257*** -0.231*** 
--- --- (0.044) (0.045) --- --- (0.046) (0.048) 
Age(t)*100 -0.707** -0.593* -0.977*** -0.877*** -0.491 -0.370 -0.755** -0.653* 
(0.328) (0.331) (0.329) (0.332) (0.331) (0.334) (0.333) (0.338) 
Age(t)2*10000 0.555 0.417 0.804** 0.691* 0.278 0.134 0.519 0.405 
(0.377) (0.380) (0.378) (0.382) (0.397) (0.401) (0.398) (0.403) 
Education(t)*100 2.251** 2.222** 2.141** 2.135** 3.082*** 3.140*** 2.963*** 3.008*** 
(0.906) (0.910) (0.910) (0.911) (0.867) (0.874) (0.869) (0.872) 
Education(t)2*10000 -4.959* -4.675 -4.600 -4.461 -7.321*** -7.294*** -6.939*** -6.955*** 
(2.864) (2.882) (2.875) (2.885) (2.572) (2.585) (2.573) (2.581) 
Tenure at company(t-1)*100 -1.390*** -1.659*** -1.402*** -1.569*** -1.411*** -1.643*** -1.421*** -1.561*** 
(0.336) (0.343) (0.336) (0.342) (0.356) (0.356) (0.351) (0.353) 
Tenure at company(t-1)2*10000 5.247*** 6.421*** 5.824*** 6.498*** 5.137*** 6.179*** 5.796*** 6.365*** 
(1.738) (1.760) (1.746) (1.761) (1.964) (1.959) (1.944) (1.943) 
Tenure at level(t-1)*100 1.087** 1.332*** 0.902* 1.076** 1.216** 1.416** 0.991* 1.132** 
(0.470) (0.472) (0.471) (0.473) (0.557) (0.554) (0.545) (0.545) 
Tenure at level(t-1)2*10000 -5.447 -6.493* -4.440 -5.204 -5.963 -6.694 -4.740 -5.276 
(3.565) (3.544) (3.574) (3.559) (4.466) (4.431) (4.358) (4.339) 
Rating(t-1) 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Average turnover rate 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 
 
(0.273) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) 
Level(t-1) indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 12751 12751 12751 12751 12751 12751 12751 12751 
Adj. R-sq./ pseudo R-sq. 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.030 0.032 0.035 0.036 
Log likelihood --- --- --- --- -3477.833 -3470.437 -3458.288 -3455.771 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; 
average marginal effects are calculated. 
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Table 8. OLS Estimates for the Impact of Promotion on Log-salary, Level Subsamples 
Dependent variable Log-salary(t) 
 
Full Sample Stringent Sample Stringent Sample 
High level Low level High level Low level High level Low level 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promotion(t) 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.042*** 0.051*** 0.042*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Rating(t-1) --- --- --- --- -0.012*** -0.003** 
--- --- --- --- (0.002) (0.001) 
Log-salary(t-1) 0.986*** 0.965*** 0.979*** 0.963*** 0.971*** 0.961*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Age(t)*100 -0.782*** -0.974*** -0.709*** -0.969*** -0.681*** -0.953*** 
(0.144) (0.092) (0.167) (0.107) (0.165) (0.108) 
Age(t)2*10000 0.621*** 0.989*** 0.514*** 0.998*** 0.504*** 0.983*** 
(0.164) (0.109) (0.193) (0.126) (0.190) (0.127) 
Education(t)*100 -0.654** -0.556** -0.691* -0.151 -0.621* -0.142 
(0.311) (0.277) (0.366) (0.316) (0.362) (0.317) 
Education(t)2*10000 1.970** 1.653* 2.055* 0.305 1.914* 0.293 
(0.933) (0.880) (1.101) (1.002) (1.096) (1.007) 
Tenure at company(t-1)*100 0.296*** -0.680*** 0.153 -0.975*** 0.100 -0.963*** 
(0.094) (0.115) (0.112) (0.133) (0.110) (0.132) 
Tenure at company(t-1)2*10000 0.244 4.180*** 1.146** 5.924*** 1.362** 5.893*** 
(0.487) (0.699) (0.566) (0.799) (0.547) (0.790) 
Tenure at level(t)*100 -0.667*** -0.578*** -0.393** -0.293* -0.255 -0.247 
(0.155) (0.135) (0.172) (0.160) (0.167) (0.160) 
Tenure at level(t)2*10000 3.690*** 3.792*** 1.899 1.894* 1.364 1.659 
(1.123) (0.951) (1.166) (1.084) (1.104) (1.077) 
Average log-salary 11.119 10.687 11.124 10.705 11.124 10.705 
 
(0.313) (0.212) (0.290) (0.207) (0.290) (0.207) 
Level(t) indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8280 9775 5631 7091 5631 7091 
Adj. R-sq. 0.961 0.935 0.957 0.933 0.957 0.933 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; the 
low level subsample contains promotions from job levels 1 and 2 while the high level subsample contains promotions from job levels 3 
through 7; observations in the stringent sample contain no missing information on performance ratings. 
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Table 9. Linear Fixed Effects for Promotion and Log-salary, Level Subsamples 
Dependent variable Log-salary(t) 
 
Full Sample Stringent Sample Stringent Sample 
High level Low level High level Low level High level Low level 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promotion(t) 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.031*** 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Rating(t-1) --- --- --- --- -0.009*** -0.000 
--- --- --- --- (0.002) (0.002) 
Log-salary(t-1) 0.804*** 0.785*** 0.808*** 0.832*** 0.801*** 0.832*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Age(t)2*10000 -2.521*** -0.459 -1.922*** -0.053 -1.885*** -0.055 
(0.443) (0.385) (0.519) (0.461) (0.513) (0.462) 
Education(t)*100 -2.166 -0.352 -3.748 -1.763 -3.755 -1.758 
(1.568) (1.330) (2.986) (1.950) (2.972) (1.952) 
Education(t)2*10000 6.720 0.379 11.958 4.981 11.941 4.963 
(4.647) (3.943) (9.227) (5.580) (9.165) (5.585) 
Tenure at company(t-1)*100 2.251*** -0.004 1.272** -0.743* 1.240** -0.739* 
(0.445) (0.371) (0.550) (0.438) (0.540) (0.439) 
Tenure at company(t-1)2*10000 4.928*** 2.973** 7.396*** 5.715*** 7.459*** 5.711*** 
(0.737) (1.160) (0.931) (1.422) (0.922) (1.421) 
Tenure at level(t)*100 -0.019 -0.021 0.068 -0.116 0.153 -0.110 
(0.213) (0.201) (0.281) (0.249) (0.276) (0.250) 
Tenure at level(t)2*10000 -0.265 0.702 -1.517 0.770 -1.757 0.738 
(1.441) (1.391) (1.840) (1.694) (1.778) (1.698) 
Average log-salary 11.119 10.687 11.124 10.705 11.124 10.705 
 
(0.313) (0.212) (0.290) (0.207) (0.290) (0.207) 
Level(t) indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8280 9775 5631 7091 5631 7091 
Adj. R-sq. 0.971 0.956 0.970 0.956 0.970 0.956 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; 
individual fixed effects are calculated; the low level subsample contains promotions from job levels 1 and 2 while the high level subsample 
contains promotions from job levels 3 through 7; observations in the stringent sample contain no missing information on performance ratings. 
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Table 10. Logit Marginal Effects for Performance Ratings and the Probability of Promotion, 
Level Subsamples 
Dependent variable Promotion(t) 
High level Low level 
 
(1) (2) 
Rating(t-1) -0.052*** -0.083*** 
(0.006) (0.008) 
Age(t)*100 -2.258*** -2.049*** 
(0.560) (0.651) 
Age(t)2*10000 1.960*** 1.101 
(0.677) (0.812) 
Education(t)*100 2.257* -5.210** 
(1.285) (2.257) 
Education(t)2*10000 -3.978 21.907*** 
(3.787) (7.255) 
Tenure at company(t-1)*100 -1.370*** -4.595*** 
(0.479) (0.947) 
Tenure at company(t-1)2*10000 5.382* 24.227*** 
(2.791) (6.299) 
Tenure at level(t)*100 3.573*** 12.916*** 
(0.855) (1.587) 
Tenure at level(t)2*10000 -16.308** -89.744*** 
(6.361) (14.147) 
Average promotion rate 0.095 0.253 
 
(0.293) (0.435) 
Level(t) indicators Yes Yes 
N 5711 7149 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.231 0.147 
Log likelihood -1383.300 -3447.826 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level; the low level subsample contains promotions from job levels 1 and 2 
while the high level subsample contains promotions from job levels 3 through 7; for all the regressions 
average marginal effects are calculated. 
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Table 11. OLS Estimates for the Impact of Promotion on Labor Turnover, Level Subsamples 
Dependent variable Turnover(t) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
High level Low level High level Low level High level Low level High level Low level 
Promotion(t-1) -0.027** 0.008 -0.024* 0.016** -0.023** 0.012 -0.024* 0.017** 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) 
Log-salary(t) --- --- -0.023 -0.074*** --- --- 0.005 -0.060*** 
--- --- (0.023) (0.018) --- --- (0.023) (0.019) 
Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1) --- --- --- --- -0.297*** -0.219*** -0.301*** -0.172*** 
--- --- --- --- (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.066) 
Age(t)*100 0.907 -1.402*** 0.936* -1.229*** 0.622 -1.672*** 0.611 -1.474*** 
(0.555) (0.412) (0.557) (0.415) (0.554) (0.415) (0.555) (0.420) 
Age(t)2*10000 -1.283** 1.380*** -1.321** 1.178** -1.047* 1.656*** -1.035* 1.432*** 
(0.623) (0.480) (0.626) (0.483) (0.623) (0.483) (0.624) (0.488) 
Education(t)*100 2.283* 0.481 2.318* 0.160 2.116* 0.417 2.106* 0.170 
(1.241) (1.594) (1.243) (1.600) (1.245) (1.596) (1.244) (1.601) 
Education(t)2*10000 -5.916 1.583 -5.941 2.895 -5.381 1.776 -5.368 2.801 
(3.689) (5.275) (3.696) (5.302) (3.701) (5.281) (3.698) (5.306) 
Tenure at company(t-1)*100 -1.480*** -0.959* -1.587*** -1.232** -1.421*** -1.088* -1.397*** -1.282** 
(0.450) (0.568) (0.463) (0.572) (0.451) (0.571) (0.463) (0.573) 
Tenure at company(t-1)2*10000 4.890** 2.784 5.350** 3.855 5.198** 3.814 5.101** 4.462 
(2.286) (3.165) (2.329) (3.179) (2.291) (3.194) (2.328) (3.198) 
Tenure at level(t-1)*100 2.015*** 0.204 2.139*** 0.391 1.857*** 0.077 1.828*** 0.256 
(0.595) (0.745) (0.606) (0.744) (0.593) (0.747) (0.602) (0.748) 
Tenure at level(t-1)2*10000 -13.886*** 3.679 -14.330*** 2.699 -12.941*** 4.335 -12.829*** 3.396 
(4.227) (5.742) (4.245) (5.714) (4.226) (5.768) (4.230) (5.744) 
Rating(t-1) 0.030*** 0.019*** 0.028*** 0.014*** 0.027*** 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.014*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Average turnover rate 0.085 0.078 0.085 0.078 0.085 0.078 0.085 0.078 
 
(0.279) (0.268) (0.279) (0.268) (0.279) (0.268) (0.279) (0.268) 
Level(t-1) indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5644 7107 5644 7107 5644 7107 5644 7107 
Adj. R-sq. 0.015 0.020 0.015 0.022 0.019 0.022 0.018 0.023 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; the low 
level subsample contains promotions from job levels 1 and 2 while the high level subsample contains promotions from job levels 3 through 7. 
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Table 12. Logit Marginal Effects for Promotion and Labor Turnover, Level Subsamples 
Dependent variable Turnover (t) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
High level Low level High level Low level High level Low level High level Low level 
Promotion(t-1) -0.032** 0.007 -0.029* 0.015* -0.029* 0.011 -0.030* 0.016** 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008) 
Log-salary(t) --- --- -0.021 -0.071*** --- --- 0.006 -0.058*** 
--- --- (0.021) (0.019) --- --- (0.021) (0.019) 
Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1) --- --- --- --- -0.310*** -0.214*** -0.315*** -0.168** 
--- --- --- --- (0.069) (0.065) (0.070) (0.067) 
Age(t)*100 1.015* -1.017** 1.050* -0.839** 0.776 -1.309*** 0.761 -1.102** 
(0.605) (0.423) (0.609) (0.425) (0.609) (0.427) (0.611) (0.434) 
Age(t)2*10000 -1.444** 0.901* -1.488** 0.701 -1.261* 1.207** -1.244* 0.978* 
(0.706) (0.522) (0.710) (0.524) (0.710) (0.525) (0.713) (0.530) 
Education(t)*100 2.721** 2.271* 2.795** 2.120* 2.595* 2.169* 2.570* 2.053* 
(1.330) (1.190) (1.338) (1.193) (1.335) (1.189) (1.336) (1.191) 
Education(t)2*10000 -7.083* -4.102 -7.218* -3.342 -6.650* -3.799 -6.599* -3.201 
(3.830) (3.625) (3.845) (3.623) (3.833) (3.620) (3.833) (3.616) 
Tenure at company(t-1)*100 -1.354*** -1.016 -1.447*** -1.238* -1.324*** -1.135 -1.296*** -1.284* 
(0.461) (0.713) (0.468) (0.704) (0.457) (0.700) (0.466) (0.695) 
Tenure at company(t-1)2*10000 4.110 1.691 4.517* 2.521 4.701* 2.757 4.593* 3.180 
(2.561) (4.604) (2.586) (4.572) (2.543) (4.529) (2.568) (4.522) 
Tenure at level(t-1)*100 2.296*** 0.295 2.408*** 0.401 2.041*** 0.153 2.007*** 0.265 
(0.734) (0.862) (0.740) (0.853) (0.712) (0.847) (0.715) (0.844) 
Tenure at level(t-1)2*10000 -16.406*** 5.142 -16.802*** 4.659 -14.768** 5.788 -14.641** 5.293 
(6.047) (6.413) (6.061) (6.369) (5.836) (6.296) (5.822) (6.286) 
Rating(t-1) 0.029*** 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.013** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.013*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Average turnover rate 0.085 0.078 0.085 0.078 0.085 0.078 0.085 0.078 
 
(0.279) (0.268) (0.279) (0.268) (0.279) (0.268) (0.279) (0.268) 
Level(t-1) indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5644 7107 5644 7107 5644 7107 5644 7107 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.030 0.039 0.031 0.043 0.038 0.043 0.038 0.046 
Log likelihood -1590.115 -1866.556 -1589.520 -1858.661 -1577.459 -1859.190 -1577.415 -1854.394 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; the low 
level subsample contains promotions from job levels 1 and 2 while the high level subsample contains promotions from job levels 3 through 7; for 
all the regressions average marginal effects are calculated. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDX 1. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.1 
Consider first the second period. Since period 2 is the last period of production, each worker 
must choose the lowest effort level in equilibrium, i.e. 	 = : = ∗ = 0. Because of market 
competition, the market wage 15 equals each worker’s expected productivity in period 2. That 
is, 15∗ = . 
In period 1, each worker chooses an effort level to maximize her expected lifetime utility 
conditional on the wage offers, while each firm chooses wages to maximize each worker’s 
expected utility subject to a zero profit constraint and that her effort is a best response to the 
wages. Because of the assumptions !0) = 0 and " > 0, if a solution exists, we know it must 
be an interior solution. 
We now write down each worker ’s expected utility function and each firm’s expected profit 
function. In particular, the utility function can be written as follows. 
67	 = 12 + 89	' > :';<8"	 < 13 −15)13 + [1 − 8"	 < 13 −15)]15> + ?1 −
89	' > :';@<8"	 < 143 −15)143 + [1 − 8"	 < 143 −15)]15> − 6["	 + 	')] −
<89	' > :'; A B%B)CB + ?1 − 89	' > :';@ A B%B)CB>DEFGDHG(
DFGDH
G(                           (A1.1) 
In the expression above, 6["	 + 	')] = 	'). Let °. ) and . ) denote the cumulative 
distribution function and the density function of :
 − 	
, respectively, where 0) > 0 and 
°0) = '. Therefore, the probability of worker  winning the tournament can be expressed as 
follows. 89yM' > yN'; = °9	' − eN';. To simplify notation, define I	 ≡ 8αM < 1I −15) =
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±²G³
( +
'
, where t ∈ <8, e8>. Due to the assumption that match qualities are uniformly 
distributed on the interval [−#, #], (A1.1) can be expressed in the following way. 
67	 = 1[ + °9	' − eN';<313 + 1 − Fµ)15> + ?1 − °9	' − eN';@<43143 + 1 −
F¶µ)15> − CeM') − °9	' − eN'; |DFGDEF −15} −
DEFGDHG(
 − 	')                           (A1.2) 
Now consider the firms’ profit function. Because of the assumption that  > 2, we know 
in equilibrium each firm earns zero expected profit. This zero profit condition can be expressed 
as (A1.3). 
6J = 6	'	) + K°9	' − :';3	 + ?1 − °9	' − :';@43	 O6		) + 69:'; + K?1 − °9	' −
:';@3: + °9	' − :';43: O69:; − <°9	' − :';3	 + ?1 − °9	' − :';@3:>13 − K?1 −
°9	' − :';@43	 + °9	' − :';43: O143 −12 −12 = 0                                                    (A1.3) 
In expression (A1.3), yM¸  denotes each worker ’s output level in period t. Based on the utility 
function and the profit function above, the maximization problem can be set up as the following. 
max67	                                                                                                                                   (A1.2) 
<12,13 ,143 , 	'>   
st. 6J = 0                                                                                                                               (A1.3) 
					' ∈ argmax	67	, given 12, 13, 143, and :'                                                                  (A1.4) 
				<	' ≥ 0>  
We now solve for the maximization problem. First, recall that , ) satisfies both the 
MLRC property and the CDFC condition.92 According to Rogerson (1985), we can solve for the 
                                                 
92
 See footnote 13 for details on the MLRC property and the CDFC condition. 
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maximization problem using the first order approach. That is, the problem defined by (A1.2) to 
(A1.4) is equivalent to the relaxed program defined by (A1.2), (A1.3) and (A1.5). 
max67	                                                                                                                                   (A1.2) 
<12,13 ,143 , 	'>   
st. 6J = 0                                                                                                                               (A1.3) 
¹º»i
¹-ik
= 0, given 12, 13, 143, and :'                                                                               (A1.5) 
In addition, (A1.5) can be rewritten as (A1.6). 
9	' − :'; 313 − ) − 43143 − ) − DFGDEF +  = !	')                                (A1.6) 
Note that condition (A1.6) defines a worker’s optimal effort choice as the best response function 
of the wages Wµ, W¶µ, and W[ and the other worker’s first period effort choice :'. 
Given the symmetry of 	' and :' in (A1.2), (A1.3) and (A1.6), we know that if a solution 
exists, it should be a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which each worker in a tournament exerts 
the same level of first period effort and has a probability of  ' of being promoted. Let '∗ denote 
this equilibrium effort level. Due to the symmetry between the two workers, we can simplify 
conditions (A1.2), (A1.3), and (A1.6) as (A1.7), (A1.8), and (A1.9), respectively.  
67	 = 1[ + ' <313 + 1 − 3)15> +
'
 <43143 + 1 − 3)15> − '∗) −
'
 |
DFGDEF
 −
} − DEFG¼G( = 1[ +
'
313 − ) +
'
43143 − ) −
'
13 −
'
143 + 2 +
'
# − '∗)  
(A1.7) 
6J = 2 + 2'∗ − 21[ − 313 − ) − 43143 − ) = 0		                                            (A1.8) 
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0) ½313 − ) − 43143 − ) −13 −1432 + ¾ = 
!'∗) 
Or equivalently, 
0) DFG¼)( −
DEFG¼)
( +  = !'∗)                                                                            (A1.9) 
From (A1.9), we can solve for '∗ as a function of the period two wages 13 and 143, i.e., 
'∗ = ℎ13 − ,143 − ) = !G'<0) DFG¼)

( −
DEFG¼)
( + >.                                 (A1.10) 
Due to the fact that " > 0, we know that ′ is both invertible and strictly increasing, and so 
is ′G'. For notational simplicity, define À ≡ ′G'. Therefore, À satisfies À! > 0. Plugging 
(A1.10) into (A1.8), the zero profit condition is simplified to the following equation. 
2 + 2ℎ13 − ,143 − ) − 21[ − 313 − ) − 43143 − ) = 0		                       (A1.11) 
Solving 12 from (A1.11), we have (A1.12).  
21[ = 2 + 2ℎ13 − ,143 − ) − 313 − ) − 43143 − )                                (A1.12) 
Define BI ≡ 1I − , t ∈ <8, e8> and plug (A1.12) into (A1.7). The maximization problem is 
now reduced to the problem characterized by (A1.13). 
maxℎB3, B43) − ÁF −
ÁEF
 − ℎB3, B43))	                                                                      (A1.13) 
<B3, B43>  
Define ℎ3 ≡ ¹ÂÁF,ÁEF)¹ÁF  and ℎ43 ≡
¹ÂÁF,ÁEF)
¹ÁEF . From (A1.10) we now have (A1.14). 
hµ = D!<g0) ±ÄG³)

Å −
±ÆÄG³)
Å + b>
±ÄG³
(
ℎ43 = D!<g0) ±ÄG³)

Å −
±ÆÄG³)
Å + b>−1)
DEFG¼
(
                                                       (A1.14) 
Further, taking derivatives with respect to B3 and B43 in (A1.13), respectively, we have the first 
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order conditions (A1.15) and (A1.16). 
. . . B3):ℎ3∗ [1 − !'∗)] = '                                                                                          (A1.15) 
. . . B43):ℎ43∗ [1 − !'∗)] = '                                                                                      (A1.16) 
Conditions (A1.15) and (A1.16) yield 
ℎ3∗ = ℎ43∗ ≠ 0,                                                                                                                       (A1.17) 
while condition (A1.14) says  
ÂF∗
ÂEF∗
= − ÁF∗ÁEF∗ .                                                                                                                          (A1.18)  
Therefore, (A1.17) together with (A1.18) tell us that B3∗ + B43∗ = 0, i.e., 
143∗ +13∗ = 2.                                                                                                                  (A1.19) 
We now consider the equilibrium wages. First consider the relationship between 13∗ and 
143∗ . Suppose 13∗ ≤	143∗ . Then we know that workers would exert zero effort in period 1, i.e.,  
'∗ = 0. Focusing on interior solutions, the equilibrium wages must satisfy 13∗ >	143∗ . This 
wage relationship together with (A1.19) indicates that 
13∗ >  > 143∗ .                                                                                                                    (A1.20)  
In addition, one can solve for the equilibrium first period wage 12 from (A1.12) where the 
second period wages are at the equilibrium levels. As a result, 12∗ =  + '∗ − ' [
DF∗G¼)
( +
13∗ − ) + DEF
∗ G¼)
( + 143∗ − )]. Note that because of condition (A1.19), 13∗ −  +143∗ −
 = 0. Therefore, 12∗ can be rewritten as 12∗ =  + '∗ − ' [
DF∗G¼)
( +
DEF∗ G¼)
( ]. Therefore, 
12∗ <  + '∗, i.e., due to the fact that firms offer higher promotion wages and the promoted 
workers are more likely to stay, each firm makes strictly negative expected second period profit 
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from a worker. As a result, the first period wage is below the young workers’ expected 
productivity in period 1. 
 Next, consider the level of first period effort in equilibrium. Instead of solving for it 
explicitly, I focus on the comparison of that to the efficient effort level. First, condition (A1.17) 
tells us that ℎ3∗ = ℎ43∗ , while condition (A1.20) says that 13∗ −  > 0 and 143∗ −  < 0. 
Because À! > 0, the inequalities above together with (A1.14) indicate that ℎ3∗ = ℎ43∗ > 0. 
Additionally, conditions (A1.15) and (A1.16) indicate that !'∗) < 1, i.e., '∗ < 'X. In other 
words, the equilibrium level of first period effort is below the efficient level. 
Lastly, let us compare the equilibrium turnover rates to the efficient turnover rate. First, note 
that turnover is efficient if a worker quits when her match quality with the current firm is worse 
than her expected match with a potential employer. That is, turnover is efficient if and only if 
1I∗ = 15∗ = , t ∈ <8, e8>. Further, there is excessive (insufficient) turnover if and only if 
1I∗ < >), t ∈ <8, e8>. Recall that 8X, 83∗ and 843∗  denote the efficient and equilibrium 
turnover rates for the promoted and the non promoted workers. According to the previous 
analysis, condition (A1.20) indicates that 83∗ < 8X < 843∗ , i.e., there is insufficient turnover for 
the promoted workers while excessive turnover for the non-promoted workers in equilibrium 
(QED).
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APPENDIX 2. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.3 
Consider first the second period. Recall that ]′ denotes the ability level for efficient 
promotion.93 Let 15:  and 1	:denote the market wage offer and the current firm’s wage offer to 
each worker  with job assignment a. Let ]r denote the ability level so that a firm is indifferent 
between promoting a worker with such ability and not promoting a worker with such ability. 
That is, the expected profit from promoting the worker with ability ]r equals that from not 
promoting the worker. As a result, ]r must satisfy the condition 
8"	 ≤ 1	' −15')[1 + )C' + b']r	) − 1	'] = 8"	 ≤ 1	 −15)[1 + )C + b]r	) −
1	]	.                                                                                                                                        (A2.1) 
Therefore, a worker with ability ]	 > ]r will be promoted to job 2 while a worker with ability 
]	 ≤ ]r will stay at job 1 in the second period.  
We now characterize the market wages. Note first that the market wage equals the worker’s 
expected productivity at the job the worker is assigned to conditional on the fact that the worker 
switched employers. Since ability is not observable to outside firms, outside firms use the 
promotion decision as a signal of ability and update their beliefs regarding ability upon observing 
each worker’s job assignment at her current employer. Let "	:]	) denote the cutoff match 
quality for worker  with ability ]	 at job a such that a worker will switch employers if her match 
quality is worse than "	:]	).94 In addition, let  ]-: denote the expected ability of the workers who 
were assigned to job a and switched employers. That is, 
                                                 
93
 To ensure θ′ exists and that θ! > θÊ, assume ËkGËÌGÌk ∈ 
ÍÎrÍÏ
 , θÐ). 
94
 That is, worker i will switch employers if αM ≥ αMNθM). 
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]- = A ]	 (GÒi
ni)	
A (GÒini)		*niÓpÓÔ
C]	npnÔ , and ]-' = A ]	
(GÒikni)	
A (GÒikni)		*niÓ
Ô
Ós
C]	n
Ô
ns .
 95                                             (A2.2)  
In other words, the expected ability of each group of workers equals the weighted average of 
the ability levels by the probability of a worker switching employers given that ability level. As a 
result, the market wage offer to the workers who were promoted and left and that to the workers 
who were not promoted and left equal 15 = C + b]- and 15' = C' + b']-', respectively. 
We now consider the current firm’s problem regarding each worker . First consider the 
amount of rent the current firm extracts from worker . Given the worker’s ability and the market 
wage offer, the current firm’s problem is to choose a wage 1	:to maximize its expected profit. 
Since worker  only stays at the current firm if her expected cost from staying is less than or 
equal to her expected benefit from staying, each firm’s expected profit function is given by 
89"	 ≤ 1	: −15:;[1 + )C: + b:]	) −1	:]. Let ∆	: denote the difference between the current 
firm’s wage offer and the market wage offer to each worker , i.e., ∆	:≡ 91	: −15:;. Because 
"	:]	) denotes the cutoff match quality for worker  at job a such that the worker leaves if her 
match with the current firm is worse than "	:]	), we know by definition 
"	:]	) = ∆	: .                                                                                                                           (A2.3)  
Based on the notation above, each firm’s expected profit can be written as (A2.4). 
89"	 ≤ ∆	:;[1 + )C: + b:]	) − 15: + ∆	:)], where 89"	 ≤ ∆	:; = ∆i
jr(
(                           (A2.4)  
Therefore, each firm’s problem is to choose ∆	: to maximize the expected profit in (A2.4). 
Solving this maximization problem we have the difference between the non-turnover and the 
                                                 
95
 Here I assume outside firms make consistent job assignment decisions with each worker’s current 
employer. I prove later that this is indeed the optimal strategy for outside firms in equilibrium. 
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turnover wages equals ∆	:∗= ' [1 + )9C: + b:]	; − # −15
:] in equilibrium, where a ∈ <1,2>. 
Therefore, the second period wage 1	: = 15: + ∆	:∗= ' ?1 + )9C: + b:]	; − # +15
:@ =
'
 ?1 + )9C: + b:]	; − # + 9C: + b:]-
:;@, where a ∈ <1,2>. 
I now calculate the turnover rate for each worker  given the equilibrium rent ∆	:∗. Let B	:  
denote the difference between the efficient ability of an old worker  and the market expected 
ability of this worker at job a. That is, 
B	: = 1 + )]	 − ]-:, a ∈ <1,2>.                                                                                              (A2.5)  
Later I refer to B	:  as the ability distance. Based on the definition of B	: , ∆	:∗ can be rewritten as 
(A2.6). 
∆	:∗= ' 9C: − #; +
lj
 B	
: , a ∈ <1,2>.                                                                                       (A2.6) 
Therefore, the second period wage 1	: = 15: + ∆	:∗= 15: + ' 9C: − #; +
lj
 B	
:
 increases in the 
ability distance B	: , a ∈ <1,2>. Also, condition (A2.6) tells us that the probability of staying for 
worker  at job a equals 89"	 ≤ ∆	:∗; = '( 9C: + #; +
lj
( B	
: , a ∈ <1,2>. Let 8	:denote the 
turnover rate for worker  at job a. We know  
8	: = 1 − 89"	 ≤ ∆	:∗; = '( 93# − C:; −
lj
( B	
:
.                                                                  (A2.7) 
That is, the turnover rate decreases in the ability distance B	: . 
I now demonstrate that, to prove the average turnover rate of the promoted workers is higher 
than that of the non-promoted workers, it is sufficient to show the distance between the market 
expected ability and the mean ability levels of the promoted workers is less than that of the non-
promoted workers, where the mean ability level is calculated based on a uniform distribution. Let 
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8:denote the average turnover rate of the workers at job a, where a ∈ <1,2>. Therefore, the goal 
here is to show 8 > 8'. Assume first there is no firm specific human capital, i.e.,  = 0. 
From equation (A2.7) we know that 8	' = ~ −
lk
( B	' and that 8	 =
~
−
l
( B	'. In addition, assume 
that the return to effort at the two jobs is the same, i.e., b' = b. As a result, to show 8 > 8', 
where 8: = A8	:C]	, it is sufficient to show 
 A B	'C]	n
Ô
ns > A B	C]	
np
nÔ .                                                                                                        (A2.8) 
To prove condition (A2.8) holds, let us first solve for A B	'C]	n
Ô
ns  and A B	C]	
np
nÔ  explicitly. 
From equation (A2.5), we know (A2.9) and (A2.10) hold. 
A B	'C]	n
Ô
ns = ]r − ]^)[1 + )
nÔrns
 − ]-']                                                                        (A2.9)  
A B	C]	npnÔ = ]_ − ]r)[1 + )
nÔrnp
 − ]-]                                                                     (A2.10)  
Let ]'ÊÊÊ and ]ÊÊÊ denote the average ability level of worker  at jobs 1 and 2, respectively, where ]	 
is uniformly distributed on the relevant interval. That is,  ]'ÊÊÊ = n
Ôrns
   and ]ÊÊÊ=
nÔrnp
 . As a result, 
conditions (A2.9) and (A2.10) can be rewritten as conditions (A2.11) and (A2.12). 
A B	'C]	n
Ô
ns = ]r − ]^)[1 + )]^ÊÊÊ − ]-']                                                                            (A2.11)  
A B	C]	npnÔ = ]_ − ]r)[1 + )]_ÊÊÊÊ − ]-]                                                                           (A2.12)  
Suppose ]r > ]!. Based on the assumption that ]! > ]̅, we have ]r − ]^ > ]_ − ]r. 
Therefore, to show condition (A2.8) holds, it is sufficient to show ]'ÊÊÊ − ]-' > ]ÊÊÊ − ]-. See 
Figure 9 below for the relationship among the critical ability levels. 
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I now prove ]'ÊÊÊ − ]-' > ]ÊÊÊ − ]-. First, let v:]	) denote the updated market belief of each 
worker ’s probability of leaving conditional on her job assignment a, i.e., 
v:]	) = (GÒi
jni)	
A (GÒijni)		*niÖj
, where ' = []^ , ]r] and  = []r, ]_], a ∈ <1,2>. Further, let C:) 
denote the length of the interval :. According to (A2.11) and (A2.12), we know that 
v:]	) = ~(G*jGlj['r)niGn,
j]
*9×j;[~(G{*jGlj['r)nØÊÊÊGn,j]
, where a ∈ <1,2>.                                                           (A2.13)  
For simplicity, define :]	) ≡ 3# − C: − b:[1 + )]	 − ]-:]. According to this definition, 
:]	) is an increasing function of ]	. Also, we can now rewrite v:]	) as v:]	) = jni)*×j)j9nØÊÊÊ;. 
Therefore, according to condition (A2.13), the market expected ability of the workers assigned to 
job a equals ]-: = A ]	v:]	)C]	 = ]Ù − '9nØÊÊÊ; 1 + )b:
*×j)
'×j  and hence the distance between 
the mean ability and the market expected ability levels equals ]Ù − ]-: = '9nØÊÊÊ; 1 + )b:
*×j)
' . 
Because :]	) increases in ]	, we know ]'ÊÊÊ)<	]ÊÊÊ), i.e., '9nkÊÊÊÊ; >
'
9nÊÊÊÊ;. Additionally, because 
]r − ]^ > ]_ − ]r, we know C') > C), i.e., C') > C). Lastly, based on the 
assumption that in the limit as b' − b approaches 0, we have ]'ÊÊÊ − ]-' > ]ÊÊÊ − ]-. As a result, we 
have the average turnover rate of the promoted workers is higher than that of the non-promoted 
workers, i.e., 8 > 8'. 
Let ¨ denote the ratio of the return to ability at job 2 to that at job 1, i.e., b = ¨b', ¨ > 1. 
]! ]r ]-' ]^ ]_ ]- ]ÊÊÊ ]'ÊÊÊ 
Figure 9. Relationship of the Ability Levels in the Signaling Model 
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Note that because 8: , a ∈ <1,2> is a continuous function of  and the return to ability at job a, 
b: ,we know that there exists an  > 0 that is small enough and a Ú > 0 that is small enough so 
that ∀ ∈ 0, ) and ∀¨ ∈ 1,1 + Ú), the condition 8 > 8' holds. That is, if the firm specific 
human capital is sufficiently small and the return to ability at the two jobs are sufficiently close 
to each other, it is always true that the average turnover rate of the promoted workers is higher 
than that of the non-promoted workers. 
I now consider the relationship between ]r and ]!. First, based on the equilibrium solutions 
to the wages, condition (A2.1) is equivalent to C' + b'[1 + )]r − ]-'] = C + b[1 +
)]r − ]-]. Solving for ]r from the previous condition we have 
]r = *kG*)rln,Glkn,k)'r)lGlk) .                                                                                                    (A2.14) 
To compare ]r with ]!, I subtract ]! from equation (A2.14). As a result, we have (A2.15). 
]r − ]! = 9*rln,;G*krlkn,k)'r)lGlk)                                                                                               (A2.15)  
Note that the denominator of condition (A2.15) is strictly positive and the numerator of 
condition (A2.15) is the difference between the market expected productivity of the promoted 
workers and that of the non-promoted workers. As a result, the comparison of ]r and ]! is 
equivalent to the comparison of the two expected productivities.  
Consider the following two cases. First, suppose ]r = ]!, i.e.,  
C + b]- = C' + b']-'.                                                                                                        (A2.16)  
According to the definition of ]!, we know 
C + b]! = C' + b']!.                                                                                                         (A2.17) 
Subtracting condition (A2.17) from condition (A2.16) we have (A2.18). 
b]- − ]!) = b']-' − ]!)                                                                                                   (A2.18)  
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However, since ]- > ]! > ]-', the left hand side of condition (A2.18) is strictly positive while 
the right hand side of this condition is strictly negative. Hence, we have a contradiction.  
Second, suppose ]^ ≤ ]r < ]!. Now there are two possible relationships between the market 
expected abilities and the efficient ability for promotion. Suppose first that ]-' < ]! < ]-, then 
similar to the analysis in the previous case, we have a contradiction to condition (A2.18). If, on 
the other hand, ]-' < ]- < ]!, it is then optimal for the market to assign all the workers who 
switched employers to the low level job. As a result, outside firms are only willing to pay a 
single wage to the workers who switched employers, which equals the expected productivity of 
the worker evaluated at the lower expected ability level, i.e., 15' = 15 = C' + b']-'. The 
previous analysis suggests that the promotion signal has no value to the outside firms and hence 
should not bid up the wage paid to the promoted workers. As a result, the current firm of each 
worker will promote the worker in an efficient fashion, i.e., promote the worker if and only if 
this worker’s ability ]	 is above the efficient ability for promotion ]!, and not otherwise. This in 
turn indicates ]r = ]!, which leads to a contradiction to the case being considered here.  
From the discussion of the two cases above we know it must be true in equilibrium that 
]r > ]!. That is, similar to the discussion in Ghosh and Waldman (2010), because promotion 
signals a worker’s high ability and hence bids up the market wage offer to the promoted workers, 
a firm is only willing to promote this worker if her ability is high enough. This is to ensure that 
the increase in productivity is sufficient to cover the associated increase in the wage.  
As a final note, ]r > ]! tells us that it is optimal for the outside firms to align their job 
assignment decisions with the current firm. That is, to assign a worker to the high level job if the 
worker was promoted and switched employers, and to the low level job if she was not promoted 
and switched employers. 
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Lastly, consider the first period wage 12. Because of the free entry assumption, we know that 
each firm makes zero expected profit in equilibrium, where the expected profit can be expressed 
as follows. 
6Π	 =
C' + b']̅) − 12 + n
ÔGns
npGns 8"	 ≤ ∆	
'∗)[1 + )C' + b']	) −15' − ∆	'∗] + npGn
Ô
npGns 8"	 ≤
∆	∗)[1 + )C + b]	) −15 − ∆	∗]                                                                                (A2.19) 
Further, 6Π	 can be rewritten as condition (A2.20). 
 6Π	 = 89"	 ≤ ∆	:∗;?1 + )C: + b:]	; −15: − ∆	:∗] = '( Û9C: + #; + b:?1 + )]	 −
]-:@Ü
 ≥ 0, a ∈ <1,2>                                                                                                              (A2.20) 
That is, the expected profit from each worker  is non-negative. Therefore, the expected 
second period profit must be strictly positive in equilibrium.96 Because the first period wage 12∗ 
satisfies the zero profit condition, we know that it must be higher than the young workers’ 
expected output in period 1. That is, 12∗ > C' + b']̅ (QED). 
                                                 
96
 This is based on the assumption that not all the workers a firm hires have abilities that equal the market 
expected ability level ]-:, a ∈ <1,2>. 
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APPENDIX 3. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.1 
Below I solve the utility maximization problem in the extension of the tournament model with 
a focus on the symmetric perfect Bayes Nash equilibrium. Consider first the second period. 
Similar to the original model, because period 2 is the last period of production, workers choose 
the lowest effort possible and outside firms pay the workers according to their expected second 
period outputs. Because the human capital is firm specific, each worker will earn the market 
wage of 15 =  in equilibrium. 
In the first period, each worker chooses an effort level to maximize her expected lifetime 
utility given the wages. On the other hand, each firm chooses wages to maximize a worker's 
expected utility subject to a zero profit constraint and the fact that each worker chooses effort to 
maximize her expected lifetime utility given the wages.  
Before solving the problem in more detail, it is helpful to first consider the relationship 
between the human capital and non-human capital wages. Recall from the analysis of the original 
extension of the tournament model that each firm chooses second period wages to minimize 
three types of inefficiencies, i.e., the inefficiency from the first period effort, the insufficient 
turnover of the promoted workers, and the excessive turnover of the non-promoted workers. This 
remains the case in the further extension of the model. However, what changes is that there are 
now two pairs of second period wages, where there is a distinct pair for each human capital 
outcome. Let 1I and 1I denote the human capital and the non-human capital wages for the 
worker with the job assignment t, where t ∈ <8, e8>. Because the human capital workers 
contribute higher productivities to their current employers, we should expect to see that each 
firm has a stronger incentive to minimize the inefficiencies from turnover of the workers with the 
 119 
 
human capital. That is, the wage spread for the workers with the human capital is smaller than 
that for the workers without the human capital, i.e., 13 −143 < 13 −143 . 
Now let us characterize the efficient effort level and turnover rate. Following the notation in 
the original extension of the tournament model, let °. ) and . ) denote the cumulative 
distribution function and the density function of the random variable :
 − 	
 and let 	
) 
denote the disutility of effort. In addition, 	
) satisfies the conditions ! ≥ 0,	" > 0, 
!0) = 0, and 0) = 0.  
To begin, note that the level of efficient effort remains the same as in the original model. 
Specifically, it equates the marginal cost of effort to the marginal revenue, i.e., !'X) = 1. 
However, the efficient turnover rate now varies with the human capital outcome. Let 8X denote 
the efficient turnover rate of the worker with the human capital outcome  ∈ <, 0>. Then we 
have 8X = 8"	 ≥ 0) while 8X = 8"	 ≥ ). That is, it is efficient for a non-human capital 
worker to leave if her match with the current employer is worse than the expected match with a 
potential employer, while it is efficient for a human capital worker to leave when her match 
quality is more than the extra productivity she brings to the firm, which equals the amount of the 
firm specific human capital . 
We now solve for the first period wages and turnover rates explicitly. Let us first write down 
the expected utility function of worker . Below let I ≡ DÝ
GDH
( +
'
 denote the probability of 
staying for the human capital and non-human capital workers under each job assignment t and 
human capital outcome , t ∈ <8, e8> and  ∈ <, 0>. 
67	 = 12 + °9	' − :';Kc?313 + 91 − 3;15@ + 1 − c)[313 + 1 − 3)15]O +
?1 − °9	' − :';@Kc?43 143 + 91 − 43 ;15@ + 1 − c)[43 143 + 1 − 43 )15]O −
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	') − °9	' − :'; Þc ßDF
GDHG(
 à + 1 − c) |
DFáGDHG(
 }â + [1 −
°9	' − :';][cDEF
 GDHG(
 ) + 1 − c) |
DEFá GDHG(
 }]                                                             (A3.1) 
Plugging in 15 =  and simplifying (A3.1) we have the following expression for the 
expected utility function. 
67	 =
12 + °9	' − :';c DF
G¼)
( + °9	' − :';1 − c)
9DFáG¼;
( + ?1 − °9	' − :';@c
9DEF G¼;

( +
?1 − °9	' − :';@1 − c) 9DEF
á G¼;
( +  +
(
 − 	') 97                                                         (A3.2) 
Define BI ≡ 1I − , t ∈ <8, e8> and  ∈ <, 0>. Also, taking the first order condition of 
(A3.2) with respect to 	' yields (A3.3). 
9	' − :';<δ |B3 − B43 } + 1 − δ) |B3 − B43 }> = 2#!	')                                    (A3.3) 
Now we consider the firms’ expected profit function, where the expected productivities in 
period 2 vary with the human capital outcome. Building on the zero profit condition in (A1.1), 
the zero profit condition can now be written as the following. 
6J = 6	') + 69:'; −12 −12 + c<K°9	' − :';3	 + ?1 − °9	' − :';@43	 O69		; +
K?1 − °9	' − :';@3: + °9	' − :';43:O69:; −
K°9	' − :';3	 + ?1 − °9	' − :';@3:>	13 −
K?1 − °9	' − :';@43	 + °9	' − :';43:O143 O + 1 − c)<K°9	' − :';3,	 + ?1 − °9	' −
                                                 
97
 In the specification for utility maximization below I ignore the term  + ( because it is a constant. 
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:';@43,	O69	,	; + K?1 − °9	' − :';@3,: + °9	' − :';43,:O69:,; − K°9	' − :';3,	 +
?1 − °9	' − :';@3,:>	13 − K?1 − °9	' − :';@43,	 + °9	' − :';43,:O143 O = 0            (A3.4) 
Using the first order approach, we can set up the utility maximization problem in the 
following way. 
max67	                                                                                                                                   (A3.2) 
<12,13,143 ,13, 143 , 	'>  
f. 6Π = 0                                                                                                                               (A3.4) 
¹º»i
¹-ik
= 0, given 12, 13 ,143 ,13,143 , and :'                                                                    (A3.3) 
Because of the symmetry between 	' and :', the utility function in (A3.2) can be rewritten as 
(A3.5). 
67	 = 12 + ä( B3
 + B43 ) + 'Gä( B3
 + B43 ) − 	')                                                 (A3.5) 
The first order condition in (A3.3) can be expressed as (A3.6). 
0)[δ |B3 − B43 } + 1 − δ) |B3 − B43 }] = 2#!	')                                               (A3.6) 
Lastly, because of the symmetry of the effort choices of the two workers in the same 
tournament, each firm’s zero profit condition in (A3.4) can be rewritten as (A3.7). 
6J = 2 + 2' − 21[ − 1 − δ)[3B3 + 43 B43 ] − δ?3B3 − k) + 43 B43 − k)@ = 0  
(A3.7) 
We now solve the maximization problem following the same idea in the original extension of 
the tournament model. To begin, we solve for the equilibrium first period wage 12∗∗ using the 
zero profit condition in (A3.7). Specifically, 
12∗∗ =  + ' − ' <1 − δ)[3B3 + 43 B43 ] + δ?3B3 − k) + 43 B43 − k)@>.              (A3.8) 
 122 
 
Next, let '∗∗ ≡ æB3, B43 , B3 , B43 ) denote the equilibrium first period effort that satisfies the 
first order condition in (A3.6). Also, define À as À ≡ ′G'. We know from the assumptions on 
the disutility of effort that À! > 0. Thus the equilibrium solution to ' satisfies (A3.9). 
'∗∗ ≡ æB3, B43 , B3 , B43 ) = D< '(0)[δ |B3
 − B43 } + 1 − δ) |B3 − B43 }]>           (A3.9) 
Define æI ≡ ¹ç¹ÁÝ, where t ∈ <8, e8> and  ∈ <, >, and define À
∗
 as 
À∗ ≡ D′< '(0)[δ |B3
 − B43 } + 1 − δ) |B3 − B43 }]>. Taking the derivatives of 
æB3, B43 , B3 , B43 ) with respect to  BI using condition (A3.9) we have (A3.10). 
æ3 = '(À∗0)cB3
æ43 = '(À∗0)cB43 −1)
æ3 = '(À∗0)1 − c)B3
æ43 = '(À∗0)1 − c)B43 −1)
	                                                                                        (A3.10) 
Define ` ≡ 1 − (. Because of the assumption that 0 <  < #, we know ` ∈ 0,1). Now 
plugging (A3.8) and (A3.9) into (A3.5) and ignoring the constant terms, the maximization 
problem can be rewritten as (A3.11). 
¡#B æ9B3, B43 , B3 , B43 ; − 'Gä B3 + B43 ) −
ä
 	`B3 + B43 ) − CæB3, B43 , B3, B43 )	)   
<B3, B43 , B3 , B43 >                                                                                                                  (A3.11) 
Taking the first order conditions of (A3.11) with respect to the wages yields the following 
equations. 
B3):	æ3[1 − !'∗∗)] = ' 1 − c)
B43 ):	æ43 [1 − !'∗∗)] = ' 1 − c)
9B3;:	æ3[1 − !'∗∗)] = ä 	`
9B43 ;:	æ43 [1 − !'∗∗)] = ä 	`
			                                                                                (A3.12) 
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Because 0 < c < 1 and 0 < ` < 1, we know æI ≠ 0, where t ∈ <8, e8> and  ∈ <, 0>. In 
addition, we have æ3 = æ43 , where  ∈ <, 0>. Therefore, (A3.10) tells us that B3 = −B43 , 
where  ∈ <, 0>. According to the definitions of BI , we have 
13 +143 = 215 = 2,  ∈ <, 0>.                                                                                   (A3.13) 
Restraining our attention to the interior solutions where '∗∗ > 0, it must be the case that 
13 > 143 ,  ∈ <, 0>. Therefore, (A3.13) indicates (A3.14). 
13 >  > 143 ,  ∈ <, 0>                                                                                                   (A3.14) 
That is, æI > 0,	where t ∈ <8, e8> and  ∈ <, 0>. This condition further tells us that 
!'∗∗) < 1, i.e., '∗∗ < 'X.  
In addition, from (A3.11) we have 
 
çÝ
çÝá
= äÁÝ'Gä)ÁÝá, where t ∈ <8, e8>.                                                                                         (A3.15) 
Because (A3.14) tells us çÝ

çÝá
= ä'Gä `, (A3.15) now yields the following relationship. 
|1I
 − | = `|1I
 − |, where t ∈ <8, e8>                                                                         (A3.16) 
Therefore, consistent with my previous conjecture, the wage spread under the human capital 
case is tighter than that under the non-human capital case. The intuition behind this conclusion is 
that the inefficiencies from turnover for the human capital workers are more costly to firms since 
these workers are more productive at their current firms, and hence each firm is willing to further 
sacrifice the ability to elicit effort by offering a tighter wage spread.98  
Furthermore, due to the conditions in (A3.16), we know (A3.17) holds. 
143
 > 143

 and 13 < 13                                                                                                  (A3.17) 
                                                 
98
 Note that the relationship between 143  and 13 is ambiguous. It depends on the relationship between 
the general human capital  and the size of the wage spread 13 −143 , where  ∈ <, 0>. 
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That is, workers who are not promoted earn a higher wage if they accumulate human capital 
while those who are promoted earn a higher wage if they do not accumulate human capital. As a 
result, the problems of insufficient turnover of the promoted workers and excessive turnover of 
the non-promoted workers are alleviated compared to the turnover scenarios under the non-
human capital case. 
 (A3.14) and (A3.16) allow us to compare the equilibrium turnover rates to the associated 
efficient levels of turnover. Recall that 8X denotes the efficient turnover rate of a worker with the 
human capital outcome . Next, let 8I denote the equilibrium turnover rate of a worker with the 
job assignment t and the human capital outcome . Because 8I ≡ 8"	 ≥ 1I − ) and that 
8X = 8"	 ≥ 0), the wage inequalities in (A3.14) indicate that 83 < 8X < 843 . That is, as in the 
original extension of the tournament model, there is insufficient turnover among promoted 
workers and excessive turnover among non-promoted workers if those workers do not 
accumulate the firm specific human capital. However, because 8X = 8"	 ≥ ), it is unclear 
how the turnover rates for the human capital workers compare with the efficient turnover rate. 
Suppose the human capital is sufficiently small. Then, as is true in the non-human capital case, 
83 < 8X < 843 . In addition, since |1I − | = `|1I − |, where t ∈ <8, e8>, we have 
83
 > 83

 and 843 < 843 , i.e., given the job assignment, workers with the human capital have a 
higher turnover rate if they are not promoted and a lower turnover rate if they are. Finally, 
according to (A3.17), given the job assignment, the human capital wage is different from the 
non-human capital wage. Because the market wage is independent of the job assignment, given 
the job assignment, the wage is negatively related to turnover (QED). 
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APPENDIX 4. FULL SAMPLE AND SUBSAMPLE SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Table 13. Logit Estimates for the Impact of Promotion on Labor Turnover, Full Sample 
Dependent variable Turnover(t) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Promotion(t-1) 0.025 0.098 0.071 0.111 
(0.088) (0.091) (0.088) (0.091) 
Log-salary(t) --- -0.676*** --- -0.409** 
--- (0.184) --- (0.189) 
Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1) --- --- -3.523*** -3.172*** 
--- --- (0.636) (0.651) 
Age(t)*100 -6.719 -5.068 -10.358** -8.966* 
(4.517) (4.576) (4.560) (4.627) 
Age(t)2*10000 3.804 1.841 7.121 5.566 
(5.422) (5.491) (5.457) (5.531) 
Education(t)*100 42.142*** 42.992*** 40.662*** 41.292*** 
(11.824) (11.935) (11.896) (11.955) 
Education(t)2*10000 -100.095*** -99.884*** -95.221*** -95.489*** 
(35.108) (35.342) (35.264) (35.387) 
Tenure at company(t-1)*100 -19.298*** -22.496*** -19.498*** -21.430*** 
(4.855) (4.858) (4.804) (4.827) 
Tenure at company(t-1)2*10000 70.242*** 84.613*** 79.536*** 87.386*** 
(26.809) (26.767) (26.623) (26.625) 
Tenure at level(t-1)*100 16.631** 19.386** 13.602* 15.547** 
(7.620) (7.586) (7.482) (7.480) 
Tenure at level(t-1)2*10000 -81.526 -91.667 -65.044 -72.444 
(61.080) (60.680) (59.808) (59.582) 
Rating(t-1) 0.313*** 0.261*** 0.286*** 0.257*** 
  (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.054) 
Average turnover rate 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 
  (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) 
Level(t-1) indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 12751 12751 12751 12751 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.030 0.032 0.035 0.036 
Log likelihood -3477.833 -3470.437 -3458.288 -3455.771 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level; logit coefficients are calculated; job levels are pre-promotion job 
levels. 
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Table 14. Estimates for the Impact of Promotion on Labor Turnover, with Promotion-level and Salary-level Interactions, Full Sample 
Dependent variable Turnover(t) 
 
OLS Logit Marginal Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Promotion(t-1)*level(t-1)=1 0.019* 0.027** 0.020** 0.027** 0.018* 0.026** 0.020** 0.026** 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Promotion(t-1)*level(t-1)=2 0.006 0.012 0.008 0.013 0.006 0.012 0.007 0.012 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Promotion(t-1)*level(t-1)=3 -0.031** -0.023* -0.026** -0.022 -0.034** -0.026 -0.029* -0.026 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Promotion(t-1)*level(t-1)=4 -0.077* -0.061* -0.052* -0.060* -0.087 -0.086 -0.079 -0.086 
 
(0.044) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) 
Promotion(t-1)*level(t-1)=5 -0.069* -0.138** -0.116*** -0.130** --- --- --- --- 
 
(0.041) (0.061) (0.037) (0.060) --- --- --- --- 
Log-salary(t)*level(t-1)=1 --- -0.074*** --- -0.062** --- -0.073*** --- -0.061** 
 
--- (0.024) --- (0.025) --- (0.025) --- (0.026) 
Log-salary(t)*level(t-1)=2 --- -0.057** --- -0.045* --- -0.054** --- -0.042 
 
--- (0.026) --- (0.026) --- (0.027) --- (0.027) 
Log-salary(t)*level(t-1)=3 --- -0.059* --- -0.027 --- -0.055* --- -0.025 
 
--- (0.033) --- (0.034) --- (0.030) --- (0.031) 
Log-salary(t)*level(t-1)=4 --- -0.013 --- 0.018 --- -0.011 --- 0.017 
 
--- (0.029) --- (0.031) --- (0.025) --- (0.025) 
Log-salary(t)*level(t-1)=5 --- 0.000 --- 0.028 --- -0.039 --- 0.018 
 
--- (0.087) --- (0.083) --- (0.060) --- (0.060) 
Log-salary(t)*level(t-1)=6 --- -0.191 --- -0.162 --- -0.045 --- -0.267*** 
 
--- (0.200) --- (0.184) --- (0.055) --- (0.059) 
[Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1)] *level(t-1)=1 --- --- -0.198** -0.144* --- --- --- -0.139 
 
--- --- (0.082) (0.087) --- --- --- (0.092) 
[Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1)] *level(t-1)=2 --- --- -0.176** -0.145 --- --- --- -0.145 
 
--- --- (0.089) (0.091) --- --- --- (0.094) 
[Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1)] *level(t-1)=3 --- --- -0.312*** -0.291*** --- --- --- -0.313*** 
 
--- --- (0.080) (0.082) --- --- --- (0.089) 
[Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1)] *level(t-1)=4 --- --- -0.330*** -0.348*** --- --- --- -0.328*** 
 
--- --- (0.097) (0.099) --- --- --- (0.099) 
[Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1)] *level(t-1)=5 --- --- -0.493 -0.524* --- --- --- -0.570 
 
--- --- (0.306) (0.297) --- --- --- (0.365) 
[Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1)] *level(t-1)=6 --- --- -0.550 -0.250 --- --- --- -59.542*** 
  --- --- (0.556) (0.292) --- --- --- (3.253) 
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Table 14 (Continued) 
N 12751 12751 12751 12751 12749 12749 12749 12749 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; all 
regressions also control for age, education, tenure and the associated square terms, level indicators, and performance ratings; average marginal effects 
are calculated; adjusted R-square is calculated for the OLS estimates while pseudo R-square is calculated for the logit marginal effects; average 
turnover rate is 0.081; interaction terms of higher job levels are dropped due to missing data. 
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Table 15. Logit Estimates for the Impact of Promotion on Labor Turnover, Level Subsamples 
Dependent variable Turnover(t) 
High-level Subsample Low-level Subsample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Promotion(t-1) -0.421** -0.387* -0.382* -0.391* 0.105 0.214* 0.154 0.233** 
(0.204) (0.208) (0.205) (0.209) (0.105) (0.109) (0.105) (0.110) 
Log-salary(t) --- -0.270 --- 0.076 --- -1.021*** --- -0.825*** 
--- (0.270) --- (0.273) --- (0.264) --- (0.274) 
Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1) --- --- -4.088*** -4.155*** --- --- -3.056*** -2.407** 
--- --- (0.905) (0.914) --- --- (0.929) (0.955) 
Age(t)*100 13.308* 13.777* 10.226 10.025 -14.497** -11.998** -18.711*** -15.773** 
(7.914) (7.967) (8.016) (8.044) (6.010) (6.065) (6.085) (6.190) 
Age(t)2*10000 -18.933** -19.518** -16.612* -16.388* 12.842* 10.022 17.242** 13.997* 
(9.228) (9.291) (9.348) (9.382) (7.433) (7.479) (7.480) (7.581) 
Education(t)*100 35.676** 36.655** 34.199* 33.872* 32.366* 30.308* 30.992* 29.389* 
(17.404) (17.516) (17.566) (17.583) (16.928) (17.032) (16.969) (17.026) 
Education(t)2*10000 -92.864* -94.668* -87.638* -86.965* -58.463 -47.766 -54.289 -45.822 
(50.119) (50.323) (50.439) (50.437) (51.631) (51.750) (51.697) (51.734) 
Tenure at company(t-1)*100 -17.756*** -18.983*** -17.442*** -17.082*** -14.477 -17.689* -16.214 -18.373* 
(6.029) (6.128) (6.011) (6.128) (10.160) (10.057) (9.997) (9.946) 
Tenure at company(t-1)2*10000 53.891 59.234* 61.946* 60.532* 24.096 36.033 39.400 45.525 
(33.563) (33.899) (33.485) (33.828) (65.632) (65.349) (64.722) (64.741) 
Tenure at level(t-1)*100 30.107*** 31.578*** 26.902*** 26.446*** 4.203 5.736 2.191 3.793 
(9.593) (9.669) (9.355) (9.402) (12.288) (12.198) (12.102) (12.075) 
Tenure at level(t-1)2*10000 -215.109*** -220.362*** -194.618** -192.948** 73.293 66.600 82.706 75.761 
(79.064) (79.256) (76.728) (76.535) (91.370) (91.003) (89.923) (89.950) 
Rating(t-1) 0.377*** 0.354*** 0.336*** 0.342*** 0.259*** 0.190** 0.245*** 0.192*** 
  (0.074) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) 
Average turnover rate 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 
  (0.279) (0.279) (0.279) (0.279) (0.268) (0.268) (0.268) (0.268) 
Level(t-1) indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5644 5644 5644 5644 7107 7107 7107 7107 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.030 0.031 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.043 0.043 0.046 
Log likelihood -1590.115 -1589.520 -1577.459 -1577.415 -1866.556 -1858.661 -1859.190 -1854.394 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; logit coefficients are calculated, * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** 
significant at 1% level; the low-level subsample contains promotions from job levels 1 and 2 while the high-level subsample contains promotions 
from job levels 3 through 7. 
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Table 16. Logit Marginal Effects for Promotion, Salary, and Labor Turnover, Point Estimates, Level Subsamples 
Dependent variable Turnover(t) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  High-level Low-level High-level Low-level High-level Low-level High-level Low-level 
25th percentile 
Promotion(t-1) -0.029** 0.005 -0.027* 0.010* -0.028* 0.007 -0.029* 0.011** 
(0.015) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) 
Log-salary(t) --- --- -0.019 -0.049*** --- --- 0.006 -0.041*** 
--- --- (0.019) (0.014) --- --- (0.020) (0.014) 
Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1) --- --- --- --- -0.299*** -0.146*** -0.304*** -0.119** 
  --- --- --- --- (0.077) (0.049) (0.078) (0.050) 
50th percentile 
Promotion(t-1) -0.045** 0.006 -0.041* 0.013* -0.040* 0.009 -0.041* 0.014** 
(0.022) (0.006) (0.022) (0.007) (0.021) (0.006) (0.022) (0.007) 
Log-salary(t) --- --- -0.029 -0.063*** --- --- 0.008 -0.050*** 
--- --- (0.029) (0.017) --- --- (0.029) (0.017) 
Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1) --- --- --- --- -0.427*** -0.182*** -0.434*** -0.145** 
  --- --- --- --- (0.095) (0.056) (0.097) (0.058) 
75th percentile 
Promotion(t-1) -0.039** 0.005 -0.036* 0.010* -0.033* 0.007 -0.034* 0.011** 
(0.019) (0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.018) (0.005) (0.018) (0.005) 
Log-salary(t) --- --- -0.025 -0.049*** --- --- 0.007 -0.037*** 
--- --- (0.025) (0.015) --- --- (0.023) (0.014) 
Log-salary(t)-Log-salary(t-1) --- --- --- --- -0.352*** -0.136*** -0.357*** -0.109** 
  --- --- --- --- (0.079) (0.042) (0.080) (0.043) 
Average turnover rate 0.085 0.078 0.085 0.078 0.085 0.078 0.085 0.078 
  (0.279) (0.268) (0.279) (0.268) (0.279) (0.268) (0.279) (0.268) 
N 5644 7107 5644 7107 5644 7107 5644 7107 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; the 
low-level subsample contains promotions from job levels 1 and 2 while the high-level subsample contains promotions from job levels 3 
through 7; average marginal effects are calculated; all regressions also control for age, education, tenure and the associated square terms, as 
well as level indicators, and performance ratings; all the covariates except for the level indicators are evaluated at the quantiles of the full 
sample distributions. 
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